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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the State of Utah recognizes the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
NOTE: These respondents agree with the briefs filed by 
respondents, Ainsworth and Staker. No attempt will be made to 
repeat the points made in those briefs. Ratherf this brief will 
focus only on points not covered by other respondents, including the 
wisdom of the decision in Hal 1 aday v^> Cl_uf f, 685 P. 2d 500, which 
drastically altersf to the point of oblivion, the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. 
This case involves rural farmland which has had fences and 
irrigation ditches marking property lines for the last 75 to 100 
years. The fence lines do not now correspond with surveys performed 
in the last fifteen years. According to present surveys, the 
property lines should be approximately eighty feet to the south. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The doctrine set out in past Utah Supreme Court cases, and 
perpetuated in Halladay v. Cluff, for resolving boundary line 
disputes, confuses the doctrines of "boundary by acquiescence" with 
the doctrine of "boundary by agreement." Adopting the criteria of 
"boundary by agreement" and making it an element of "boundary by 
1 
acquiescence" deals the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence a 
fatal blow in the State of Utah. 
It is incumbent upon this Court to differentiate between 
the doctrine of "boundary by agreement" and "boundary by 
acquiescence" and put an end to the confusion which has existed in 
this State in somef but not allf cases since Tripp v. Bag!ey, 74 
Utah 57f 276 P. 912 (1928). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE SOURCE OP THE PROBLEM 
The year 1984 was a watershed year in this State for Utah 
Supreme Court cases dealing with boundary dispute resolution. In 
May, Hal l_aday y\L_Cluf f, 685 P. 2d 500 , was decided finally adding, 
in no uncertain terms, the element of "objective uncertainty or 
dispute" to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Four months 
later, in Stratford^y. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, and Pajj^ ons__v^ _ 
Anderson, 690 P.2d 535, the Utah Supreme Court decided two more 
cases using "objective uncertainty or dispute" as the criteria for 
boundary by acquiescence disputes. 
Appellant, who had known of the boundary problem on his 
property since 1972 when he purchased the property and had a survey 
performed, saw his chance to claim additional property and forced 
this matter into litigation. Of the six parties involved herein, 
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6. Appellant's appeal was for the entire decision of the 
District Court and an appellant is stuck with the facts involving 
all property owners, not just the property line between its prop-
erty and the Ainsworths, as it asserts in its' brief. 
7. A drawing of the subject properties and the problem 
posed is setforth below: 
CfUOO ^ O O T W 
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A. Boundary by Agreement 
S 78. By Parol Agreement. 
It is now a well-settled principle of law that an 
unascertained or disputed boundary line dividing 
the lands of adjoining owners may be permanently 
and irrevocably established by a parol agreement of 
the adjoining owners. Such an agreement does not 
originate or create a line or pass title to real 
estate; it simply serves to fix the true location 
between contiguous lands of a boundary line about 
which there is dispute; hence the agreement is not 
in contravention of the statute of frauds. It is, 
however, essential to the validity and binding 
effect of such agreement that the boundary line 
fixed by the agreement be definite, certain, and 
clearly marked, and that it be made by the 
adjoining landowners with reference to an uncertain 
or disputed boundary line between their lands. * * * 
§ 79.—Necessity for dispute or uncertainty 
concerning location of line. 
One of the requisites necessary to the validity of 
a parol agreement establishing a boundary line 
between adjoining owners is that the location of the 
true line sought to be thus established be doubtful, 
uncertain, or in dispute. If the line is not 
disputed, indefinite, or uncertain, a parol agreement 
changing its location is within the statute of 
frauds. 
B. Boundary by Acquiescence 
§ 85. Acquiescence, generally. 
It is well established that if adjoining landowners 
occupy their respective premises up to a certain line 
which they mutually recognize and acquiesce in for a 
long period of time—usually the time prescribed by 
the statute of limitations—they are precluded from 
claiming that the boundary line thus recognized and 
acquiesced in is not the true one. In other words, 
such recognition of, and acquiescence in, a line as 
the true boundary line, if continued for a sufficient 
length of time, will afford a conclusive presumption 
that the line thus acquiesced in is the true boundary 
line. This is a rule of repose for the purpose of 
quieting titles and discouraging confusing and 
vexatious litigation. According to many decisions, 
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recognition of, and acquiescence in, a line as the 
true boundary line in order to establish that line 
as the true line must continue for the period f 
time necessary to establish title under the 
statutes of limitation, or, at least, for L 
period of acquiescence fixed by a special statute 
as sufficient to establish a boundary line, mv**-
rule, however, is based upon policy, and 
circumstances may exist which •* " 1 ~ control the 
ordinary requirement \. ^ a line be recognized a.iu 
acquiesced in for a pe: L O G of time equal to that of 
the statute of limitations. Thu- •., ^presentati-" 
as to the boundary line or conveyance made with tue 
intent to describe a boundary marked and located on 
the ground, followed by acquiescence therein for 
less than the statutory period, prevent the parties 
from,, claiming a different ] ine thereafter, 
With regard to the establishment of a commo? 
boundary line, acquiescence means a consent to the 
conditions and involves knowledge of them. It 
involves more than a mere establishment of a line 
by one party and the taking of possession by him. 
There must be knowledge on the part of the other 
party of the establishment of the line and the 
taking of possession by the adjoining owner, and 
there must be assent thereto, and this may be shown 
by the conduct of the second party, by his words f 
r*r &\?&r>. hv hie QJ ] ence. 
Acquiescence may,- of" course, be'"shown .; ... i. „,. 
possession of the o w i lers up to the line, 01 it -^v 
consist of acts or declarations recognizing th* 
line over the necessary period. But the line 
acquiesced in must be known, definite, and certain 
or known and capable of ascertainment --H~ 
parties agree that the line to which 
not the true line and agree subseque:^^. L-
ascertain the true boundary, the quality oi: 
acquiescence is destroyed and no boundary 3 f. i xed 
by continued occupation, 
The cases approving the doctrine of acquiescence 
generally do not differentiate between cases where 
the boundary was uncertain or in doubt at \ne t .•e 
it was first acquiesced in and cases where it was 
known and certain. However, in the second case r 
only adverse possession can. avail the person 
c 1 a i m i n g u n d e r t h e bo 11 n d a i: y s o recognized. 
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As noted in the last paragraph quoted above, the section 
on Acquiescence refers to "cases" in which boundaries are 
"uncertain or in doubt at the time it was first acquiesced in." 
There is only one citation given for that whole paragraph and that 
citation is Tripp y. BagjL e g* 7 4 Utah 57, 276 P 912, which started 
the confusion in Otah in the first place. 
In short, boundary by agreement involves a situation in 
which the location of the true boundary between two adjoining 
tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, and the owners, 
by parol agreement, establish the boundary line, and thereby 
irrevocable bind themselves and their grantees. See Brcwn^j^ 
Milliner, 323 P.2d 202, 206 (Utah 1951); see also Rydalch v. 
Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 107 P.25; Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 
912. 
Boundary by acquiescence involves a situation in which: 
(1) adjoining landowners, (2) have occupied respective premises up 
to an open boundary line visibly marked by monuments, fences or 
buildings, (3) for a long period of time, and (4) have mutually 
recognized it as a dividing line between them. See B^own^v^ 
Milliner, supra, and Holmes v. Jud^e, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009. 
IV 
THE ABSENCE OP AN ADVERSE POSSESSION REMEDY 
The problem with adding the standard of "objective uncert-
ainty and/or dispute" to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
8 
is further compounded in this State by the fact that Utah does not 
havef either by statute or common law, a provision for parties to 
make a claim to property by reason of long-term adverse possession. 
Our statute is short-term (seven years) and requires the payment of 
property taxes—which rarely occurs. (See UCA § 78-12-12.) 
Adverse possession has not been claimed herein by either 
appellant or respondents because none can claim the possession of 
the property and the payment of property taxes. 
What is lacking in the legal framework in the State of 
Utah in this particular situation, created by the doctrine 
enunciated in Hal1a<3ayy is: (1) the ability to claim adverse 
possession to fence lines by a party in possession even though 
possession has been open and notorious for a long period of time, 
and/or (2) the ability to claim acquiescence in a property linef 
without having to also show there was once a dispute as to the line. 
V 
THE PROBLEM OP "TIME" PROPOSED BY THE 
"OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY OR DISPUTE" STANDARD 
A. Impossibility of Proof. 
Using the property occupied by respondents Holmes/Jensen 
and Shane typifies the problem of impossibility. This property was 
purchased by Mr. Hyrum Lancaster in 1889. His grandsonf Melvin A. 
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Lancaster, stated in his affidavit that the fence lines between the 
Holmes/Jensen/Shane property and the Staker property were erected 
by his grandfather and are presently located in the same place they 
were that he remembers as a child in the 1920s. (R. 75.) The 
fence was erected in the 1890s (as was the house presently occupied 
by Shane). (R. 120.) Determining whether there was any uncertainty 
or dispute as to these fence lines when they were erected in 1890s 
would require testimony of Hyrum Lancaster. Were he alive today, 
he would be 135 years old (b. October 8f 1852f d. August 5, 1941). 
Halladay requires the party attempting to establish boundary by 
acquiescence to have the burden of proving there was uncertainty or 
dispute as to the boundary line and that it was resolved in favor 
of the fence. (At 506-507.) To do so in the potential 
Holmes/Jensen/Shane dispute with Staker (should the district 
court's decision be reversed) this case would require our raising 
the dead. 
By its very nature, any uncertainty or dispute with regard to a 
property line will be oral. Property owners then resolve the 
dispute, orally, at a predetermined point. For the law to require 
anyone to prove an oral agreement of anyone nearly 100 years ago is 
simply absurd. (The old English system of "feoffment with livery 
of seisin" for transfer of property actually has some superior 
aspects to the requirement imposed in Halladay. At least with 
livery of seisin the law required the presence of assembled 
neighbors who might be prospective jurors to witness the event in 
case of a future title dispute.) 
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B. Reasonably Available Survey Information. 
The Halladay case states: 
In general, when survery information is 
reasonably available (such as when reliable 
survey control points are accessible to the 
land and survey costs are not disproportionate 
to the value of the land) so that it is 
reasonable to expect the parties to locate 
their boundary on the ground by surveysf the 
courts should be less willing to apply the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. This 
reasonable availability of survey information 
obviously varies from place to place and from 
time to time. Howeverf it can be said in 
general that survey information is more 
available and its cost is less likely to be 
disproportionate in relation to the value of 
the land in the city and platted areas than in 
rural or wilderness areas. (At 504.) 
Again, the case raises the question of time. In the 
present case is the survey information to be reasonably available in 
1889 when Lancaster bought the property or 1985 when this suit was 
filed? Should the trial court take testimony as to the relative 
cost of surveys in the relation to the value of the land in 1889? 
According to the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Officer 
Mr. Lancaster paid $275 for forty acres of land in 1889. Is that 
information helpful? 
C. Rural or Urban. 
The Halladay case further imposes the requirement of 
determining whether the land is rural or urban for purposes of 
reasonably available survey information. Againf the question is a 
matter of time. Does this refer to when the fence was installed or 
11 
at some later date, presumably when the property changes hands? 
In 1889 the land was a rural and today all the property in 
question herein is still used for farming purposes. However, 
kitty-corner across the freeway to the southeast of the subject 
properties one of the largest shopping malls in the State of Utah 
was completed. Does the court want evidence as to whether that 
constitutes the property presently being rural or urban? 
D. Repose. 
The issue of boundary lines among the properties involved 
herein remained dormant from the time it was first discovered by 
appellant in 1972 until 1984—the year of Halladay et al. 
A basic reason for applying the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence is that it avoids litigation. This point has been well 
made by this court in the case of Baum_j L^_DeJEar 525 P.2d 725: 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives 
from the realization, ancient in our law, that 
peace and good order of society is best served by 
leaving at rest possible disputes over long 
established boundaries. Its essence is that where 
there has been any type of a recognizable physical 
boundary, which has been accepted as such for a 
long period of time, it should be presumed that any 
dispute or disagreement over the boundary has been 
reconciled in some manner. (At 726.) 
The second reason for the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence is that it minimizes conflict with the statute of 
frauds. See Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726, 728 Utah 1981); Tripp v. 
Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 71-72, 276 P. 912, 917-918 (1928). 
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Applying the rational of Halladay to the issue of repose 
in the present case is indicative of the fact that Halladay will do 
anything but let sleeping dogs lie. If the decision is expecting 
resposef it is asking homeowner (Shane) who now has a property line 
running through the middle of his house to sit quietly by and 
accept the fatef and the Yocum's to move out of their house 
entirely. It is also asking respondents Holmes and Jensen to give 
up one and one-half acres they have had for thirty years, and asks 
Holmes and Jensen, the Stakers, and the Ainsworths to construct new 
fences and irrigation ditches, and award appallent one and one-half 
acres he never thought he had and never used. 
VI 
THE DISSENTING VIEW 
While justice Howe's dissent in Halladay, §tjcatfojcd_ and 
Parsons is anything but passive, he sits as the lone wolf on the 
bench on this issue. 
Interestingly, in the four commentaries which have been 
written on the matter since these cases were decided, Justice Howe 
is anything but alone. All articles have been unanimous in their 
criticism that the cases "effectively sounds the death knell for 
boundary by acquiescence in this state." Stj^ atf^ r<3, supra, Howe, J. 
dissenting. 
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The first article to appear was a 1984 BYU Law Review 
article on page 711f entitled "Objective Uncertainty In Boundary By 
Acquiescence: Hal lad ay y_.L_Clu_ff. " This article essentially takes 
the position that the Halladay decision, rather than reducing 
litigation, will increase litigation, "thus defeating the 
traditional rational for boundary by acquiescence." (At 720.) 
A 1985 Utah Law Review note under "Recent Developments," 
commenting on Halladay, Stratfc^rd and Parsojis, states: 
These decisions effectively eliminate boundary by 
acquiescence as a viable doctrine for settling 
property disputes in Utah. As a result, 
longstanding boundaries may now be subject to 
challenge. (At 194.) 
* * * 
Since claimants in Utah cannot rely on the 
doctrine of adverse possession to settle boundary 
disputes, there is no effective way to quiet title 
to small portions of land representing the 
difference between a fence line and a deed 
description. (At 201.) 
This article also notes that "in contrast to the purpose of 
the court, litigation over boundaries may increase." (At 201.) 
In 11 Journal of Comtemporary Law 567, an article entitled 
"Hal1aday v. Cluff: 'Objective Uncertainty' In Deed!" the author 
states: 
...and the new requirement of "objective uncert-
ainty" as to the true location of the boundary line 
makes the doctrine inapplicable to a great majority, 
14 
if not all, of the cases involving disputed 
boundary locations. (At 567.) 
* * * 
In adopting the "objective uncertainty" 
requirement as an element of boundary by 
acquiescence, the Utah Supreme Court has further 
confused one of the most troubled doctrines of 
Utah law. The new objective uncertainty 
standard, as Justice Howe stated in the Stratford 
dissent, "effectively sounds the death knell of 
boundary by acquiescence in this state. (At 
581-582.) 
* * * 
In Halladay, the court turned conventional 
thinking regarding boundary by acquiescence 
upside down when it argued that the goals of 
preventing litigation and strife could best be 
served by adoption of the objective uncertainty 
requirement. Because the conventional approach 
outlined in Brown v. Milliner had served these 
goals so well, the court should return to that 
policy of clearly distinguishing boundary by 
agreement and boundary by acquiescence. 
(At 582.) 
This article is an excellent review on how we got into the 
quagmire we are in and analyzes the cases cited in Halladay. 
A 1986 BYU Law Review article by Professor James H. 
Backman, entitled "The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and 
the Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy," is a thoughtful 
discussion of the boundary problem in Utah as it has developed. 
With regard to boundary by acquiescence, Professor Backman states: 
15 
The Utah Supreme Court has eliminated an 
important doctrine in its arsenal for 
reaching equitable results in cases based on 
possession. It may not be fully satisfied 
with the announced principles and the 
apparently inconsistent results flowing from 
the old doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
But that liberality in applying this boundary 
doctrine was justified because it was the 
last route of escape for a party that had 
exercised significant possessory claims to 
property for substantial periods of time. 
(At 981.) 
Since all articles are so on point, and provide a thorough 
analysis of the history of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
and boundary by agreement in this state, they are attached hereto 
in the Appendix as Exhibits "D," "E,n "F" and "G." 
VII 
THE SOLUTION 
Asking this court to retreat from a recently announced 
legal principle is not made lightly. However, it is made sensibly. 
There is no question that this state has confused the 
doctrine of boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence in 
some cases prior to Halladay. But it has not confused them in all 
cases and just because it has confused the doctrines in some cases 
does not mean we should perpetuate the confusion. The Hal1aday, 
Stratford and Parsons cases not only confuses the doctrines, it 
completely obliterates them by merging the two together. 
16 
The case of ^rown^j/^j^Ulin^r
 f 232 P. 2d 202, is a Utah 
Supreme Court case which clearly differentiates between the 
doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and boundary by agreement and 
can be relied upon with clarity by this court as enunciating good, 
clear, cogent law. We should return to what was once clearly 
stated legal principles. The case of HoJjfnes_yj._^ 31 Utah 269, 
87 P. 1009, which is the first case to setforth the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence in this State also makes an excellent 
statement as what the law should be. There are other cases noted 
in Justice Howe's dissents and the attached law review articles. 
They should be followed. 
CONCLUSION 
Somehow, in 1928 in TrjLjpp y. §agl_ey, supra, this Court 
merged the doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and boundary by 
agreement. It has caused considerable confusion since, but worst 
of all it was perpetuated in 1984 in Halladay v. Cluff;, Stratford 
^-Jl^ISA1!' anc^ ParSQn.s_ _Y* _An.4erso_n* There is no reason it should 
continue. The doctrines are clear and distinct and are viable 
doctrines which can be followed for the peace and good order of 
society in maintaining stability in the ownership and occupation of 
lands. The reason for their existence in the Common Law has not 
vanished with time. 
17 
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Mack HALLADAY and Merle Halladay, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Madge CLUFF, Perry K. Bigelow and 
Norma G. Bigelow, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 18032. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1984. 
In a boundary dispute, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, 
J., sustained defendants' ownership of dis-
puted tract under doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence, and record owners of the 
tract appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, 
J., held that: (1) with regard to require-
ments that there must be uncertainty or 
dispute over location of boundary before 
claim based on boundary by acquiescence 
can be maintained, existence of dispute or 
uncertainty should be measured against ob-
jective test of reasonableness, so that dis-
pute is not proved by mere difference of 
opinion, and uncertainty is not proved by 
mere lack of actual knowledge of true loca-
tion of the boundary; (2) where boundary 
dispute involves property in city for which 
survey information is readily available, par-
ty claiming boundary by acquiescence has 
burden of proving objective uncertainty as 
one of the prima facie elements of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; and 
(3) defendants failed to establish applicabili-
ty of doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, 
where defendants had ready access to 
deeds and had actually examined surveys 
clearly establishing plaintiffs' record title 
to property in dispute. 
Reversed and remanded with di-
rections. 
Howe, J., filed an opinion concurring 
and dissenting. 
1. Boundaries <£»48(3) 
Period of acquiescence required fur rw 
liance on a "boundary by acquiescence1*] 
depends on the circumstances of the partitt 
ular case, but only under unusual circunw 
stances would period be less than 20 years* 
2. Boundaries <s=>48(2) 
For purposes of rule that doctrine of 
"boundary by acquiescence" cannot be ap-
plied where there is no dispute or uncer-
tainty concerning location of the boundary, 
"dispute" is not proved by a mere differ-
ence of opinion, and "uncertainty" is not 
proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge 
of the true location of the boundary; "dis-
pute or uncertainty" should be measured 
against an objective test of reasonableness, 
rather than against a subjective test under 
which a boundary line could be uncertain or 
in dispute even though capable of being 
readily ascertained; rejecting Ekberg v. 
Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 and 
Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523, 
175 P.2d 718. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Boundaries «=»48(2) 
Under doctrine of "boundary by acqui-
escence," property line shown on record 
title cannot be displaced by another bound-
ary unless it is shown that during the peri-
od of acquiescence there was some objec-
tively measurable circumstance in the 
record title or in the reasonably available 
survey information, or other technique by 
which record title information was located 
on the ground, that would have prevented a 
landowner, as a practical matter, from be-
ing reasonably certain about the true loca-
tion of the boundary; by the same token, a 
claimant cannot assert boundary by acqui-
escence if he or his predecessors in title 
had reason to know the true location of the 
boundary during the period of acquies-
cence. 
4. Boundaries «=»48(2) 
Examples of objectively measurable 
uncertainties in location of boundary, based 
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doctrine of boundary by acquies-
i^ would be appropriate if the doctrine's 
r requirements were met, are: inability 
ate monuments established in original 
internal inconsistencies in plat, no 
I or original plat or survey by which 
line could be located, disagree-
Dt among different surveyors on loca-
of boundary line, landmarks refer-
in deeds that have disappeared, un-
titles or disputes created by conflict-
terms in deeds, such as overlapping 
ption, or metes and bounds descrip-
jpns that do not close; boundary by acqui-
scence should also be available where 
iere are other inconsistencies that create 
reasonable doubt in the meaning of the 
ord title or in its application to the actu-
on-the-ground location of the property 
ntified in the record. 
% Boundaries e=>33 
I: Where boundary dispute involves prop-
erty in city for which survey information is 
readily available, party claiming boundary 
by acquiescence has burden of proving ob-
jective uncertainty about the location of the 
boundary as one of the prima facie ele-
ments of the doctrine of boundary by ac-
quiescence; rejecting Brown v. Milliner, 
120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202; Wright v. Clis-
sold, 521 P.2d 1224; Universal Invest-
mentCorp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 
484 P.2d 173; King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 
135, 378 P.2d 893; Mortzkus v. Carroll, 7 
Utah 2d 237, 322 P.2d 391. 
6. Boundaries <3=»48(2) 
Notwithstanding allocation to party 
claiming boundary by acquiescence of bur-
den of proof of objective uncertainty as one 
of the prima facie elements of the doctrine 
of boundary of acquiescence, record land-
owner may conclusively negate the exist-
ence of objective uncertainty by proving 
that the claimant or his predecessors in 
title had reason to know the location of the 
true boundary before the expiration of the 
period of acquiescence. 
7. Boundaries «=>48(2) 
Claimants failed to establish applicabil-
ity of doctrine of boundary by acquies-
cence, where claimants had ready access to 
deeds and had actually examined surveys 
clearly establishing adjoining landowners' 
record title to property in dispute. 
Brent D. Young, Provo, for plaintiffs and 
appellants. 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for Cluff. 
S. Rex Lewis, Provo, for Bigelow. 
OAKS, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a judgment rely-
ing on boundary by acquiescence to quiet 
title to a 52.5- by 118-foot parcel of real 
property in the city of Provo. The issues 
are whether a showing of uncertainty or 
dispute on the locationj)f a boundary line Js 
necessary to the application of boundary by 
acquiescence, and, if so, what is meant bjr 
"uncertainty" and who has the^burden^ of 
proving it — ~ ~ 
The property in issue is located in Provo 
City and is shown as parcel A-B-OD on 
the accompanying map. From 1930 to the 
present, there has been a feMejtlongJjnes 
E-A-B-K It extends approximately 52 
feet behind the rear property lines (OD) of 
lots 1 and 2. This extension apparently 
resulted from an assumption that the 231-
foot depth of these lots was measured from 
the edge of the street instead of from the 
points across 100 South Street shown on 
the legal descriptions. 
The fence was clearly visible when the 
Bigelows purchased lot 1 in 1947 and when 
Cluff acquired lot 2 iiu!948. The Halla-
days acquired lot 3, which contains most of 
the disputed parcel, in 1958. (They pur-
chased lot 5 in 1950 and lot 4 in 1961.) 
When the Bigelows and Cluff purchased 
lots 1 and 2, they assumed their properties 
extended to the back fence at line A-B. 
Acting accordingly, they cultivated gardens 
and built and maintained several chicken 
coops on their respective portions of parcel 
A-B-C-D. Bigelows^  had ajsurvey made in 
1956 that placed their rear boundary near 
Hne_ C-D, but they and Cluff apparently 
believed the survey to be erroneous. In 
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1975, Cluff obtained a plat that placed her 
rear boundary at line C-D. 
boundaries were at line C-D. Mr. Halla-_ 
day informed Mr Bigelow of Uus fact""on -
one occasion in the 1950s and told him not 
to use the disputed parcel on several occa-
sions in the 1970s. Halladays had no dis-
cussions with Cluff regarding the property 
line until shortly before this litigation com-
menced. Halladays made very little use of 
lot 3. 
In 1979, the Halladays commenced this 
suit to quiet title to parcel A-B-OD. The 
During the.period of their adjoining pi 
erty ownership, the Halladays maintai 
that Bigelows' and Cluffs true Tl 
Bigelows and Cluff counterclaimed, and the 
 district court sustained their ownership of 
this parcel under the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence. On appeal, the Halladays 
seek to overturn that decision on the basis 
that boundary by acquiescence cannot b€ 
appliecTwhere there wasrio* dispute or" un-
certainty concerning the location of the 
boundary. We agree and reverse with di-
rections to quiet title in the Halladays, the 
record owners. 
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UNCERTAINTY OR DISPUTE AS 
INGREDIENT IN BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE 
he doctrine of boundary by, acquies-
nce has been the jourcejof considerable 
sion andj^jitroversy among judges, 
wyers, and landowners in this state. 
Kng~vrFr6nJc; 14 Utah'2d 135, 139, 378 
]2A 893, 895 (1963); Note, Boundary by 
cquiescence, 3 Utah L.Rev. 504, 504 
.953). See generally Note, Boundaries 
fby Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah, 
•1975 Utah LRev. 221. One of the primary 
f§reas of confusion is the requirement of 
foe "presence or absence of dispute and/or 
[uncertainty as to boundary." King v. 
\Fronky 14 Utah 2d at 139, 378 P.2d at 895. 
f [1] Much of thecpnfusiojni^has^resulted 
I from the intermingling of rules governing 
•boundary by acquiescence and boundaryjbj 
-par^agr^m^nC*%nnot, 7 ^ . 1 T R 4th 53, 
["69 USWlKTtfoflTof these doctrines identify 
circumstances in which landowners can es-
tablish boundary lines without a written 
agreement Originall^,_the two were easily 
distinguishable because bouS3ary"by parol 
igrwment^jrequired_an^ express,_parol 
.agreement .with respect to a boundary but 
no period of acquiescence, while boundary 
by acquiescence jeguired a Jengthy period 
of acquiescence but no express parol agree-
ment Hummel v. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 
239-40, 265 P.2d 410, 411 (1953); Brovm v. 
Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 25, 232 P.2d 202, 
207 (1951); Note, 1975 Utah L.Rev., supra, 
at 224.1 
With time, the distinctions between 
boundary by agreement and boundary by 
acquiescence became blurred. The require-
ment of an Express parol agreement began 
to be articulated among the elements of 
boundary by acquiescence, although this 
Court said that "the law will imply an 
agreement fixing the boundary as located, 
if it can do so consistently with the facts 
1. The period of acquiescence required for 
boundary by acquiescence has not been quanti-
fied into an exact period of time; it depends on 
the circumstances of the particular case. This 
Court's most recent discussion identifies it as a 
"long period of time . . . generally related to the 
common law prescriptive period of 20 years; 
appearing — " Hummel v. Young, 1 
Utah 2d at 240, 265 P.2d at 411. Similarly, 
the requirement of a long period of acqui-
escence was applied to boundary by agree-
ment. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 
Utah, 530 P.2d 792, 794 (1975); Blanchard 
v. Smith, 123 Utah 119, 121, 255 P.2d 729, 
730 (1953). J^j^qu^qpinions, the^Court 
even referred to boundary by agreement 
and boundary by acquiescence as if_they 
had merged into one. See, e.g., Hobson v. 
Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d at 794 
(reference to "the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence or agreement"); Carter v. 
Lindner, 23 Utah 2d 204, 460 P.2d 830 
(1969) (reference to "boundary line by ac-
quiescence under an oral agreement;"); 
Note, 1975 Utah L.Rev., supra, at 222-23. 
The confusion stemming from the inter-
mmgling of boundary by agreement and 
boundary by acquiescence has carried over 
to the subject of uncertainty pr_ dispute 
over the_boundary. Originally, this was 
mentionedj^ a.rjBquirementonly ir^ccjiriec-
tion with boundary_by agreement Ry-
dalch v. Anderson, 37 Utah 99,lo9, 107 P. 
25, 29 (1910). In that context, uncertainty 
or dispute over the boundary would pre-
cede and provide the motivation for the 
oral agreement In 1928, th^JSourt began 
to refer to uncertainty or dispute ai~aT 
m a t t e r ^ n ^ c o n s i d e i ^ J n boundary Jby 
acquiescence, Tripp v. Bjxaley%7i Utah 
"57T66^72, 276 P. 912, 916-liT (1928). 
Thereafter, the opinions of this Court fre-
quently referred to a showing of uncertain-
ty or dispute as an essential ingredient in 
the application of the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence. Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 
639 P.2d 726, 728-29 (1981); Leon v. Dan-
sie, Utah, 639 P.2d 730, 731 (1981); Wright 
v. Clissold, Utah, 521 P.2d 1224, 1226 
(1974); Universal Investment Corp. v. 
Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 37-38, 484 P.2d 
173, 174-75 (1971); Glenn v. Whitney, 116 
and only under unusual circumstances would a 
lesser period be deemed sufficient." Hobson v. 
Panguitch Lake Corp., Utah, 530 P.2d 792, 795 
(1975) (10 years held insufficient). Accord King 
v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 141-42, 378 P.2d 893, 
897 (1963). 
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Utah 267, 272-73, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949); 
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 
Utah 208, 219, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (1943); 
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 93, 34 
P.2d 697, 698-99 (1934). Although there 
are admittedly some other opinions 
throughout this period that make no men-
tion of a showing of uncertainty or dis-
pute,2 we have concluded from the more 
recent cases and from the clear weight of 
authority that the relevance of this ingredi-
ent is settled in our law. See generally 
Annot, 69 A.L.R. 1430,1501-04 (1930), sup-
plemented in 113 A.L.R. 421, 436 (1938); 12 
AmJur.2d Boundaries §§ 78-79, 83, 88 
(1964). 
The difficult issues in respect to uncer-
tainty or dispute as an ingredient in bound-
ary by acquiescence concern the meaning 
of these terms and who has the burden of 
proof. As demonstrated hereafter, our 
opinions have not given consistent answers 
to these questions. The contest is typically 
between interests that are both worthy— 
the desire to confirm boundaries that have 
apparently been recognized on the ground 
over a long period of time and the desire to 
enhance reliance on the property dimen-
sions shown in the county records. The 
law clearly gives precedence-to .thejrscori 
title, with boundaryJ>y acquiescence being 
an exception, but the conditions of that 
exception have not been settled with clarity 
or adhered to with consistency, in part be-
cause of the bewildering variety of factual 
circumstances in which the question arises. 
In general, when survey information is 
reasonably available (such as when reliable 
survey control points are accessible to the 
land and survey costs are not dispropor-
tionate to the value of the land) so that it is 
reasonable to expect the parties to locate 
their boundary on the ground by surveys, 
the courts should be less willing to apply 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
2. Eg., Goodman v. Wilkinson, Utah, 629 P.2d 
447 (1981); Monroe v. Harper, Utah, 619 P.2d 
323 (1980); Hales v. Frakes, Utah, 600 P.2d 556 
(1979). See also Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah at 
25, 232 P.2d at 207 (uncertainty or dispute char-
acterized as the "fiction" on which boundary by 
acquiescence is grounded). 
This reasonable availability of survey in 
mation obviously varies from place to \ 
and from time to time. However, it < 
said in general that survey informati 
more available and itsjyst is less likel; 
beHIsproportionate in rdationjp thej 
of the land in city and .platted, areas I 
rural or wilderness_areas^ It can alsolS 
said in general that technological advance 
in survey techniques (as well as in thi 
accuracy and accessibility of record titlj 
information) is tipping the scales towarc 
greater reliance~on record Jitle i^nformatioi 
and lesser reliance on boundary by acquiea 
jgnce.3 The law should conform to thoa 
realities. 
II. THE MEANING OF UNCERTAIN 
OR DISPUTE OVER BOUNDARY 
In some earlier cases, uncertainty or < 
pute had to be traceable to an objective 
determinable ambiguity in a deed or sui* 
vey, so that the true location of the bound-
ary could not be readily ascertained. It 
was not established by proving that neither 
adjoining landowner knew the exact loca-
tion of the boundary, because "lack of 
knowledge as to the location of the true 
boundary is not synonymous with uncer-
tainty." Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah at 
273, 209 P.2d at 260; Note, 1975 Utah 
L.Rev., supra, at 231-32. However, later 
cases rejected this objective measurement 
in favor of a subjective test in which "a 
boundary line may be 'uncertain' or 4in 
dispute' even though it is capable of being 
readily ascertained." Ekberg v. Bates, 121 
Utah 123, 127, 239 P.2d 205, 207 (1951), 
quoting Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 
Utah 523, 531, 175 P.2d 718, 723 (1946). 
Uncertainty or dispute was much easier to 
prove under this rule, which therefore had 
the effect of increasing the availability of 
3. When boundary by acquiescence was first in-
troduced in Utah almost a century ago, Switzga-
ble v. Worseldine, 5 Utah 315, 15 P. 144 (1887), 
much of the state had not been surveyed and 
searches of record title may have been difficult 
to conduct. 
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pundary by acquiescence and decreasing 
nee on the record title. 
e[2] After carefully considering our pre-
pus decisions on this question, we return 
) the more rigorous definition set forth in 
Ifrlenn v. Whitney, supra, and hold that 
&dispute" is not proved by a mere differ-
ence of opinion, and "uncertainty" is not 
proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge 
u>f the true location of the boundary. This 
pa the thrust of our recent decisions on this 
subject, e.g.f Madsen v. Clegg, supra, and 
i^t is the holding of the better-reasoned 
cases in other jurisdictions. E.g., Buza v. 
Wojtalewicz, 48 Wis.2d 557, 564-67, 180 
N.W.2d 556, 560-61 (1970); Hartung v. 
Witte, 59 Wis. 285, 298-300, 18 N.W. 175, 
180-81 (1884); Fry v. Smith, 91 Idaho 740, 
741-42, 430 P.2d 486, 487-88 (1967). Final-
ly, the ingredient that has been called "dis-
pute or uncertainty" should be measured 
against an objective test of reasonableness 
and should therefore more appropriately be 
called "objective uncertainty." 
[3] Under the rule as we have defined it 
here, the property line shown on the record 
title cannot be displaced by another bound-
ary unless it is shown that during the peri-
od of acquiescence there was some objec-
tively measurable circumstance in the 
record title or in the reasonably available 
survey information (or other technique by 
which record title information was located 
on the ground) that would have prevented 
a landowner, as a practical matter, from 
being reasonably certain about the true 
location of the boundary. By the same 
token, a claimant cannot assert boundary 
by acquiescence if he or his predecessors in 
title had reason to know the true location 
of the boundary during the period of acqui-
escence. 
Our decision to measure compliance with 
the requirement of "objective uncertainty" 
by whether the landowner, as a practical 
matter, could be reasonably certain about 
the true location of the boundary on the 
ground is supported by two policy consider-
ations. 
Utah Rep 682-692 P 2d—7 
First, by allowing less latitude for bound-
ary by acquiescence, we minimize conflict 
with the objectives of our statute of frauds, 
which forbids the transfer of interests in 
real property without a written convey-
ance. U.C.A., 1953, § 25-5-1; Madsen v. 
Clegg, 639 P.2d at 728-29; Tripp v. Bag-
ley, 74 Utah at 68-72, 276 P. at 916-18. 
Second, an objective test, which minimiz-
es reliance on boundary by acquiescence, 
corresponds more closely to the purposes 
of that doctrine. This Court has recog-
nized that "[tjhe very reason fox bejngjrf 
the doctrine of boundary byacquiescence 
or agreement is ^JtojwoioV) stirring up^  
controversy," Hobson v. Panguitch Lake 
Corp., 530 P.2d at 794, ^prevent litiga-
tiqn^ and[ j£J?EQmpj£_r^pose^of^  title, jand 
stability in ^undarjgs. Hales v. Frakes, 
600 P.2d at 559? These purposes are best 
furthered if those who purchase, use, or 
sell real property must rely on descriptions 
in deeds and reasonably available survey 
information to settle boundary questions in 
the first instance. .Only when it is jiot 
reasonable to^expect landowliers to ascer-
tain the true location of the boundary by 
this manner should landowners be allowed 
to claim boundary by acquiescence. See 
Hartung v. Wiite, 59 Wis. at 298-500, 18 
N.W. at 180-81. Allowing a claimant to 
forego reasonably available means of de-
termining the true boundary and to assert 
his lack of "actual knowledge" as a basis 
for boundary by acquiescence fosters un-
certainty on the location of boundaries and 
magnifies the number of instances in which 
landowners have to resolve disputes by liti-
gation. 
[4] Boundary by acquiescence remains 
a viable means of establishing a boundary 
where there is objective uncertainty in the 
location of the true boundary that cannot 
reasonably be resolved by reference to the 
record title and by use of reasonably avail-
able survey information. For example, fol-
lowing are instances of objectively measur-
able uncertainties in which boundary by 
acquiescence would be appropriate if its 
other "requirements were met: inability ^ to 
locate 'monume~nte~established in original 
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survey, Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 271, 
87 P. 1009, 1010 (1906); internal ineonsist-
enciesjiyjlat,. Young v. Hyland, 37 Utah 
229, 233, 108 P. 1124, 1126 (1910);_nooffi-
cial or originaTplat or survey by which the 
boundary line_can.be located, Jensen v. 
Barileil, 4 Utah 2d 58, 60, 286 P.2d 804, 
806 (1955); disagreement among different 
surveyors^onjocation of boundary line, id.; 
landmarks referenced in deeds havejlisap-
j^ared7~^oaguin v. Shiloh Orchards, 84 
Cal.App.3d 192, 148 Cal.Rptr. 495, 496 
(1978); uncertainties orjiisputes .created by 
conflicting terms in deeds, such as overlap-
ping^ descriptions, Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 
Utah 2d 237, 239, 322 P.2d 391, 393 (1958); 
or metes and^  bounds descriptions thatjio 
not close, Nunley v. Walker^ 13 Utah 2d 
105, 110-11, 369 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1962). 
Boundary by acquiescence should also be 
available where there are other inconsisten-
cies that create reasonable doubt in the 
meaning of the record title or in its applica-
tion to the actual on-the-ground location of 
the property identified in the record.4 
III. BURDEN OF PROOF OF 
OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY 
An early line of cases placed the burden 
of proving uncertainty or dispute on the 
party claiming boundary by acquiescence. 
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah at 93-94, 34 
P.2d at 698-99; Home Owners' Loan 
Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah at 219-20, 141 
P.2d at 166; Willie v. Local Realty Co., 
110 Utah at 530-32, 175 P.2d at 722-23; 
Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah at 272-73, 209 
P.2d at 260. For example, since the fence 
in Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 
supra, "was not shown to have been estab-
lished to settle any dispute or to establish 
any boundary line, the true location of 
which was unknown or even uncertain," 
boundary by acquiescence was held to have 
failed. 105 Utah at 219, 141 P.2d at 166. 
A few years later, however, in Brown v. 
Milliner, supra, this Court rejected the 
ruling in this line of cases, stating: 
4. Parties also remain free to settle uncertainties 
or disputes through boundary by agreement or 
by the use of quitclaim deeds or other legal 
In some of the opinions of this cojj 
the subject of disputed boundaries,* 
are statements to the effect 
location of the true boundary mu 
uncertain, unknown or in dispute i 
an agreement between the adjoin 
landowners fixing the boundary 
upheld, citing Tripp v. Bagley, sup 
support thereof But the Tripp n 
does not require a party relying up 
boundary which has been acquie 
for a long period of time to pr 
evidence that the location of the taj 
boundary was ever unknown, uncertai 
or in dispute. That the true boundtn 
was uncertain or in dispute and that thi 
parties agreed upon the recognizee 
boundary as the dividing line will be in 
plied from the parties' long acquiescence 
120 Utah at 27, 232 P.2d at 208. Nume! 
ous decisions after Brown v. Milliner use 
a. similar approach, either by omitting thi 
subject from the list of elements to estaiH 
lish the doctrine or by requiring the defend^  
ing landowner to prove "the absence of a 
dispute or uncertainty in fixing the bound* 
ary" as a means of rebutting a presump. 
tion of boundary by acquiescence. Wright 
v. Clissold, 521 P.2d at 1226. See, e.g.t 
Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury, 
26 Utah 2d at 37, 484 P.2d at 174; King v. 
Fronh, 14 Utah 2d at 138, 378 P.2d at 895; 
Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d at 242-43, 
322 P.2d at 395-96. 
However, in Florence v. Hiline Equip-
ment Co., Utah, 581 P.2d 998 (1978), this 
Court was again squarely faced with the 
question of who should carry the burden of 
proof. In holding that boundary by acqui-
escence did not apply, the trial court had 
stated as a conclusion of law "[t]hat the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
arises only when the true boundary is ei-
ther unknown, uncertain, or in dispute, 
none of which was proved in this case." 
Id. at 1000. The Court, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Hall (only one justice 
dissenting), affirmed that decision and its 
documents. Disputants may also acquire prop-
erty through adverse possession, as provided by 
statute. §§ 78-12-2 to -21. 
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nent of the law, noting that it was 
sistent with this Court's prior hold-
Id. The Florence holding was ap-
ently ignored (but not questioned) in 
subsequent cases.5 Then, in reject-
rfg boundary by acquiescence, our two 
most recent cases discuss the absence of 
uncertainty or dispute in conjunction with 
the affirmative requirements of the doc-
tine and contain no intimation that this 
aubject is part of the burden of a record 
landowner seeking to rebut a presumption. 
Leon v. Dansie, Utah, 639 P.2d 730 (1981); 
Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981). 
Jn the latter case, this Court stated: "In 
the absence of any initial uncertainty 
concerning the ownership of the property 
in question, the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence has no application/9 Id. at 
729 (emphasis added). 
The question of burden of proof is about 
evenly balanced on the authorities. On 
policy, both positions are supportable by 
persuasive arguments. The allocation of 
the burden of proof could therefore depend 
on what one assumes about whether it is 
the record owner or the claimant by acqui-
escence who has superior access to facts 
about events long past, but that basis of 
decision is unacceptable because either as-
sumption could be made and neither could 
be justified empirically. In this circum-
stance, we are especially well advised to 
limit our rule of law to the facts before us. 
[5,6] This case involves property in the 
city of Provo, where survey information is 
readily available. It is therefore reason-
able for the law to require the parties in 
this case to locate their property lines on 
the ground by means of the record title and 
reasonably available survey information 
rather than by acquiescence in a fence line 
or other identifiable points on the ground. 
Consequently, as to this circumstance we 
5. These cases, cited note 2 supra, do not list 
uncertainty or dispute as an affirmative require-
ment of boundary by acquiescence. 
6. We express no opinion on whether this alloca-
tion of the burden of proof would apply to 
property not located in a city or platted area. 
hold that the party claiming boundary by 
acquiescence has the burden of proving 
objective uncertainty asjart^of Jthe prima 
facie elements &£_thejipctrine.of. boundary 
by acquiescence/ Notwithstanding this al-
location of the burden of proof, the record 
landowner may, of course, conclusively ne-
gate the existence of objective uncertainty 
by proving that tj^clafniarit or his prede-
cessors'"^ title had reason to know the 
location of the_trae_boundary before the 
expiration of the period of acquiescence. 
IV. THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
We are mindful that the district court 
had to rule on the facts of this case in the 
face of the contradictory authorities we 
have discussed. Since we have now under-
taken to clarify the rules pertaining to this 
case, our task is much easier. 
[7] Although there are no direct find-
ings relating to the requirement of uncer-
tainty, the court did find that "[t]here is no 
record title in either [the Bigelows or Cluff] 
to the property in dispute/' Neither of 
these claimants challenges the factual ba-
sis for that finding. In addition, there is no 
evidence jtf imy_otueatryjely.ine5Siirfiabl^ .cir-
cumstance in the record title or in the_rea-
sonably available survey information that 
would have prevented the^claimants from 
using these means to ascertain, the true 
boundary onJhe^ground. On the contrary, 
Ttlie evidence clearly ^ sKows that both claim-
ants had ready access to deeds and had 
actually examined surveys clearly estab-
lishing the Halladays' record title to the 
property in dispute. Consequently, the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence Is 
inapplicable as a matter of law In the cir-
cumstances jjfjthis case. The decree rely-
ing on that doctrine in quieting the claim-
ants' title to parcel A-B-C-D must there-
fore be reversed.7 
7. Our resolution of this issue makes it logically 
unnecessary for us to rule on the other issues 
tendered by appellants. 
We also forego answering the numerous argu-
ments and charges in the dissenting opinion. 
We do caution that the meaning and intent of 
this opinion should not be judged by the content 
of the dissent, because we do not acquiesce in 
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The decree is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to the district court for the entry 
of a new decree in conformity with this 
opinion. No costs awarded. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent-
ing): 
I concur in the result i>n_the Junited 
ground^that both,jtheJEigejowj^^and .the 
Cluffs, whorefy on Jboundary J?y .^ acquies-
cence, halTa^ualjy^examined jLUiyey.3, dur-
ing the period of acquiescence jhowing the 
Hanadayr8 ownejrehip of the property Jn 
dispute. Once t^y_^xamined the^surveys, 
^ney Jiadj^easpn tofknow that the Jine_ac-
quiesced to_w^ jiot t h e _ ^ 
could acquire ^ jio frights J&erej&fj&k In 
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 
(1928), this Court held the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence to be not applica-
ble because the evidence affirmatively dem-
onstrated that when the boundary fence 
was erected, the parties knew that it was 
not on the true line, and further, they could 
not have believed it to be on the true line 
since the true line was straight north and 
south along a section line, whereas the 
boundary fence had angle turns in it like a 
dog's leg. This requirement was again rec-
ognized in Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 
Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718 (1946). More re-
cently, in Florence v. Hiline Equipment 
Co., Utah, 581 P.2d 998 (1978), this Court in 
holding the doctrine of boundary by acqui-
escence not applicable, noted that both the 
joining owners knew where the true bound-
ary was located and thus they did not treat 
a fence which ran between their properties 
as marking the boundary. Similarly, in 
Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981), 
we stressed the fact that the fence running 
between 'the two properties ran in a 
straight line, whereas the parties' deed 
the dissent's interpretation of this opinion. To 
cite only one example, a boundary located on a 
surveyed line could qualify for boundary by 
acquiescence, even though a subsequent survey 
showed the original survey to have been in 
error. A rule of law that is intended to encour-
age landowners to rely on record title informa-
lines which coincided along this cou 
two right-angle turns in them. In'* 
these decisions the parties had 
know that the acquiesced line was : 
true line, or that fact was implicit^ 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence^ 
held in each case to be not applicable^ 
I regard most_o,f the balance of thej 
jority opinion to be dicta and, an unwa 
ed assault upon boundary J^acquiei 
as it haa frpen r W ^ p p ^ by tftp 
this Court over the past 80 years. I 
sent from much of it, especially from '& 
announcement that boundary by acqui ~ 
cence should be further restricted and i 
applied where the adjoining land on 
could have or should jiavehad their prop 
ties surveyed before the boundary 
marked on the ground. I cannot sub 
to that announcement for the folio* 
reasons. 
The doctrine of boundary by acquies-j 
cence has always been very restrictively' 
applied. Since it operates to take from thr 
fee owner a small strip of his land, it has 
never been given broad application. Only 
in those exceptional circumstances where 
all four of the following elements were 
present has it been employed: (1) occupa-
tion up to a visible line marked by monu-
ments, fences or buildings; (2) mutual ac-
quiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) 
for a long period of time; (4) by adjoining 
land owners. Goodman v. Wilkinson, 
Utah, 629 P.2d 447 (1981). Since the doc-
trine was first announced in Holmes v. 
Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009 (1906), it 
has been applied only in approximately 25 
cases reaching this Court (see appendix). 
The effect of the announcement by the 
majority opinion is to sub silentio overrule 
most of those cases. In a thoughtful and 
well-considered opinion written by Justice 
Frick of this Court in Holmes v. Judge, 
supra, it was pointed out that the doctrine 
tion and reasonably available survey informa-
tion will not be applied to penalize a landowner 
who has done just that. If the original survey 
was in error, that is a clear instance of objective 
uncertainty, and boundary by acquiescence will 
apply if its other elements are proved. 
oundary by acquiescence rests upon 
nd public policy; that it was a doctrine 
epose with the view of quieting titles 
preventing strife and litigation con-
ring boundaries. Many years later, Jus-Crockett in Hobson v. Panguitch Lake 
Jwy., Utah, 530 P.2d 792 (1975), endorsed 
lis same public policy when he said: 
jTKat in the interest of preserving the 
fpeace and good order of society (sic) the 
•quietly resting bones of the past, which 
no one seems to have been troubled or 
complained about for a long period of 
years, should not be unearthed for the 
purpose of stirring up controversy, but 
jjhould be left in their repose. 
Now the majority seems to say that this 
long recognized public policy should be 
abandoned; that the bones of the past may 
be unearthed and controversy permitted if 
when the boundary was marked on the 
ground (by fences, trees, etc.) 30, 40 or 50 
years ago it was feasible for the then own-
ers to have surveyed their properties which 
supposedly would have resulted in the 
placement of the boundary on the deed line. 
There are three major difficulties with that 
approach. In the first place, a .survey may 
have been actually made and the^oundary 
Sjarjced janjhat Hne. Because of the lapse 
of many yearsA no one who was then 
present may be alive or_available^ Just 
because a recent purvey shows the marked 
boundary to be incorrectly^plajgdjioes^npt 
proveHffiat the Jhen j)wners^ many years 
ago, did not have a survey made onjyhich 
they relied in establishing the marked 
boundary." As finer and more precise in-
struments of survey are developed, proper-
ty lines established in accordance with ear-
lier surveys may often be shown to be out 
of place by later surveys. Under the rule 
adopted by the majority, apparently the 
later survey would govern and a marked 
boundary which may well have been estab-
lished in reliance on the earlier survey 
would yield. In Wacker v. Price, 70 Ariz. 
99, 216 P.2d 707 (1950), the Court emphati-
cally rejected such a suggestion and quoted 
with approval the following statement ap-
pearing in a Michigan case, Diehl v. Zan-
ger, 39 Mich. 601 (1878): 
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Nothing is better understood than that 
few of our early plats will stand the test 
of a careful and accurate survey without 
disclosing errors. This is as true of the 
government surveys as of any others, 
and if all the lines were now subject to 
correction on new surveys, the confusion 
of lines and titles that would follow 
would cause consternation in many com-
munities. Indeed, the mischiefs that 
must follow would be simply incalcula-
ble, and the visitation of the surveyor 
might well be set down as a great public 
calamity. But no law can sanction this 
course. 
The majority assures us that a new survey 
would not necessarily be allowed to upset a 
boundary set on an earlier survey. But 
after the lapse of many years, no one may 
kiiow that an earlier survey was^made. 
Thus, the later survey will be followed and 
tKe boundary^ IQH^ recQ^Tiize/L, will he 
moved. 
Secondly, the boundary dispute is here 
jigd now._It does little good to reflect as ^ o 
what the then owners 30, 40 or 50 years 
ago might have done and disregard entirely 
the conduct of the owners and their succes-
sors since that time in acquiescing in the 
markers on the ground. In most cases, the 
acquiescence is an unconscious act with no 
thought being given during the period of 
acquiescence to the boundary, let alone 
with surveying it Thirdly, this Court 
should not embark upon the impossible 
task of tryj.ng,. tn -determine, .in each_case. 
whether thejtwners 30, 40 or 50 years ago 
could have afforded a survey had they then 
given_ thoughtJojthejjoundary or whether 
the value of the property " ^ "that'time 
would have been worth it, depending upon 
whether the boundary dispute arises "in 
city and platted areas" or whether it arises 
in "rural or wilderness areas." The an-
swers to such inquiries will be impossible 
to obtain. The inquiry apparently will be 
subjective. Yet in many cases the builders 
of the marked boundary will be dead or will 
have long since sold their interest in the 
property and be unavailable. Our cases on 
boundary by acquiescence for the past 80 
510 Utah 685 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
years have approached boundary disputes 
with the view that it is not unjust in certain 
cases to require disputing owners to live 
with what they and their predecessors have 
acquiesced in for a j^ng^jemd,_of time. 
TodayThe majority turns its back on that 
philosophy and now wants to explore and 
decide boundary cases on what might have 
been. This approach is not practical and I 
believe will prove to be unworkable. 
Holmes v. Judge, supra, and its progeny 
have been consistent in rejecting the notion 
that boundary by acquiescence should only 
be applied when the true line could not 
have been ascertained by a survey. This 
contention was put to rest in an earlier 
case, Young v. Hyland, 37 Utah 229, 108 
P. 1124 (1910). Two years later, in Bin-
ford v. Eccles, 41 Utah 453, 126 P. 333 
(1912), Chief Justice Frick again dismissed 
that contention in the following words: 
Appellant would thus be permitted to 
unsettle boundaries which by the adjoin-
ing land owners had been recognized and 
acquiesced in for approximately a quar-
ter of a century. Any rule of law which 
would permit such a result would be 
pernicious, and in the long run would 
produce strife and litigation, and in 
the nature of things would often result 
in injustice if not oppression. [Empha-
sis added.] 
More recently in Willie v. Local Realty 
Co., supra, and in Ekberg v. Bates, 121 
Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951), this Court 
again rejected the suggestion that bound-
ary by acquiescence should not apply un-
less it could be demonstrated that the true 
line could not be ascertained by a survey. 
The majority advocates that we "return" 
and now 'follow an obscure statement made 
in Glenn v.JVhitney, 116 Utah 267,209 
P2g~257 '(1949), that "lack ofjoiowledge as 
ETtfie location of the txue boundary is not 
synonymous with uncertainty." The sub-
ject of surveying was not discussed in that 
case and it is this writer's opinion that that 
statement does not refer to surveying. 
However, if that statement means that 
there can be no uncertainty in the absence 
of a survey, it is out of harmony with every 
other case of this Court on the subject and 
should be summarily disavowed, 
statement was dicta since the ev 
showed that the person who had ereda 
the old fence did not own land on 
side of it and boundary by acq ie ^ 
clearly did not apply. 
Ill a surprising turnabout in thinkini 
public policy, the majority opinion now 3 
claims that the stirring up of controversy^  
avoided, litigation is prevented and 
of title and stability in boundaries is 
moted if "those who purchase, use or i 
real property may rely on descriptions 
deeds and reasonably available survey 
formation to settle boundary questions 
the first instance." As I have already] 
pointed out, generally reliance on descriw 
tions in deeds and available survey infor^  
mation is salutary. However, in those rare 
instances where the elements of boundary 
by acquiescence are present, an exception 
has been recognized and disputing neigh-, 
bors are not permitted to depart from that 
which they have long acquiesced in. This 
does no mischief to those who purchase, 
use or sell real property as the majority 
opinion maintains since it is not unfair to 
charge buyers with taking notice of a 
marked boundary which is there to be seen 
in plain sight Boundary by acquiescence 
cases oftenarise when one adjpining.land 
"nownertte^cies JolggJLhis property and a 
survey is made by him or his buyer reveal-
ing that the marked boundary encroaches a 
~few~tricfies or"somifimes a"few feet "Rath-
er than disturbing the long acquiesced in 
boundary, the law has been and is that the 
boundary shall not be disturbed but the 
buyer may protect himself by requiring a 
reduction in the purchase price by the ven-
dor to compensate for the shortage of prop-
erty. If fortuitously the survey shows that 
the seller has an excess of property, the 
buyer reaps the bargain of it. Either way 
the old boundary is preserved and strife 
and litigation is prevented. No innocent 
person is harmed. Only that owner who 
has slept_QH.his jrighte is made to live with 
that which he has long accepted. 
I dissent from many statements made in 
part I of the majority opinioo First, proof 
aty or dispute is not, and has 
£been an "ingredient" or element of a 
ot action for jMindary by acqjuies-
^ce> Tripp v. Bagley, supra, cited by the 
" onty does not so hold. Uncertainty and 
pute were discussed in that case in con-
on with an express parol boundary 
ement where it must be proved to 
jrercome the bar of the statute of frauds. 
jje party relying on the oral agreement 
just show that the location of true bound-
iry was unknown, uncertain or disputed 
men the agreement was made; otherwise 
gie oral agreement is invalid as an attempt 
by the contracting parties to transfer own-
ership of real estate without a writing. 
Pie plaintiff in that case also relied upon 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
but this Court held it to be not applicable 
for the reasons already stated in the first 
paragraph of this opinion, viz., when the 
boundary fence was erected the parties 
mew that it was not on the true line be-
cause of its angle turns. The Court did not 
lold that a party relying upon boundary by 
icquiescence had to affirmatively show 
hat the boundary was erected following 
incertainty or dispute. Such a require-
ment would be entirely foreign to the doc-
trine of boundary by acquiescence because 
the basis of the doctrine is that the law 
implies that there once existed uncertainty 
and dispute and that the adjoining owners 
mutually agreed upon the marked bound-
ary in settlement. Holmes v. Judge, supra. 
If there was ever any question about this 
proposition, our opinion in Brown v. Milli-
ner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951), 
decided many years after Tripp v. Bagley, 
supra, clarified that matter and put it to 
rest 
In some of the opinions of the court on 
the subject of disputed boundaries, there 
are statements to the effect that the 
location of the true boundary must be 
uncertain, unknown or in dispute before 
an agreement between the adjoining land 
owners fixing the boundary will be up-
held, citing Tripp v. Bagley, supra, in 
support thereof. Such statements 
should be understood to mean that if the 
location of the true boundary line is 
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known to the adjoining owners, they can-
not by parol agreement establish the 
boundary elsewhere. As was pointed 
out in the Tripp case, such an agreement 
would be in contravention of the statute 
of frauds. But the Tripp case does not 
require a party relying upon a boundary 
which has been acquiesced in for a long 
period of time to produce evidence that 
the location of the true boundary was 
ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. 
That the true boundary was uncertain or 
in dispute and that the parties agreed 
upon the recognized boundary as the di-
viding line will be implied from the par-
ties' long acquiescence. Roberts v. Brae, 
5 Cal.2d 356, 54 P.2d 698. In Holmes v. 
Judge, supra, this court, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Frick, set forth the 
following requirements necessary to es-
tablish a boundary by acquiescence: The 
line must be open, visible, marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings and rec-
ognized as the boundary for a long term 
of years. It was expressly stated by the 
court in that case that there was no 
evidence how the fence and building 
which were recognized as the boundary 
came to be erected, or that there was 
ever any dispute between the adjoining 
owners concerning the location of the 
true boundary, or that any question was 
ever raised as to its location until shortly 
before the plaintiff commenced his ac-
tion. ^ZZZ 
This explanation was again set out in haec 
verba in Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d 
237, 322 P.2d 391 (1958), where we express-
ly rejected the contention that the party 
relying on the long recognized boundary 
must prove that it was once unknown, un-
certain or in dispute. Justice Wade, writ-
ing for the Court, stated: 
[I]t is clear that where a party by evi-
dence establishes a long period of acqui-
escence in a fence as marking the bound-
ary line between two tracts, he is not 
required to also produce evidence that 
the location of the true boundary line 
was ever unknown, uncertain or in dis-
pute. The establishment of a long period 
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of acquiescence in a fence as marking 
the boundary line between two tracts by 
the respective owners gives rise to a 
presumption that the true boundary line 
was in dispute or uncertain, which 
places, at least, the burden of producing 
evidence that there was no dispute or 
uncertainty but that the true boundary 
line was known to the respective owners 
on the party claiming that such was the 
fact Where, as here, there is evidence 
on that question other than the proof of 
acquiescence in the fence as marking the 
boundary line for the required long peri-
od of time the trial court must find that 
the boundary line by acquiescence has 
been established. 
(Emphasis added.) Justice Wade cited as 
his authority Brown v. Milliner, supra, 
which in turn relied on the original acquies-
c&TKfe s»&fc, Holmes u Judge, %wpr&. 
^^m view of the foregoing unequivocal pro-
/ nouncements of this Court, I cannot agree 
/ with the majority that "we have concluded 
/ from the more recent cases and from the 
' clear weight of authority that the relevance 
of this ingredient [uncertainty and dispute] 
is settled in our law." None of the cases 
cited by the majority in s^gort'^p^ that 
statement' do'in fact ''Sjffilft£*~ ~ 
™e majority opinion in the face of 80 
years of cases to the contrary also places 
the burden of proof that an uncertainty or 
dispute once existed upon the party relying 
1. The cases cited by the majority make only the 
briefest mention of uncertainty and dispute; 
none of them hold that the party advocating 
boundary by acquiescence must prove as an 
element of his cause of action that the fence, 
etc. was erected because of uncertainty or dis-
pute by the adjoining land owners. For exam-
ple, in Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 
(1981), Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 
P.2d 257 (1949), Homeowners Loan Corp. v. 
Dudley, 105'Utah 208, 141 R2d 160 (1943), and 
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34 P.2d 697 
(1934) it appears to this writer that uncertainty 
and dispute was mentioned as an element of an 
express parol agreement; most of those cases 
cite Tripp v. Bagley, supra, which gives credence 
to my interpretation. In two other cases cited 
by the majority, Wright v. Clissold Utah, 521 
?2d 1224 (1974), and Universal Investment Corp. 
v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173 
(1971), it was stated that lack of any uncertainty 
upon 'the old established boundary. ByS 
doing, one of the foundations of the da 
trine is destroyed, viz., that the |*wtfja 
plies that the landowners were once unce 
Tajn or in^ dispute and the boundary .WMl 
marked on the ^oundi;ij /s^emfi'na 
Rolmes v. Judge, supra. This unplicai-Lk 
is drawn because due to the passage^ 
time, there is often little or no eviden3 
available as to the erection of the boundary 
marker. Without being able to rely on thy 
implication, the doctrine of boundary bg 
acquiescence cannot continue to exist as | ] 
workable and viable doctrine. Our cased 
h^ve recognized that lack of uncertainty on 
dispute can be raised as a defense againstj] 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence] 
by the person assailing the old boundary* 
Wright v. Clissold, Utah, 521 P.2d 1224; 
(1974). Motzkus v. Carroll, supra, and 
Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury? 
26 Utah 2d 36, 484 P.2d 173 (1971), properly 
held that like other defenses the burden of 
proof is upon the person asserting the de-
fense. We explained in our opinion in 
Weight v. Clissold, supra, that once the 
four elements of boundary by acquiescence 
(named above) are established, the Court ia 
required to presume, the existence of a 
binding agreement unless the party who 
assails it proves by competent evidence 
that there was actually no agreement be-
tween the adjoining land owners or there 
could not have been a proper agreement 
Said the Court 
or dispute at the time the fence was erected 
could be shown as a defense by the party resist-
ing boundary by acquiescence. In Leon v. Dan-
sie, Utah, 639 ?2d 730 (1981), "dispute" was 
mentioned not as a requirement but "that there 
had been no dispute as to record title [not as to 
the location of the boundary] at any time over 
the years.'* In most of the above cases the 
mentiQtt QC uncertainty m d dispute v<a& dicta, 
since the case was decided on other grounds. 
For example, in Leon v. Dansie, Wright v. Clis-
sold and Glen v. Whitney, the fence was shown 
to have been erected not as a boundary but 
simply to contain livestock. Similarly, in Glenn 
v. Whitney, the person erecting the fence did not 
own land on either side of it; in Homeowners 
Loan Corp. v. Dudley the same person owned 
the land on both sides of the fence and in 
Peterson v. Johnson the land on one side of the 
fence was in the public domain 
HALLADAY v. CLUFF 
Cite u 685 PJd 500 (Utah 1984) 
Utah 513 
Facts which prove the latter include the 
following: (1) no parties available to 
make an agreement, e.g., sole ownership 
of the property with the existing line 
tfhich was later transferred in tracts to 
two or more other persons; (2) the line 
tfas set for a purpose other than setting 
i boundary; (3) the absence of a dispute 
ir uncertainty in fixing the boundary; 
md (4) . . . 
I disagree with the majority opinion that 
some of our cases have placed the burden 
of proof upon the party relying upon 
boundary by acquiescence. My reading of 
the cases cited by the majority indicates 
that who has the burden of proof was not 
an issue in any one of them, and I consider 
the incomplete statements in those cases 
upon which the majority relies to be dicta 
as far as burden of proof is concerned. On 
the other hand, in Motzkus v. Carroll, su-
pra, burden of proof was a vital issue and 
it was there held that the party relying 
upon the old boundary fence is not required 
to produce evidence that the location of the 
true boundary line was ever unknown, un-
certain or in dispute. 
I dissent from the adoption of the rule 
proposed by the majority in Part II that: 
(T|he property line shown on the record 
title cannot be displaced by another 
boundary unless it is shown that during 
the period of acquiescence there was 
some objectively measurable circum-
stance in the record title or in the reasona-
bly available survey information (or other 
technique by which record title informa-
tion was located on the ground) that 
would have prevented a landowner as a 
practical matter from being reasonably 
certain about the true location of the 
boundary. By the same token a claimant 
cannot assert boundary by acquiescence 
if he or his predecessors in title had 
reason to know the true location of the 
boundary during the period of acquies-
cence. 
I am in accord with the second sentence. 
The instant case provides an illustration of 
that rule, viz., during the period of acquies-
cence, Bigelow and Cluff had access to a 
survey which indicated that they did not 
own to the fence to which they claim. 
However, the first sentence quoted above 
seems to be out of harmony with the sec-
ond sentence. It seems to require proof of 
a negative, i.e., proof by the person relying 
on boundary by acquiescence that he and 
his predecessors were prevented for some 
reason from having a survey made which 
would have determined the location of the 
true line. So far as this writer knows only 
the lack-TJfTmoney could really "keejT'any 
land owner from having, a,survey made._ Is 
thaj^now^goinff-taJie a.,vital and yalid 
inquiry bvthft-Court in_future boundary 
cases? 
I believe that a rule which would serve 
us better and which would be workable 
might be simply stated as follows: 
A claimant cannot assert boundary by 
acquiescence if he or his predecessors in 
title during the period of acquiescence 
had reason to know that the boundary 
acquiesced in was not on the true line. 
This "reason to know" could come about 
because of information contained in the 
record title or in existing survey informa-
tion or information from other sources 
which would put a reasonable man on 
notice that the boundary acquiesced in 
was not on the true line. — 
Since the reasonable man standard is used 
in other areas of the law I would hope that 
it would work well here. It would provide 
courts with the basis for refusing to apply 
boundary by acquiescence where the dis-
crepancy was apparent and the acquies-
cence was blindly indulged in. On the oth-
er hand, we must not expect too much from 
the rule since being familiar with the legal 
description of one's property and locating 
that description on the land are two entire-
ly different things. That is why surveys 
are made. However, the rule would serve 
well in instances like Tripp v. Bagley, su-
pra, where an old fence line had several 
angle turns in it whereas the true line was 
straight north and south along the section 
line; and in Madsen v. Clegg, supra, where 
the boundary fence ran on a straight line, 
whereas the deed lines of both parties had 
right-angle turns in them. In both cases 
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the landowners had reason to know that 
the fence was not on the true line. 
Part III of the majority opinion ends with 
the observation that because the property 
involved in this case is in the city of Provo 
survey information is readily available and 
it is reasonable for the law to require the 
parties to locate their property lines on the 
ground by means of a survey. It appears 
to me that this statement is out of harmony 
with earlier statements in the opinion 
which indicated that the Court should look 
at the situation as of when the acquies-
cence began to determine ..whether, j,t,w#s 
feasible for a survey to haye^been^made^-
n^C^^ears later when this litigationJ8#s 
commenced. 
In conclusion, I am concerned that the 
rules laid down by the majority are unclear 
and unworkable as I understand them 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
has a proper p\ace m our yarisprudence atf^  
in my opinion has served well the publim-
policy which brought it into existence in the 
first place. It has provided a fair basis for 
settling disputes over often insignificant 
amounts of land and has discouraged 
countless property owners from feuding 
with their neighbors when a recent survey 
conflicts with long recognized lines. 
Everything the majority argues and now 
espouses was considered and rejected by 
this Court in Holmes v. Judge, supra, when 
Justice Frick wrote: 
While the interests of society require 
that the title to real estate shall not be 
transferred from the owner for slight 
cause, or otherwise than by law, these 
same interests demand that there sh#H 
be stability in boundaries, and th#t, 
where parties have for a long term of 
years acquiesced in a certain line be-
tween their own and their neighbors 
property, they will not thereafter be per-
mitted to say that what they permitted to 
appear as being established by and with 
their consent and agreement was in fact 
false. 
For nearly 80 years we have followed that 
philosophy. But today the majority opinion 
opens the way for any property owner in 
this state to have now his property 
veyed (or resurveyed) and gain posse 
of every inch contained in his legal dee 
tion. Old surveys and boundaries biL 
reliance thereon will be meaningless 
believe that the majority opinion is a 
backward in achieving stability of b^ 
aries in this state 
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1. Boundaries «=»37(5) 
In absence of evidence showing 
there was dispute or uncertainty as to j 
boundary, landowners failed to proved 
elements of boundary by acquiescence. 
Landowners brought action against 
neighbors to quiet title to two small parcels 
of property on basis of boundary by acqui-
escence. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered 
judgment for neighbors, and landowners 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., 
held that (1) in absence of evidence show-
ing that there was dispute or uncertainty 
as to true boundary, landowners failed to 
prove all elements of boundary by acquies-
cence; (2) title opinion, correspondence be-
tween landowners' predecessor and county, 
and predecessor's testimony as to what she 
believed boundaries of property to be when 
purchased were properly excluded, as irrel-
evant or as hearsay if offered on basis of 
its truth; (3) judgment which declared that 
landowners were not owners or had any 
record title of two described parcels was 
required to be modified to decree that land-
owners had no right, title or interest in 
described parcels as against defendant 
neighbors based on boundary by acquies-
cence; and (4) denial of landowners' motion 
to amend complaint to plead adverse pos-
2. Boundaries «=35(4) 
In action to quiet title on basis or 
boundary by acquiescence, title opinion? 
correspondence between landowner^ 
predecessor and county, and predecessors 
testimony as to what she believed bouncG 
aries of property to be when purchasS 
were properly excluded, as predecessor 
state of mind was not relevant and e jg 
dence was hearsay if offered on basis of i g 
truth. Rules of Evid., Rule 63. 
3. Boundaries <s=>43 
In action to quiet title to two small 
parcels of property on basis of boundary by 
acquiescence, judgment which declared 
that landowners were not owners or 
any record title of two described parcels 
improperly included property in landown-
ers' possession in which neighbors had no 
record title, and thus, was required to be 
modified to decree that landowners had no 
right, title or interest in described parcete 
as against defendant neighbors based on 
boundary by acquiescence. 
STRATFORD v. MORGAN 
CUe as 689 92d 360 (Utah 1984) 
4. Pleading ^236(1) 
Although rules of civil procedure tend 
to favor granting of leave to amend, matter 
remains in sound discretion of trial court. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 15, 15(b). 
Utah 361 
5. Quieting Title <s=>42 
In action to quiet title to two small 
parcels of property on basis of boundary by 
acquiescence, in which landowners earlier 
indicated to court that they did not intend 
to rely on adverse possession and failed to 
show requisite payment of taxes on disput-
ed parcels, denial of landowners' motion to 
amend complaint to plead adverse posses-
sion as additional theory was not abuse of 
discretion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 15, 
15(b). 
David E. West, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
Thomas A. Duffin, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and respondents. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment dis-
missing their action to quiet title to two 
small parcels of property on the basis of 
boundary by acquiescence. We affirm. 
On March 10. 1951, plaintiffs' predeces-
sors in interest, L.H. and Ella Stratford 
(hereinafter "the Stratfords"), purchased a 
4.77-acre tract of land in Salt Lake County. 
This property was conveyed to plaintiffs as 
trustees for the Stratford grandchildren by 
Ella Stratford after her husband's death. 
The property was purchased by the 
Stratfords for the purpose of operating a 
hobby farm, where they could raise live-
stock (horses, cows, sheep, etc.) and other 
farm animals. In order to make the prop-
erty suitable for such use, the Stratfords 
mended already-existing fences and con-
structed a new one along the south bank of 
Big Cottonwood Creek. 
Shortly after the Stratfords constructed 
the fence alongside the creek, they put 
their livestock and other farm animals on 
the property. They later built a fish pond 
and a track for exercising their horses. 
Both the pond and the track partially ex-
tend into the disputed parcel denominated 
Parcel 12 in the diagram. The plaintiffs 
and their predecessors in jnterestJreatecT 
the property up tOLthe northern fence line 
as their own and used it in the manner so 
descnT)ej_wjthout interruption or dispute 
from the defendants jorjhe^jnredecessors 
until 197JL_jai ..period of ^ nearly 30 ^ years.^ 
In 1979, plaintiff Charles Stratford had 
the property surveyed. (See diagram.) 
The survey indicated that the location of 
the fence constructed by the Stratfords 
between the parties' properties was not 
compatible with the metes and bounds de-
scription of the boundary line between the 
properties. The portion of the fence at 
issue here had been builtjfarlhe most part 
Inside the legajjpjjujidaries of defendants' 
property? —-—=*-••< —^ 
After the plaintiffs received the survey, 
they prepared and presented to defendants 
for their signatures a quitclaim deed con-
veying the area put in issue as a result of 
the discrepancy between the deed survey 
and the fence line. Defendants refused to 
sign the quitclaim deed. 
As a result, plaintiffs initiated this quiet 
title action, claiming that under the doc-
trine of boundary by acquiescence they 
own fee simple title to the parcels designat-
ed on the accompanying diagram as Par-
cels * 1 and * 2. At trial, after plaintiffs 
had presented their evidence and rested 
their case, defendants moved for a dismiss-
al, which the court granted. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court 
erred in four aspects: (1) in ruling that 
plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to es-
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DEFENDANTS ' 
(Morgan) 
TRACT1 
<&: 
v 
fence erected by 
L. H. Stratford 
ID 1951. 
Parcel 
Boundary line according 
\ to 1979 survey (based 
on metes and bounds 
descriptions in 
plaintiffs* deed). 
PLAINTIFFS' 
(Stratford) 
TRACT 
"°# Xh 
Parcel 
# 1 
tablish "prima facie" a boundary by acqui-
escence; (2) in excluding certain evidence 
proffered by plaintiffs; (3) in the form of 
1. The record docs not include the metes and 
bounds description of defendants' (Morgan) 
tract. It does, however, indicate that the metes 
and bounds description of the pertinent south-
ern boundary of defendants' property is the 
same as the metes and bounds description de-
judgment entered against plaintiffs; and 
(4) in denying plaintiffs' motion to amend 
the pleadings to conform with the evidence-
scribing the northern boundary of plaintiffs 
property. The record also fails to show the 
eastern boundary of defendants' property, but it 
is undisputed that defendants do not own all of 
the property contiguous to plaintiffs' northern 
boundary line. 
STRATFORD v. MORGAN 
Cite as 689 PJd 360 (Utah 1984) 
Utah 363 
I. BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
The jriaLcourtfound, relying on Madsen 
v. Clegg,2 jhatplaintiffs had failed to pro-
duce evidence showing that therewas^ dis-
pute or uncertainty as to the true boundary 
and thus had failed to prove all of the 
necessary elements of boundary by acqui-
escence. Plaintiffs contend that a showing 
>^f dispute or uncertainty is not ajiecessary 
element ~of_boundary by _  acquiescence. 
CaseTaw~does not support that contention. 
In Madsen, the parties' predecessors in 
interest had acquired adjoining tracts of 
land from a common grantor on the same 
day in 1904. The metes and bounds de-
scriptions of their respective deeds were 
compatible insofar as they described the 
boundary between the two tracts. Al-
though a fence existed along the boundary, 
plaintiffs predecessor, owner of the south-
ern parcel, constructed a new fence upon 
his own property approximately 25 feet 
south of the boundary line. He used the 
small lane between the fences to drive his 
cattle from a corral that had been con-
structed in the northeast corner of his par-
cel. Some years later (between 1936 and 
1942), the original fence on the boundary 
line and the corral were torn down, and 
defendant's predecessor in interest began 
to farm the land up to the fence construct-
ed by plaintiffs predecessor. In 1979, 
plaintiff put a new fence along the bound-
ary line, which defendant removed. Plain-
tiff then filed an action to quiet title to the 
small parcel between the two fences. 
The trial court in Madsen found that 
inasmuch as defendant and his predeces-
sors had farmed the land in question since 
the 1930s without obtaining plaintiffs per-
mission and inasmuch as plaintiff had 
failed to notify defendant of his claim upon 
the land until 1979, the fence constructed 
by plaintiffs predecessor in 1904 (25 feet 
south of the metes and bounds boundary 
line) had been established by mutual acqui-
escence as the boundary between the two 
properties. 
2. Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981). 
3. Id. at 728. 
4. Id. at 729. 
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial 
court, saying that "when the location of the 
true boundary between adjoining tracts of 
land is unknown, uncertain or jn jiispute, 
the owners thereof may [establish a bound-
ary by acquiescence]." x This Court found, 
Tiowever, that: 
[Plaintiff showed that no uncertainty or 
dispute existed concerning the location of 
the boundary line at the time the 1904 
fence was constructed. The 1904 deeds 
to plaintiffs and defendant's predeces-
sors unmistakenly define a boundary 
which takes a substantial jog northward 
at its eastern end. Defendant has raised 
no question concerning the validity of 
these deeds; nor has he shown any sub-
sequent conveyance by plaintiff or his 
father which might cast doubt on plain-
tiffs present title. The trial court did 
not include in its findings any indication 
that the boundary was disputed when 
plaintiff s father built the fence or that 
the fence was intended originally as a 
boundary line. In the absence of any 
initial uncertainty concerning the owner-
ship of the property in question, the doc-
trine of boundary by aquiescence has no 
application.^ 4! 
Ringwood v. Bradford* which involved a 
fence not erected to settle any uncertainty 
or dispute, also supports the findings of the 
trial court In Ringwood, the Court cited 
Glenn v. Whitney* with approval and 
quoted therefrom as follows: 
The theory under which a boundary 
line is established by long acquiescence 
along an existing fence line is founded on 
the doctrine that the parties erect the 
fence to settle some doubt or uncertainty 
which they may have as to the location of 
the true boundary, and the [sic] compro-
mise their differences by agreeing to ac-
cept the fence line as the limiting line of 
their respective lands. The mere fact 
that a fence happens to be put up and 
neither party does anything about it for 
5. 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P. 2d 1053 (1954). 
6. 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949). 
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a long penod of time will not establish it 
as the true boundary. [Citations omit-
ted.]7 
In Halladay v. Cluff? the Court declared 
that the showing of dispute or uncertainty 
necessary in order to establish boundary by 
acquiescence should be^measured^jtgainst 
an objective test of .reasonableness:. 
Under the rule as we have defined it 
here, the property line shown on the 
record title cannot be displaced by anoth-
er boundary unless it is shown that dur-
ing the period of acquiescence there was 
some objectively measurable circum-
stance in the record title or in the reason-
ably available survey information (or oth-
er technique by which record title infor-
mation was located on the ground) that 
would have prevented a landowner, as a 
practical matter, from being reasonably 
certain about the true location of the 
boundary. By the same token, a claim-
ant cannot assert boundary by acquies-
cence if he or his predecessors in title 
had reason to know the true location of 
the boundary during the period of acqui-
escenceJ11 
[1] PJamtiffsjpjlus^ 
vide any objective, pr_subjectiYe evidence of 
dispute or uncertainty. The trial judge 
found, supported by the evidence, that the 
parties received valid deeds containing 
metes and bounds descriptions of their re-
spective parcels, that said deed descriptions 
were compatible insofar as they described 
the boundary line between the properties, 
that no dispute ever arose with respect to 
plaintiffs' fence or the true boundary line 
until shortly before this litigation began, 
and that a survey prepared at plaintiffs' 
request based upon the parties' respective 
deed descriptions established the true loca-
tion of their common boundary to be a 
significant distance south of plaintiffs' 
fence line. These facts do not show any 
7 Supra note » «« 1054 
8. Utah, 685 P 2d 300(1984) 
9. Id., at 505 
10. Rule 63, Utah It U* >M nil mr, piovides as 
follows: 
dispute or uncertainty as measured by Hal-
laday. jM 
Therefore, plaintiffs failed to meet their 
burden of providing evidence of all of the! 
'elementsjof^boundary by acquiescence. 
IT EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
[2] The next claim asserted by plah? 
tiffs is that the trial court erred in exclud? 
ing certain evidence offered by them. Thr 
excluded evidence consisted of a title opu? 
ion, correspondence between LH. StratforT 
and Salt Lake County, and Ella Stratford's 
testimony as to what she believed th? 
northern boundaries of the property to]S? 
when purchased. The title opinion and cog 
respondence with Salt Lake County were 
excluded on the basis of hearsay, while th? 
objection to Mrs. Stratford's testimony war 
sustained by the trial judge before counsef 
could finish his objection. 
Plaintiffs contend that the contested evjF 
dence was offered by them to establish the 
state of mind of the Stratfords at the time. 
they erected the objected fence. 
Mental state of the Stratfords was not a y 
issue in this case. No element of bound 
by acquiescence could be proved by evQ 
dence as to state of mind. Therefore, sincej 
state of mind was not an issue, the only, 
effect the challenged evidence could haw-
had was its supposed truth value. As tar 
that the evidence was unquestionably bear^ 
say and thus inadmissible.10 
III. FORM OF JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs' third assertion of error is that 
the form of the judgment of dismissal was 
improper 
[31 The judgment declares: 1. It is 
hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
the plaintiffs are not the owners in fee 
Evidence oi a statement which is made other 
than by a witness while testifying at the hear-
ing offered to prove the truth of the matter 
stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible 
STRATFORD v. MORGAN 
Cite as 689 P^d 360 (Utah 1984) 
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simple title or in fact have any record title 
of the following described property in Salt 
Lake County described as follows: [Parcels 
1 and 2 are thereafter described by metes 
and bounds]." 
Plaintiffs contend that these descriptions 
include property that is in possession of 
plaintiffs in which defendants have no 
record title. While plaintiffs' and defend-
ants' land is contiguous along the mutual 
boundaries of Parcel $ 2, it is not contigu-
ous in the remainder. Therefore, plaintiffs 
argue that the judgment clouds title to 
property possessed by plaintiffs and not 
owned by defendants. Further, the judg-
ment in this case was rendered at the con-
clusion of plaintiffs' evidence on a motion 
to dismiss. 
Plaintiffs' argument has merit The 
judgment in this case should affect the 
rights of the parties to the case only. 
Rights and remedies as to other parties 
should not be adjudicated and resolved in 
this case. 
Therefore, on remand the judgment of 
dismissal should be modified to decree that 
plaintiffs' action against defendants is dis-
missed with prejudice and, as against these 
defendants, plaintiffs have no right, title or 
interest in Parcels # 1 or # 2 based on 
boundary by acquiescence. 
IV. MOTION TO AMEND 
THE PLEADINGS 
[4,5] Plaintiffs' final argument is that 
the trial court erred by refusing to amend 
the complaint to allow them to plead "ad-
verse possession" as an additional theory 
upon which to establish their ownership in 
the disputed parcels. Although Rule 15, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,11 tends to 
favor the granting of leave to amend, the 
matter remains in the sound discretion of 
the trial court.12 In denying this motion, 
the trial court cited the following reasons: 
11. The pertinent subsection, 15(b), provides: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as 
if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the 
(1) plaintiffs had earlier indicated to the 
court that they did not intend to rely upon 
adverse possession and (2) they had failed 
to show the requisite payment of taxes on 
the disputed parcels. The court's reason-
ing does not indicate an abuse of discretion. 
The case is remanded to the district court 
for entry of judgment in accordance with 
the opinions expressed herein. 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent The trial court erred in dis-
missing the plaintiffs' complaint at the end 
of the presentation of their evidence. The 
dismissal was bottomed on the failure of 
the plaintiffs to produce any evidence that 
the location of tine boundary between the 
properties was ever uncertain or in dispute. 
The trial judge apparently thought that 
Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981) 
required such evidence. 
In defense of the trial judge's action, 
admittedly there is dictum in Madspt v. 
Cleggjhat could he interpreted as imposing 
such a requirement It was for that reason 
that this writer only concurred in the result 
in that case. I thought that there was no 
boundary by acquiescence because the 
fence which allegedly was acquiesced in as 
the boundary ran in a straight line, where-
as the true line as described in the deeds of 
both of the adjoining owners had a right-
angle turn in it In view of that fact, I 
thought that the adjoining owners could 
not have reasonably believed that the fence 
was on the true boundary line. I regarded 
the reference in that case to uncertainty 
and dispute as surplusage, and directed to 
cases where a boundary is fixed by an 
express parol agreement as distinguished 
from a case of boundary by acquiescence. 
evidence and to raise these issues may be 
made upon motion of any party at any time 
12. Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., Utah. 663 P.2d 
93 (1983); Christiansen v. Utah Transit AutK 
Utah. 649 P.2d 42 (1982). 
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However, in the next boundary by acqui-
escence case decided by this Court, Halla-
day v. Cluff, Utah, 685 P.2d 500 (1984) 
proof of uncertainty and dispute was ele-
vated (albeit by dicta again) to a require-
ment. This writer in his dissenting opinion 
vigorously protested that suggestion and 
referred to Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 
16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951) where this Court in 
a unanimous opinion stated that uncertain-
ty and dispute are^significant only in cases 
involving a boundary fixed on the ground 
by_exgress par^^gre^r^nt^ofjhe adjoin-
ing owners. In such cases, if the location 
of the true boundary line is known to them, 
they cannot fix it elsewhere by their agree-
ment because such an agreement would 
contravene the statute of frauds. But we 
pointed out that uncertainty and dispute 
were not required to be shown by a party 
relying on a boundary which had been ac-
quiesced in for a long period of time but 
which had not been fixed by express parol 
agreement, citing Holmes v. Judge, 31 
Utah 269, 87 P. 1009 (1906), the first bound-
ary by acquiescence case decided by this 
Court Proof of uncertainty and dispute 
was again later rejected as a requirement 
in Motzkus v. Carroll 7 Utah 2d 237, 322 
P.2d 391 (1958). The majority misreads 
Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 
P.2d 1053 (1954). It was decided on the 
basis that the fence was never intended or 
recognized as a boundary, but was erected 
only to protect young trees from sheep. 
That case in no wise supports the necessity 
of a showing of uncertainty and dispute. 
\Madsen v. Clegg and Halladay x?. Cluff 
must bear the responsibility for imposing 
'this new requirement. 
The holding of the majority opinion today 
that uncertainty and dispute must be 
proved as an element of boundary by acqui-
escence, coupled with our recent decision in 
Halladay v. Cluff, supra, effectively 
sounds the death knell of J^^darx^X-afi-
quiescence in this state. These two cases 
have overruled sub silentio most, if not all, 
of the cases decided by this Court over the 
last eighty years in which the doctrine was 
applied. For a list of these cases, see the 
appendix to my dissenting opinion in Halla-
day v. Cluff, supra. It is useless to longer' 
pretend that application of the doctrine will" 
ever again be upheld by this Court. As i" 
pointed out in my dissenting opinion in* 
Halladay v. Cluff, it is entirely foreign to* 
the doctrine of boundary by Acquiescence^ 
toimpose^^ 
certaintjT and^ dispute. ^This is because'the^ 
very*foundation of the doctrine is that the1 
law imvlies that the adjoining landowners* 
were once uncertain or in dispute and thai*1 
the boundary was marked on the ground u l 
settlement thereof. After the parties have4 
for a long period of tame acquiesced in that1 
marked boundary, the law protects ftl 
Holmes v. Judge, supra. This implicate 
is drawn because due to the passage of 
time there is often little or no evidence 
available as to the circumstances surround^ 
ing the erection of the boundary marker^ 
Without being able to rely on the implie 
tion, the doctrine of boundary by acquie^ 
cence cannot continue to exist as a worka 
ble and viable doctrine. In many of our 
caseSjjtjs expressly stated tfiat thejaoima 
ary whichjwas acquiesced in was builtjrioi 
to.the jdme_,that the present landownei 
acquired title. Those^ predecessors in titi 
who supposedly huiltrthejnarke*d\qundar 
had moved from- the .area..or.were .dead 
There was no evidence as to how the mart 
ed Bdufiaaiycamelnto bdn^. The marked 
boundary, however, is viewed as mute evi 
dence of an agreement struck many year 
ago and acquiesced in since that time. Ab 
sent settlement of disputes under the doc 
trine of boundary by acquiescence, re-
course must now be had to surveyors who 
today with their finer and more precise 
instruments, and due to destruction of old 
monuments, often disagree with their pro 
fessional brothers who set and established 
boundaries on the properties of this state 
many years ago. All boundaries are now 
"fair game." 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not pdrtiapati 
herein. 
A P P E N D I X 
Exh ib i t "C" 
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Cite as 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984) 
evidence as to which parties' tax payment 
Susanne C. PARSONS and John M. was actually received first in years 1968 to 
Parsons, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 1970, when both parties paid taxes on same 
day. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-12. 
Glenn C. ANDERSON, Jr., Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 17827. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 31, 1984. 
Action was brought to quiet title to 
disputed strip of land along common bound-
ary. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Kenneth RigtruiL J., quieted title 
in defendant landowner on basis of bound-
ary by acquiescence and awarded damages 
to defendant for trespass. Appeals were 
taken. The Supreme Court, Hall, C J., held 
that (1) defendant landowner did not es-
tablish adverse possession; (2) there was 
no mutual acquiescence in old fence as 
boundary from 1972 onward; (3) period of 
at most 15 years of mutual acquiescence 
did not meet requirement of a "long period 
of time" necessary to establish boundary 
by acquiescence; and (4) element of dispute 
or uncertainty as to boundary which result-
ed in establishing the fence as the bound-
ary line was not established. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
1. Adverse Possession <s»93 
In order to establish adverse posses-
sion, claimant must show not only that he 
has paid taxes on the property adversely 
claimed, but that he paid them prior in time 
to payments of record titleholder for seven 
consecutive years. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-12. 
2. Adverse Possession <s=>93 
Adjoining property owner did not es-
tablish adverse possession of disputed strip 
of land along common boundary where, 
although the property owner made his tax 
payments on the disputed strip prior to 
payments made by adjoining landowners in 
1967 and from 1971 to 1976, there was no 
3. Boundaries <s=»48(l) 
In order to establish a boundary line 
by acquiescence, there must be evidence of 
occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings, a mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary for a 
long period of time by adjoining landown-
ers, and evidence of dispute or uncertainty 
as to true boundary line measured against 
an objective test 
4. Boundaries 3=48(2) 
For purpose of establishing boundary 
line by acquiescence, there was no mutual 
acquiescence between adjoining landowners 
from 1972 onward where landowners on 
east side understood that their western 
boundary was five feet to west of fence 
line, testified that they treated the five-foot 
strip as theirs, tore down significant por-
tion of the fence in 1973 and 1975 without 
objection by adjoining landowners, and 
planted trees and plants on the strip and 
used it for compost pile and for storing 
firewood. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-12. 
5. Boundaries e»48(3) 
Period of at most 15 years in adjoining 
landowners' mutual acquiescence in fence 
as boundary line did not meet requirement 
of a "long period of time" necessary to 
establish boundary line by acquiescence, 
absent unusual circumstances that might 
have justified a shorter period. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-12-12. 
6. Boundaries <^>37(5) 
For purpose of establishing boundary 
line by acquiescence, there was no evidence 
of dispute or uncertainty as to true bound-
ary line measured against an objective test 
where there was no evidence showing dis-
pute or uncertainty as to boundary which 
resulted in establishing old fence as bound-
ary line and where there was no evidence 
showing who built the fence, why it was 
built or when it was built. U.C.A.1953, 
78-12-12. 
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Thomas N. Crowther, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
Walter P. Faber, Jr., W. Chris Wicker, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respon-
dent 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs appeal a judgment of the dis-
trict court that quieted title to a disputed 
strip of land in defendant on the basis of 
boundary by acquiescence and awarded 
damages to defendant for trespass on that 
strip by plaintiffs. Defendant cross-ap-
peals the conclusion of the district court 
that defendant did not carry his burden to 
establish title to the disputed strip by ad-
verse possession. We reverse the judg-
ment of the district court and quiet title in 
plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs and defendant own adjoining 
residential properties with plaintiffs' prop-
erty situated on the east The land in 
dispute is a strip approximately 5.05 feet 
wide and 340 feet in length that lies be-
tween the respective" parcels and along the 
boundary between them.1 In 1939, title to 
this strip as well as the adjoining property 
to the east now owned by plaintiffs was 
quieted in plaintiffs' immediate predeces-
sors in interest, Lee Neff Taylor and June 
Bitner Taylor. In 1972, following Mr. Tay-
lor's death, Mrs. Taylor sold this property 
to the plaintiffs conveying by two separate 
deeds, a warranty deed and a quitclain 
deed Plaintiffs' property not in dispute 
was conveyed by warranty deed; the dis-
puted strip was conveyed by quitclaim 
deed. The description in the quitclaim deed 
was later found not to close and another 
quitclaim deed correcting the error in de-
scribing the strip in dispute was issued to 
the plaintiffs in 1979. 
Defendant acquired his property in 1972 
by warranty deed. His claim to title of the 
disputed strip arises from a quitclaim deed 
dated 1957 from Maude 0. Airis to some of 
defendant's predecessors in interest that 
included the disputed strip. There was no 
evidence in the chain of title that indicated 
that Airis had the right to convey any oi 
the disputed strip. 
1. See sketch. 
PARSONS v. ANDERSON 
Cite as WO ?2d 535 (Utah 1984) 
Disputed Str ip 
Utah 537 
Mill 
Creek 
NORTH 
t 
Old Fence 
Line 
In the Airis quitclaim deed, an "old 
fence" is used as the monument to mark 
the east boundary. A redwood fence exist-
ed in 1957 that extended for approximately 
three-quarters of the length between the 
defendant's and plaintiffs' properties. A 
wire fence extended the remainder. Plain-
tiffs tore down a significant portion of the 
fence in 1973 and 1975, leaving only about 
95 feet standing. 
In 1979, defendant began to clear the 
disputed strip with a bulldozer to build a 
bath house and assorted accessories to a 
new swimming pool on his property. Plain-
tiffs immediately objected, claiming that 
the disputed strip was their property and 
538 Utah 690 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
filed this suit to quiet title to the strip. 
Defendant counterclaimed asking for title 
to be quieted in him based on his deed, 
boundary by acquiescence and adverse pos-
session. The trial court quieted title in 
defendant on the basis of boundary by ac-
quiescence but refused to find adverse pos-
session. The court also awarded damages 
to defendant for trespass by plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs appeal that judgment, contend-
ing the evidence fails to support a finding 
of boundary by acquiescence and arguing 
that the court erred in awarding damages 
for trespass. Defendant cross-appeals the 
denial of his claim to title of the disputed 
strip based on adverse possession. 
I. ADVERSE POSSESSION 
The trial judge concluded that the evi-
dence presented by the parties as to pay-
ment of the taxes on the disputed strip did 
not meet the burden of proof required to 
prove adverse possession. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-12-12, states: 
In no case shall adverse possession be 
considered established under the provi-
sions of any section of this code, unless it 
shall be shown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven yearsLAontinuously,, and that the 
party, his predecessors and. grantors 
have paid all taxes which have been iev-
iedjincTassessed upon s^uch land accord-^  
jngj^jaw.^-, 
The evidence presented at trial indicated 
that the county assessor had levied and 
assessed property taxes on the disputed 
strip to both plaintiffs and defendant. 
Both parties paid these taxes from 1966 to 
1976 with a three-year lapse by plaintiffs. 
[1] In a case where both parties paid 
taxes on disputed la.nd, this Court, in Rio 
Grande Western Railway v. Salt Lake 
2. 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586 (1909). 
3. Id. at 540, 101 P. at 591. 
4. 1 Utah 2d 335, 266 P.2d 756 (1954); See also 
Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 983 
(1954). 
Investment Co.,1 said that "the one who 
pays first is to be deemed as having paid 
the taxes for the purpose of acquiring title 
by adverse possession."3 In Christensen 
v. Munster,* the Court held that payment 
by the record title holder of taxes prior to 
payment by the adverse possessor inter-
rupts the running of the seven-year pre-
scribed period necessary to acquire title by 
adverse possession.5 Thus, in order to es-
tablish adverse possession, the claimant, 
here defendant, must show not only that he 
has paid the taxes on the property adverse-
ly claimed, but that he paid them prior in 
time to the payments of the record title 
holder for seven consecutive years.1 This 
approach serves the primary purpose of the 
tax requirement in these cases, which is to 
increase the likelihood that the record title 
holder will be put on notice of adverse 
possession.7 
[2] In this case, the tax summaries indi-
cated that in 1967 and from 1971 to 1976, 
defendant made his tax payments prior to 
payments made by plaintiffs. In 1968 to 
1970, both parties paid the taxes on the 
same day. There is no evidence as to 
which party's tax payment was actually 
received first in those years. Therefore, 
defendant has failed to carry his burden of 
proof of showing that he paid taxes on the 
disputed property prior in time to plaintiffs 
for seven consecutive years. The trial 
court was thus correct in finding that de-
fendant did not establish adverse posses-
sion. 
II. BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
[3] In order to establish a boundary line 
by acquiescence, there must be evidence of 
(1) occupation up to a visible line marked 
byl^numents, fences or buildings, (2) mu-
tual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, 
5. Christensen, supra note 4f at 336-37, 266 P.2d 
at 757. 
6. See Neeley v. Kelsch, Utah, 600 P.2d 979 
(1979); Home Owners' loan Corp. v. Dudley, 
105 Utah 208. 141 P.2d 160 (1943). 
7. See Bowen v. Olson, supra note 4. 
PARSONS v. 
au*t(t90P2d 
(3) f or j^n£_£er ioa^ Jim^^ 
ing landowners.8 In addition, therejnust 
bel5) evidence_qf dispute or uncertainty as 
to~^jK£bpundary line jneasured against 
an objective test9 
Plaintiffs argue that none of the ele-
ments necessary to establish boundary by 
acquiescence have been met We agree 
that proof of at least some of the elements 
is lacking, most particularly those of mutu-
al acquiescence, a long period of time and 
dispute or uncertainty. 
[4] Defendant claims that a redwood 
fence located between the two properties 
marks the east boundary of his property. 
Plaintiffs, however, contend that their 
western boundary lies five feet to the west 
of the location of the fence. Testimony at 
trial indicated that there was a redwood 
fence on the property in 1957 and at least 
partially thereafter. There was no evi-
dence presented as to who built the fence, 
when it was built or why it was built 
Defendant and his predecessors in interest 
testified that they believed that the fence 
marked the boundary line between the two 
properties and treated it as such, although 
they also testified that the strip was so 
overgrown that activities by either owner 
would be difficult to see from the other 
side. Plaintiffs testified that they under-
stood that their western boundary was five 
feet to the west of the fence line and that it 
was so represented to them by the Taylors' 
son when they walked the property prior to 
buying it. Plaintiffs also testified that 
they treated the five-foot strip as theirs. It 
is undisputed that plaintiffs tore down a 
significant portion of the fence in 1973 and 
1975 without objection by defendant,10 
planted trees, shrubs and other plants on 
the disputed strip, used it for a compost 
pile and storing firewood, built a chainlink 
fence thereon and immediately objected, re-
sulting in this lawsuit, when it appeared 
8. Goodman v. Wilkinson, Utah. 629 P.2d 447 
(1981); Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 
P.2d 143 (1964). 
9. Halladav v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (1984); Mad-
sen v. Clegg, Utah. 639 P.2d 726 (1981). 
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that defendant was attempting to clear and 
build on the strip. 
Defendant contends that plaintiffs' 
predecessors in interest treated the fence 
as the boundary line and presented testimo-
ny to that effect from his predecessors in 
interest. June Bitner Taylor, plaintiffs' 
grantor, did not testify. Plaintiffs, how-
ever, argue that delivery of the quitclaim 
deed specifically describing the disputed 
strip negates the presumption that the Tay-
lors acquiesced in the fence as the bound-
ary line. 
In any event, while it is arguable that 
mutual acquiescence by both parties7 prede-
cessors in interest has been shown, given 
plaintiffs' actions from 1972 onward, there 
is little doubt that plaintiffs did not ac-
quiesce in the fence as the boundary line. 
Therefore, the most that could be said was 
that there was mutual acquiescence in the 
fence as boundary from 1957 to 1972, a 
period of fifteen years. 
^1 Fifteen years does not meet the re-
quirement "of a longjxjriodpjf time. This 
Court, in Hobson v. Panguitch Lake 
Corp.,11 said that only under unusual cir-
cumstances would any less than twenty 
years be sufficient to establish boundary 
by acquiescence. In this case, no unusual 
circumstances have been shown that might 
justify a shorter period. Therefore, in light 
of the evidence which shows a period of 
acquiescence of at most fifteen years, the 
element of a sufficiently long period of 
acquiescence has not been met 
[6] Finally, there is no evidence whatso-
ever in the record showing dispute or un-
certainty as to the boundary which resulted 
in establishing the fence as a boundary 
line.12 No evidence was presented at trial 
showing who built the fence, why it was 
built or when it was built. In addition, it 
10. Only 95 feet of the fence remains, 
sketch. 
See 
11. Utah. 530 P.2d 792 (1975). 
12. See Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (1984). 
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was undisputed at trial that title to plain-
tiffs' land including the disputed strip was 
quieted in the Taylors in 1939 and that 
Maude Airis had no interest in the disputed 
strip to convey in her 1957 quitclaim deed 
to defendant's predecessors in interest. 
No other evidence was presented that 
would indicate the fence line was ac-
quiesced in as a boundary because of some 
uncertainty or dispute as to where the 
boundary line really was. In the absence 
of this evidence, this element of boundary 
by acquiescence has not been proven, and 
boundary by acquiescence could not be es-
tablished. 
III. TRESPASS DAMAGES 
In light of our conclusion that defendant 
had no claim to ownership of the disputed 
strip, the damage award for trespass was 
inappropriate, and we need not reach the 
merits of the damages claim. 
The judgment of the trial court quieting 
title to the disputed strip in defendant and 
awarding damages to him for trespass is 
therefore reversed, and the case is remand-
ed to the district court to enter judgment in 
accordance with the opinion expressed 
herein. 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent. The majority opinion fails to 
give proper deference to the finding q£fact 
by~the trial court that -the^arties. ac-
qSescecT uTthVfence as a boundary line for 
more thanHhv^lr^years stemming jTpm 
before' 1957 ^ to'l979.~ The~fial court did 
not regard the removal of a portion of the 
fence in 1973 as breaking the acquiescence 
since it found that about that time, Mrs. 
Parsons had a conversation with Mr. An-
derson about replacing the old fence with 
the new one, that the defendants Anderson 
reasonably expected that a replacement 
fence would be built and that plaintiffs did 
not take any other action which would have 
exhibited their repudiation of the fence line 
as the boundary. The majority has over-
looked this finding of fact in its pronounce-
ment that the acquiescence was interrupted 
in 1973. 
The majority also errs in requiring proof 
that the fence was acquiesced in as a 
boundary because there was uncertainty or 
dispute among the adjoining owners as to 
the location of the true line. I pointed out 
in my dissenting opinions in Halladay v. 
Guff, 685 P.2d 500 (1984), and Stratford
 v. 
Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (1984), that evidence 
of uncertainty or dispute is not required in 
a"boundary by acquiescence case.. ToTm-
pose such a requirement in an acquiescence 
case is toWrn it ini'X).a_case_of boujndary by"* 
express^parol J^reemen^ The two means 
of establishing boundaries should notTbe 
confused: In the^elwIie^TJouh'Hary by a? 
quiescence case decided by this Court, 
Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009 
(1906), we observed that there was no evi-
dence that there had ever been any dispute 
or question over the location of the bound-
ary. We held that lack of evidence to be of 
no consequence. Although some of our 
subsequent cases have mentioned dispute 
or uncertainty, it was either dicta or the 
author was referring to boundary by ex-
press parol agreement where it is a re-
quirement The law could be no other way 
since acquiescence in a marked boundary 
rarely results from dispute or uncertainty 
as to the location of the true boundary. In 
the typical case, the parties have never 
discussed the boundary until shortly before 
the lawsuit arises. But they have both 
been content to silently abide by the mark-
ed boundary for 20 years or more, and the 
law will not thereafter allow them to de-
part from it In requiring prpofj?Luncer-
^illt^Qr_disputexj$ej^Qn 
demise of boundary by acquiescence^, as a 
means of settling boundary jiisputes, oyer 
what are often insignificant narrow strips 
o?Tand whlcF rarely add any value to the 
land of the party who seeks to upset the 
recognized boundary. ^ " ~* 
The majority opinion decries thatJ_'no_ 
evidence was presented_at Jbrial^  showing 
who built the fence, why it jvasJbuilt^or 
whenit jyasfiuilt. '* The lack of answers to 
those questions is the very stuff of which 
boundary by acquiescence cases are made. 
GODESKY v. PROVO CITY CORP. 
Cite as 690 ?2d 541 (Utah 1984) 
Evidence as tx) tho?e matters is wholly im- regarding compliance 
materials. The important fact is that the 
Utah 541 
fence was on the ground and both adjoin-
ing owners acquiesced in it as the boundary 
between their properties. In Holmes v. 
Judge, supra, the same void in the evidence 
existed. Said this Court: "The record does 
not show who constructed the fence nor 
who requested it to be built, except by 
mere inference." That lack of evidence 
was held to be of no consequence in the 
application of the rule of boundary by ac-
quiescence. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
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James GODESKY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
• . 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipal corporation, and Monticello 
Investors, a Utah limited partnership, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
No. 18475. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 12, 1984. 
Roofer brought action against city and 
building owner for injuries he sustained 
when he touched an electrical wire while 
working as part of a roofing crew. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
George E. Ballif, J., entered judgment in 
favor of roofer, and city appealed. The 
Supreme Court, J. Dennis Frederick, Dis-
trict Judge, held that: (1) trial court acted 
properly when it refused to rule as a mat-
ter of law that employee's negligence was 
the sole proximate cause of roofer's inju-
ries; (2) trial court adequately covered the 
issues of foreseeability and proximate cau-
sation; (3) instruction given by trial court 
with the national 
electric safety code was a correct state-
ment of the law and was clearer than the 
language proposed by city; and (4) city 
suffered no prejudice by trial court's in-
struction regarding its duty of care to pro-
tect persons from injury caused by its elec-
trical system. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J., concurred in separate opinion 
joined by Stewart, J. 
1. Employers' Liability ^ l 
An employer has a duty not to expose 
his employees to unreasonable dangers. 
2. Negligence <3=>62(1) 
A more recent negligent act may break 
the chain of causation and relieve the liabil-
ity of a prior negligent actor under the 
proper circumstances. 
3. Negligence «=*136(25) 
Proximate causation is generally a 
matter of fact to be determined by the 
jury. 
4. Electricity <s=>19(6) 
In action brought by employee against 
city and building owner for injuries he sus-
tained when he touched an electrical wire 
while working as part of a roofing crew, 
whether employer's negligence was the 
sole proximate cause of employee's injury 
was question for jury. 
5. Negligence <3=>62(1) 
An intervening negligent act does not 
automatically become a superseding cause 
which relieves the original actor of liability; 
the earlier actor is charged with foreseea-
ble negligent acts of others; therefore, if 
the intervening negligence is foreseeable, 
the earlier negligent act is a concurring 
cause. 
6. Electricity <3=>19(13) 
Instructions given by trial court ade-
quately covered issues of foreseeability and 
proximate causation in action brought by 
roofer against city and building owner for 
injuries he sustained when he touched an 
A P P E N D I X 
Exh ib i t "D" 
Objective Uncertainty in Boundary by 
Acquiescence: Halladay v. Cluff 
Locating boundaries between adjoining tracts of land has 
been a continual source of dispute and litigation in Utah and 
other jurisdictions.^To facilitate dispute resolution, courts have 
"employed the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The doc-
trine presumes that when a recognizable physical boundary has 
existed between adjoining tracts of land for a long period of time 
any dispute over the boundary has been resolved.1 This avoids 
controversy and prevents litigation.* 
Attempting to settle prior inconsistent case law, f;he Utah 
Supreme Court held in Halladay v. Cluff4 that "objective uncer-
tainty" must exist in the record title or in "reasonably available 
survey information" before the doctrine of boundary by acquies-
cence can be applied.1 This new requirement gives record title 
priority over previously recognized on-the-ground boundaries, 
which tends to encourage rather than discourage litigation. 
I. THE Halladay CASE 
In 1947 defendants Perry and Norma Bigelow purchased a 
231-by-59-foot parcel of real property in Provo, Utah. In 1948 
defendant Norma Cluff purchased a neighboring parcel of ap-
proximately the same dimensions.1 When the Bigelows and Cluff 
purchased the lots, a fence surrounding the two lots included an 
additional 52 Vi-feet behind the rear property line of the two 
lots. This extension apparently resulted from the assumption 
that the 231-foot depth of the lots extended from the edge of the 
street fronting the lots rather than from points across the street 
as indicated in the legal description.7 In 1958 plaintiffs Mack and 
1. Note, Boundarie* by Agreement and Acquieicence in Utah, 1975 UTAH U R*V. 
221. 
2. Bftum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974); Note, tupra not* 1, at 224. 
3. Hobaon v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 630 P.2d 792, 794 (Utah 1975); OUan v. Park 
Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145, 147 (1973). 
4. Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). 
5. Id. at 507. 
6. Id. at 501. 
7. Id. 
711 
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Merle Halladay, who already owned property on the opposite 
side of the fence, purchased the fifty-two-foot strip of disputed 
property.8 
The Bigelows and Cluff assumed they owned the fifty-two-
foot strip in their backyards. Accordingly, they cultivated gar-
dens and built and maintained chicken coops on the property.* 
On one occasion in the 1950's, Mr. Halladay informed Mr. Bige-
low that the Halladays claimed the disputed property. On sev-
eral occasions in the 1970's, Mr, Halladay asked Mr. Bigelow not 
to use the disputed parcel. The Halladays and ClufF did not dis-
cuss the property line until shortly before the litigation 
commenced.10 
In 1956 the Bigelows paid for a survey that indicated they 
did not own the disputed parcel. However, the Bigelows and 
Cluff believed the survey to be erroneous. In 1975 Cluff obtained 
a plat that also indicated that the Bigelows and Cluff did not 
own the disputed fifty-two-foot strip.11 In 1979 the Halladays 
commenced this action to quiet title to the property. The 
Bigelows and Cluff counterclaimed to quiet title in themselves 
on the ground of boundary by acquiescence. The district court 
held for the Bigelows and ClufF, and the Halladays appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court. The Halladays claimed boundary by 
acquiescence does not apply when the location of the boundary 
is not disputed or uncertain." 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding 
that a party who claims boundary by acquiescence must show 
"objective uncertainty" regarding the true location of the 
boundary.1* The court reasoned that boundary by acquiescence 
did not apply in this case since neither the Bigelows nor Cluff 
had record title to the disputed property.14 
In concluding that objective uncertainty is a requisite ele-
ment of boundary by acquiescence, the court examined its ear-
lier cases and noted that while it had required dispute or uncer-
tainty in many recent cases, it had ignored the element in 
others." Cases that required dispute or uncertainty were split on 
S Id 
9 Id 
10 Id at 502 
11 Id at 601 02 
12 Id at 602 
13 Id at 607 
14 Id 
15 Id at 603 04 Much of the confusion regarding tht element of dispute or uncer-
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the question of whether dispute or uncertainty should be mea-
sured objectively or subjectively. In some cases the court re-
quired dispute or uncertainty to be traceable to an objectively 
determinable ambiguity in a deed or survey.1* However, in other 
cases the court found mere lack of knowledge sufficient.17 
The court reasoned that the interest in encouraging reliance 
on property dimensions as recorded in the county records out-
weighed the interest in confirming boundaries that have been 
recognized on the ground for a long period of time. Thus, the 
court opte& for an objective test that made objective uncertainty 
an element of boundary by acquiescence. Although the require-
ment of dispute or uncertainty is not new to boundary by acqui-
escence in Utah, the court's requirement and definition of objec-
tive uncertainty will significantly effect future boundary by 
acquiescence cases. 
Justice Howe authored a spirited dissent criticizing the ma-
jority's objective uncertainty requirement. He argued that 
"[s]uch a requirement [is] entirely foreign to the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence because the basis of the doctrine is 
that the law implies that there once existed uncertainty and dis-
pute and that the adjoining landowners mutually agreed upon 
the marked boundary in settlement."1* Justice Howe reasoned 
that the implication of uncertainty and settlement is essential to 
the doctrine "because due to the passage of time, there is often 
little or no evidence available [regarding] the erection of the 
boundary marker."1* Justice Howe further argued that "proof of 
uncertainty or dispute is not and never has been an ingredient' 
or element of a cause of action for boundary by acquiescence."10 
Rather, such proof has only been required in boundary by agree-
ment cases. 
tamty is attributable to the intermingling of the requirements of boundary by acquies 
cence and the requirements of boundary by agreement Originally the element was men-
tioned only in connection with boundary by agreement. Beginning with Tripp v Bagley, 
74 Utah 57, 276 P 912 (1928), the Utah Supreme Court referred to uncertainty or die 
puts as an element of boundary by acquiescence Since that time, Utah caw* have been 
inconsistent in their treatment of the element of dispute or uncertainty 
16 Glenn v Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 273, 209 P 2d 257, 260 (1949), Note, tupra note 
1, at 231 32 
17 Ekberg v Bates, 121 Utah 123, 127, 239 P 2d 205, 207 (1951) (quoting Willie v 
Local Realty Co, 110 Utah 523, 631, 175 P 2d 718, 723 (1946)) 
18 Halladay, 685 P 2d at 511 (Howe, J , concurring & dissenting) 
19 Id at 612 (Howe, J , concurring & dissenting) 
£0 la at 51U 11 (Howe, J , concurring & dissenting) 
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II. ANALYSIS 
The requirement of objective uncertainty invites increased 
litigation and thereby defeats the basic rationale for adopting 
boundary by acquiescence. Making objective uncertainty an ele-
ment of boundary by acquiescence causes previously recognized 
on-the-ground boundaries to be uncertain. Consequently, land-
owners may initiate litigation to increase the acreage of their 
property.*1 Boundary disputes presumed to have been settled 
prior to the Halladay case may now be reopened and litigated. 
A. The Doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has four consis-
tent elements in Utah case law: (1) occupation up to a visible 
line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; (2) with mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) for a long period of 
time; (4) by adjoining landowners." To prove the first element, 
the party claiming boundary by acquiescence must show that 
the respective parties either actually or constructively occupied 
the land on each side of the claimed boundary." The plaintiff 
must also show that the boundary line itself is visibly and per-
manently marked on the land by fences, buildings, or other 
monuments.*4 The second element, mutual acquiescence, re-
quires a showing that the owners accepted the line as a bound-
ary.15 Showing that the parties actually intended or agreed that 
the line be a boundary is not necessary. The party claiming 
boundary by acquiescence need only show that the parties al-
lowed the boundary to stand for a long period of time." 
At least one state has held that the statutory period for ad-
verse possession (generally seven years) is sufficiently long to 
Batisfy the third element, which requires a long period of time.17 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has held "[ojnly under un-
usual circumstances would a period less [than 20 years) be 
21. Of course a judicial change would not alter the legal description found in the 
record title, but it would increase the on-the-ground acreage available for use. 
22. Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 44S (Utah 1981); Fuoco v. Williams, 18 
Utah 2d 282, 284, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966). 
23. Harding v. Allen, 10 Utah 2d 370, 37374, 363 P.2d 911. 913-14 (i960). 
24. Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 286, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966). 
26. Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 120, 605 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973). 
26. Id. 
27. Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wash. 2d 587, 434 P.2d 565 (1967). 
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deemed sufficient."" The fourth element requires a showing that 
the acquiescence is by adjoining landowners." Thus, the doc-
trine does not apply if the alleged boundary belongs to a single 
owner or if the lands of different owners are separated by a strip 
of land belonging to a third person. 
Some Utah cases additionally have required that the adjoin-
ing landowners dispute, or be uncertain over, the true location of 
the boundary." As previously noted, the issue in Halladay was 
whether this uncertainty is a required element of boundary by 
acquiescence and, if so, whether the uncertainty must be tracea-
ble to an objectively determinable ambiguity in a deed or survey 
or whether mere lack of knowledge is sufficient.11 
1. The rationale 
The basic reason for applying the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence is that it avoids litigation. The good order of soci-
ety requires stability in the ownership and occupation of land. 
Therefore, courts have sought to avoid litigation and controversy 
by declining to disturb long-established boundary lines that 
have been accepted by the concerned parties." In Baum v. 
Defa" the Utah Supreme Court said: 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives from realiza-
28. Wood v. Mymp, 681 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1984) (quoting Hobton v. Panguitch 
Lake Corp., 630 P.2d 792, 795 (Utah 1976)); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 136, 141-42. 378 
P.2d 893, 897 (1963). 
29. Note, $upra note 1, at 228-29. 
30. Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981). But tee Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 
P.2d 447 (Utah 1981) (making no mention of a showing of uncertainty or dispute). Other 
jurisdictions that recognize boundary by acquieacence are split on whether dispute or 
uncertainty is a required element of the doctrine. Dispute or uncertainty is not required 
in New Mexico, Sprolee v. McDonald, 70 N.M. 168, 173, 372 P.2d 122, 126 (1962), or 
Washington. Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wash. 2d 587, 693, 434 P.2d 566, 569 (1967). But it is 
required in Idaho. Lisher v. Kraaselt, 94 Idaho 513, 616, 492 P.2d 52, 66 (1962). 
31. Halladay, 686 P.2d at 603-06. Early cases were also inconsistent regarding this 
rule. See Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949), which required the ele-
ment of dispute or uncertainty and held that "lack of knowledge as to the location of the 
boundary is not synonymous with uncertainty." Id. at 272-73, 209 P.2d at 260. The court 
in Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951) (quoting Willie v. Local Realty 
Co., 110 Utah 623, 631,175 P.2d 718, 723 (1946)), rejected this objective measurement in 
favor of a subjective test in which "a boundary line may be 'uncertain' or 'in dispute' 
even though it is capable of being readily ascertained." Ekberg, 121 Utah at 127, 239 
P.2d at 207. 
32. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 794 (Utah 1975); Baum v. Defa, 
526 P.2d 726. 726 (Utah 1974). 
33. 625 P.2d 726 (Utah 1974). 
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tion, ancient in our law, that peace and good order of society is 
best served by leaving at rest possible disputes over long estab-
lished boundaries. Its essence is that where there has been any 
type of a recognizable physical boundary, which has been ac-
cepted as such for a long period of time, it should be presumed 
that any dispute or disagreement over the boundary has been 
reconciled in some manner.14 
A second, less frequently invoked, rationale for the doctrine is 
that it minimizes conflict with the statute of frauds, which for-
bids the transfer of an interest in real property without a written 
conveyance.8* 
The court in Halladay indicated that requiring objective 
uncertainty would minimize reliance on boundary by acquies-
cence and thereby advance both rationales.86 Arguably, requiring 
objective uncertainty does advance the statute of frauds ration-
ale. However, close analysis of the doctrine indicates the require-
ment will result in increased litigation. Therefore, the basic ra-
tionale of preventing litigation is defeated by the objective 
uncertainty requirement. 
2. Definition of objective uncertainty 
Although some Utah cases have required dispute or uncer-
tainty, objective uncertainty was not a settled element of bound-
ary by acquiescence prior to Halladay. In making objective un-
certainty an element of the doctrine, the court said, " '[DJispute* 
is not proved by a mere difference of opinion, and 'uncertainty* 
is not proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge of the true 
location of the boundary.' "8T The court then formulated the fol-
lowing test: 
Under the rule as we have defined it here, the property line on 
the record title cannot be displaced by another boundary un-
less it is shown that during the period of acquiescence there 
was some objectively measurable circumstance in the record ti-
tle or in the reasonably available survey information (or other 
technique by which record title information was located on the 
ground) that would have prevented a landowner, as a practical 
34. Id. at 720. 
35. Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1981); Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 
71-72, 276 P. 912, 917-18 (1928). 
36. Halladay, 686 P.2d at 605. 
37. Id. (citing Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 273, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949)). 
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matter, from being reasonably certain about the true location 
of the boundary.** 
The court's definition of objective uncertainty requires a de-
termination of whether there was "reasonably available survey 
jiiformation." This phrase appears to originate, and is defined," 
in the Halladay case: 
In general, when survey information is reasonably available 
(such as when reliable survey control points are accessible to 
the land and survey costs are not disproportionate to the value 
of the land) so that it is reasonable to expect the parties to 
locate their boundary on the ground by surveys, the courts 
should be less willing to apply the doctrine of boundary by ac-
quiescence. This reasonable availability of survey information 
obviously varies from place to place and from time to time. 
However, it can be said in general that survey information is 
more available and its cost is less likely to be disproportionate' 
in relation to the value of the land in the city and platted areai 
than in rural or wilderness areas.*9 
The court's requirement of objective uncertainty and its 
definition of "reasonably available survey information" compli-
cate the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Utah courts will 
now have to determine whetherjthe land is rur l^ or urban and 
whether the cost of a survejTis disproportionate to the value of 
theJan^-THese inquiries tend to encourage and prolong litiga-~ 
tibn rather than prevent it, thereby contravening the primary 
rationale for boundary by acquiescence. 
B. Applying the Element of Objective Uncertainty 
The pre-Halloday rule of boundary by acquiescence was 
based on the policy of confirming boundaries that had been rec-
ognized on the ground for a long period of time. In contrast, the 
Halladay court's requirement of objective uncertainty is based 
on the policy of encouraging reliance on the dimensions shown 
in the county records.40 By shifting the emphasis from estab-
lished boundary lines to county records, the Halladay court has 
38. Halladay. 685 P.2d at 505. The Utah Supreme Court recently quoted this lan-
guage in reaffirming that objective uncertainty ia a neceaaary element in boundary by 
acquiescence. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah 1984). 
39. Id. at 504. 
40. See id. 
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undermined the previous rationale and presumption of bound-
ary by acquiescence. 
1. Movement of on-the-ground boundaries 
Boundary by acquiescence cases generally arise in two situa-
tions. In the first situation the true location of the boundary is 
not ascertainable because of some uncertainty in the record title 
or survey and a boundary was erected which may or may not be 
the true boundary,41 In the second situation the true boundary is 
ascertainable but the physical boundary was erected somewhere 
other than on the true boundary.41 
In the first situation, the additional requirement of objec-
tive uncertainty makes no difference. If the other four elements 
of the doctrine are satisfied, the on-the-ground boundary will be 
allowed to stand regardless of the requirement of objective un-
certainty. In the second situation, the requirement of objective 
uncertainty makes a difference. If objective uncertainty is not 
required and the other four elements are met, the on-the-ground 
boundary is allowed to stand. However, if objective uncertainty 
is made an element of the doctrine, the on-the-ground boundary 
will be moved because objective uncertainty was not present, 
even though the other four elements of the doctrine may be met. 
When objective uncertainty is made an element of the doc-
trine, the property owner in the second situation who could in-
crease his acreage by moving the on-the-ground boundary is en-
couraged to bring action to quiet title to the additional property. 
Prior to Halladay, the landowner had no incentive to file a quiet 
title action because if the other four elements of the doctrine 
were satisfied, the on-the-ground boundary could not be moved. 
However, the objective uncertainty requirement allows one land-
owner to take possession of property previously occupied by an-
other landowner, thus creating an adversarial situation. Since 
the landowner whose acreage will be decreased by the move has 
occupied the land for over twenty years, he will not likely give 
up the property without litigation. 
41. See Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 105. 110-11, 369 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1962); 
Jensen v. Bartlett, 4 Utah 2d 68, 60, 286 P.2d 804, 806 (1956). 
42. See Halladay, 686 P.2d at 501-02; Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 448 
(Utah 1981); Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 666, 667 (Utah 1979). 
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2. Reasonably available survey information 
The court's definition of "reasonably available survey infor-
mation" also encourages litigation. The definition requires 
courts to inquire into the value of the property in dispute, the 
costs of the survey in proportion to the value of the property, 
and the nature of the property—whether rural or urban.4* If the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is restricted to the tradi-
tional four elements, adjoining landowners can predict with rea-
sonable certainty how a court will rule on a boundary dispute. 
Therefore, in many cases litigating the dispute is unnecessary. 
However, since the Halladay courts definition of reasonably 
available survey information requires a factual determination in-
volving several variables, parties will not be able accurately to 
predict how a court will rule on a dispute. As a result, parties 
will initiate litigation and hope the court will determine the 
facts in their favor. 
The factual variables the court must consider are subject to 
change over time. This may cause inconsistent results that tend 
to increase litigation. Situations could arise in which a court will 
not require a survey because the cost of the survey is dispropor-
tionate to the land, even though a survey would resolve the am-
biguities in the record title. Since the ambiguity is not resolved, 
objective uncertainty will be found and the on-the-ground 
boundary will not be moved. Further, because property values 
frequently vary, a court facing a similar boundary dispute a year 
later may require a survey if the increased value of the land now 
makes a survey feasible. In that situation the ambiguity would 
be resolved and there would be no objective uncertainty. The 
cases would be resolved differently simply because the land in-
creased in value. Such inconsistent results will make it difficult 
for landowners to predict how the court would rule on their dis-
putes. Therefore, the parties will seek litigation rather than set-
tling on the basis of prior cases. 
Additionally, the definition of reasonably available survey 
information requires the court to make so many factual determi-
nations that it increases not only the amount of litigation but 
also the length of time spent litigating. In contrast, requiring 
only the traditional four elements of boundary by acquiescence 
43. Halladay, 686 P.2d at 604. 
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would discourage litigation and thus further the traditional pur-
pose of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Halladay is a significant development in the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Utah Supreme Court 
added the requirement of objective uncertainty to the four pre-
viously recognized teste. This marks a shift away from the tradi-
tional deference afforded long-recognized on-the-ground bound-
aries and toward protection of property dimensions as recorded. 
Although reliance on county records is a legitimate policy con-
sideration, in the boundary by acquiescence context the new re-
quirement tends to increase litigation, thus defeating the tradi-
tional rationale for boundary by acquiescence. 
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counsel until after the child was surrendered. He filed a notice of 
paternity within hours of the child's birth and commenced court 
proceedings within one week, prior to the filing of an adoption 
petition.4*4 
Sanchez is significant because it marks a departure from the 
policies underlying the Utah statute that were relied on in Ellis 
and Wells. The Utah statute is designed to resolve the competing 
interests of the illegitimate child and the man who claims to be its 
father.446 The court noted in Wells that the statute provides a 
means "(1) of promptly determining whether there is a man who 
will acknowledge paternity and assume the responsibility of 
parenthood, and if not, (2) of speedily making the child available 
for adoption."411 Because Sanchez desired to claim paternity and 
acknowledged responsibility for his child on many occasions, legis-
lative intent would have been preserved by allowing Sanchez to 
claim parental rights despite his imperfect compliance with the 
statute. Sanchez therefore represents an abandonment of the legis-
lative purpose in favor of a policy of "discouraging litigation"4*7 in 
adoption cases. 
Further, Sanchez marks an abandonment of the principled 
analysis developed in Ellis and Wells to determine if failure to 
comply with the statute was justified. Rather than analyze whether 
it was "impossible" and "through no fault" of Sanchez that the 
454. Id. The dissent considered the purpose of the filing deadline to feciliUte and 
secure homes for children whose fathers are uncaring, not to "encourage a 'race' for place-
ment to cut off the rights of fathers who are identified and present" Further, the dissent 
noted that the majority's concern of prolonged litigation was unfounded because in the vast 
majority of cases, the unwed father ie unlikely to claim parental right*. Id. at 767. 
The dissent further pointed out that under Utah's statutory scheme, parental rights are 
terminated well before a third party may obtain parental rights to an illegitimate child. See 
UTAH COOT ANN. | 78-30-4(3)(d) (1983 Supp.). Parental rights are terminated on the child's 
surrender to an adoption agency and an adoption petition cannot be filed until this time. 
Moreover, the first tune anyone is obligated to check for a notice of parental righto is during 
adoption proceedings, which cannot take place for a minimum of six months after the filing 
of an adoption petition. Added flexibility in the statutory filing deadline, therefore, would 
not prejudice third parties. Set 680 P.2d at 767. 
466. Walla v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 681 P.2d 190, 204 (Utah 1084). 
466. Id. 
467. Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 766. This change in philosophy is contrary to United States 
Supreme Court cases indicating that the underlying policy in terminating parental righto is 
to make children available for adoption immediately when the natural father is unwilling to 
assume responsibility for the child. See Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct 2066, 2996 (1083). In 
Csban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1070), the Supreme Court held that where a father 
demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "coming forward to 
participate in the rearing of hie child," his interest in personal contact with hie child ac-
quires substantial protection under the due process clause. Id. at 302. 
No. 1] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 193 
filing deadline was not met, the court merely stated that u Wells 
controls the issue here."411 The court may or may not have found 
the Ellis exception applicable; however, the fact that those criteria 
were not mentioned emphasizes the court's strict adherence to the 
statutory filing deadline.411 
In summary, Sanchez suggests that the Ellis exception to 
compliance with the requirement of filing a notice of paternity is 
extremely limited, if an exception still exists at all. This decision 
reflects a shift in the underlying policy of the statute from one of 
eliminating parental rights of uncaring fathers to one of reducing 
litigation in adoption proceedings.411 That policy operates at the 
expense of an unwed parent who indicates a commitment to his 
child despite failure to comply with the statute. The Sanchez opin-
ion leaves no question that strict compliance with the statutory fil-
ing deadline is the only way to assure a paternal claim to an illegit-
imate child in Utah. 
VII. REAL PROPERTY 
A. Boundary by Acquiescence 
In Halladay v. Cluff,"1 the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence does not apply if the party 
relying on the doctrine cannot show "objective uncertainty" as to 
the location of the true boundary line.411 In reaching that conclu-
sion, the court purported to clarify the elements of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence and to reconcile contradictory Utah 
authority.411 Following Halladay, the court in Stratford v. 
468. Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 766. 
469. The strict interpretation of the filing deadline in Sanchez may subject the Utah 
statute to further constitutional attacks. Other states with statutory schemes similar to 
Utah's allow for notice of paternity to be filed within sixty days of birth, ninety days of 
birth, or before adoption proceedings terminate. See MINN. STAT. ANN. | 269.261(1) (West 
1982) (requiring notice within ninety days of the child's birth or within sixty days of the 
child's placement with the adoptive parents); SD CODIFIED LAWS ANN. | 26-61.1 (1984) 
(requiring notice within sixty days of the child's birth and before the entry of a final order 
in any adoption proceeding). The rapid termination of claims to parental righte in Utah 
signals what may be further constitutional challengee to the Utah statute in the future, both 
facially and aa applied. 
480. See aupro note 412 and accompanying text 
461. 686 P.2d 600 (Utah 1984). 
462. Id at 606. 
463. Id. at 603; see generally Note, Boundary by Agreement and Acquiescence in 
Utah, 1976 UTAH L. RSV. 221 (hereinafter cited as Boundary by Agreement); Note, Bound-
ary by Acquiescence, 3 UTAH L. Rav. 604 (1953) (discussing the historical development of 
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Morgan"4 again rejected a claim of acquiescence, affirming the 
"objective uncertainty" test as developed in Halladay4** These de-
cisions^ffectively eliminate boundary by acquiescence as a viable 
doctrine for settling property disputes in Utah. As a result7 long-
standing boundaries may now_ be subject to challenge.40 
Boundary by acquiescence as a means of settling boundary 
line disputes has long been recognized in Utah law.m The doc-
trine, as a rule of repose, is based on the policy that a boundary 
that has been acquiesced in for a number of years should not be 
disturbed.4** The effect is to quiet title in the claimant.4** To es-
tablish a boundary by acquiescence, the claimant must prove all of 
the following elements:470 (1) occupation up to a visible line 
marked definitely by monuments, fences or buildings;471 (2) mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary;47* (3) for a long period of 
years;471 (4) by adjoining landowners.474 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence in Utah). 
464 No. 18306 (Utah Aug. 30, 1984). The Utah court decided a second case in accord 
with Stratford the following day. See Persons v. Anderson, No. 17827, slip op. at 4 (Utah 
Aug 31, 1984). 
465. Stratford, No. 18306, slip op. at 6. 
| 466. See id. slip op. st 9 (Howe, J., dissenting) ("all boundaries sre now 'fsir game* "). 
ijThat result if particularly significant because claimants in boundary disputes in Utah uau-
jaJly are unable to rely on adverse possession as an alternate theory for quieting title in 
' occupied property. See mfra note 620; Stratford, No. 18306, slip op. at 7. 
467. See supra note 463. 
468. See Moyer v. Langton, 37 Utah 9, 106 P. 608 (1910); supra note 463. 
469. See supra note 463. 
470. See Hale v. Frakee, 600 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah 1979); Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 
282, 284, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966) (Fuoco II); Boundary by Agreement, supra note 463, at 
224. 
471. Occupation may be constructive or actual. See Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 
P.2d 1176, 1177 (Utah 1980) (cultivating the ground); King v. Pronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 138, 
378 P.2d 893, 896 (1963) (placing a mortgage or other encumbrance on the property): Dragoa 
v. Russell, 120 Utah 626, 628-29, 237 P.2d 831, 832-33 (1961) (building or other improve-
ments). The boundary line mutt alto be marked clearly and visible. See Brown v. Peterson 
Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1176, 1176 (1980) (fence and irrigation ditch); Davia v. Lynham, 67 Utah 
283, 287, 247 P. 294, 296 (1926) (buildings and trees); Bartholomew v. Pickett, 61 Utah 312, 
314, 170 P. 66, 66 (1917) (fence lines and ditchee). But see Fuoco II, 18 Utah 2d 282, 286, 
421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966) (rejecting an irrigation ditch aa a boundary line where the ditch 
was subject to "shifting or obliteration by erosion"). 
472. See infra notes 476-78 and accompanying text 
473. In most states, this period is the same as the limitations period for adverse pos-
session. Boundary by Agreement, supra note 463, at 228 & n.67. Early Utah cases accepted 
that view, requiring only a seven-year period of acquiescence. See Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 
123, 239 P.2d 206, 208 (1951) (although the parties had acquiesced in the boundary for 
fourteen years, the court indicated in dicta that it would accept the seven-year limitations 
period for adverse possession), overruled on other grounds, Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 
1268 (Utah 1984) (eleven years was insufficient). More recently, the court has estended the 
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The element of mutual acquiescence has generated the great-
est amount of controversy in Utah.47* Acquiescence has been de-
fined as "indolence," or "consent by silence/'4'* and generally re-
quires that both property owners recognize and accept the line as 
the boundary.477 Boundary by acquiescence will not exist where 
one party consistently maintains that the marked line is not the 
boundary, even though the line remains visible and the other party 
occupies up to it.47* Thus, although mutual acquiescence does not 
require express agreement, there cannot be express disagreement. 
In some earlier cases, the Utah court has accepted lack of un-
certainty or dispute over the location of the boundary line as a 
defense to boundary by acquiescence.47* In Glen u. Whitney,4** the 
court suggested that where the parties did not know where the true 
location of the boundary was but where it could have been deter-
mined, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence was inapplica-
ble.4*1 However, the court rejected that position in Brown u. Milli-
n?rt4*L, stating that a party relying on boundary by acquiescence 
was not required "to produce evidence that the location of the true 
boundary line was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute."4** Most 
cases adopt this latter rule and imply dispute and subsequent ac-
quiescence from the parties' conduct during the requisite period of 
time.4*4 Thus disputing landowners could be bound by the conduct 
acquiescence period to require at least twenty years. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 
P.2d 792, 796 (Utah 1975) (accepting twenty years); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 140 42, 
37S P.2d 893, 896-97 (1963) (twenty years eicept in unusual circumstances). 
474. See Baum v. Defa, 625 P.2d 726, 727 (Utah 1974) (fence erected when land on 
both aides was owned by the same person did not imply an intention of creating a bound-
ary); Fuoco II, 18 Utah 2d 282, 286. 421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966) (acquiescence by tenants to 
boundary marked by irrigation ditch was not sufficient; acquiescence of landowner was 
required).' 
475. The court has been unable to agree whether the test for acquiescence is subjective 
or objective. Compare Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 120, 506 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973) 
(objective indolence sufficient) with Wright v. Cliaaold, 521 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah 1974) 
(subjective test applied to find no acquiescence). 
476. Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 119-20, 506 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973). 
477. See Fuoco II, 18 Utah 2d 283, 286, 421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966). 
478. See. ej., Leon v. Danaie, 639 P.2d 730, 731 (Utah 1981); Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 
Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954). 
479. Glenn v. Whitney. 116 Utah 267, 272-73, 209 P.2d 267, 260 (1949). 
480. 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949). 
481. Id at 272, 209 P 2d at 260. 
482. 120 Utah 16, 232 P 2d 202 (1951). 
483. Id at 26, 232 P. 2d at 208. 
484. Id, 232 P.2d at 208; see also MoUkus v. Carroll. 7 Utah 2d 237, 243, 322 P 2d 
391, 396 (1968) (a long period of acquiescence gives rise to the presumption that the true 
boundary line was in dispute or uncertain); Binford v. Eccles, 41 Utah 463, 458. 126 P. 333. 
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of their predecessors who had acquiesced in a boundary for a long 
period of time.4fi 
Despite the fact that uncertainty or dispute could be implied 
from a long period of acquiescence, the opposing party still could 
defeat the claim of boundary by acquiescence by rebutting any 
other prima facie element.4** Thus if the opposing party could 
show that the claimant or his or her predecessors in interest knew 
the accurate location of the boundary, that the marked line was 
intended for other purposes or that the line had not existed for the 
requisite number of years, the claim of boundary by acquiescence 
would fail.4*7 
In Halladay v. Cluff,4" the Utah Supreme Court accepted the 
established elements of boundary by acquiescence but added a 
fifth element of objective uncertainty.4** In Halladay, the parties 
disputed the ownership of a 52.5-by-118-foot parcel of property in 
the City of Provo. Three property owners were involved. Defen-
dants Bigelow and Cluff bought their property in 1947 and 1948, 
respectively. Both assumed that their north property line extended 
to a fence that had been built in the 1930*8. In 1956, nine years 
after he purchased the property, Bigelow had a survey made that 
placed the north property line several feet south of the existing 
fence. Both Bigelow and Cluff apparently believed the survey to be 
in error and continued to occupy the property up to the fence.4*0 
During this period of adjoining ownership, the Halladays main-
tained that the fence did not mark the correct boundary line and 
so informed the claimants on one occasion in the 1950*8 and sev-
eral times during the 1970'B.491 The Halladays commenced their ac-
tion to quiet title in 1979. 
335 (1912) (adopting the rule of implied agreement where one party claimed certain surplus 
ground and her neighbor acquiesced in the line regardless of the deed description); Holmes 
v. Judgt, 31 Utah 269, 281, 87 P. 1009, 1014 (1906) ("the law will imply an agreement fixing 
the boundary as located and will not permit the parties or their grantors to depart from 
such lines"). 
485. See Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951), overruled on other 
grounds, Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1984); Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 
Utah 623, 531, 175 P.2d 718, 723 (1946); supra note 484. 
486. See Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979). 
487. Boundary by Agreement, supra note 463, at 229-30. 
488. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). 
489. Id. at 505; see also Parsons v. Anderson, No. 17817, slip op. at 4 (Utah Aug. 31, 
1984) (referring to a fifth element as "evidence of dispute or uncertainty aa to the true 
boundary line measured against an objective teat," citing Halladay). 
490. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 501-02. 
491. Id. at 502. 
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The district court quieted title in the defendants, finding 
boundary by acquiescence. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, rea-
soning that the claimants Cluff and Bigelow could not assert 
boundary by acquiescence where they had previously surveyed the 
property and had "reason to know the true location of the bound-
ary during the period of acquiescence."491 
Under the facts of the case, the same result could have been 
reached by applying the established test for boundary by acquies-
cence. The claimants examined surveys prior to the running of the 
period of acquiescence and had actual knowledge that the fence 
did not represent the true boundary. In addition, the plaintiffs 
consistently claimed ownership of the parcel.491 Thus, under prior 
case law, boundary by acquiescence could have been rebutted; mu-
tual acquiescence would not exist where there was an express disa-
greement between the parties on the location of the line and uncer-
tainty would not be implied where the opposing party could show 
that there was no dispute or that the true boundary was known to 
the respective owners.494 
The court, however, chose not to reject the claimant's position 
based on the established criteria for a prima facie case but instead 
argued for a "return to a more rigorous definition" of "dispute."4" 
Rejecting the rule that a dispute may be implied from acquies-
cence, the court held that the claimant must demonstrate the exis-
tence of uncertainty or dispute about the true location of the 
boundary line during the period of acquiescence.4** Additionally, 
the court held that a dispute or uncertainty could not be premised 
on "a mere difference of opinion" or "lack of actual knowledge of 
the true location of the boundary."4*7 Rather, a claimant must pre-
sent "some objectively measurable circumstance in the record title 
or in the reasonably available survey information . . . that would 
have prevented a landowner, as a practical matter, from being rea-
492. Id. at 506. 
493. Id. at 502. 
494. Id. at 508 (Howe, J., concurring and ditaenting). Justice Howe cites the following 
cases where the claim of boundary by acquiescence failed because the true boundary was 
known to the owners: Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981); Florence v. Hiline Equip-
ment Co., 581 P.2d 998 (Utah 1978); Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718 
(1946); Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928); see also supra note 478 and accom-
panying text. 
495. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 505. 
496. Id. 
497. Id. 
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sonably certain about the true location of the boundary."01 Thus 
the court transformed the questionable defense of lack of uncer-
tainty into a key requirement for maintaining a claim of boundary 
by acquiescence.490 
The court's holding departs from prior law that emphasized 
actual knowledge of the true boundary. Under that approach, ac-
quiescence coupled with lack of actual knowledge could imply un-
certainty, even though a survey might have placed the line accu-
rately. Under the Halladay rule, however, if there is any 
information that could locate the true boundary line, there is no 
uncertainty and the claim of boundary by acquiescence will fail. 
That is true even if a survey was not made during the period of 
acquiescence, or the opposing party made no claim to the prop-
erty.500 That change in the law severely limits application of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
While the "objective uncertainty" requirement of Halladay 
may have been dicta under the facts of the case,601 Stratford v. 
Morgan™ elevated that dicta to a rule of law. In Stratford, the 
court held that where a deed description establishes the true loca-
tion of a common boundary, there is no objective uncertainty as 
required by Halladay and boundary by acquiescence will not 
apply."* 
JStratfordjaiBkes it clear that the element of objective uncer-
tainty will limit the future application of the doctrine. The claim-
ants in Stratford met the requirements for a prima facie case of 
boundary by acquiescence under prior Utah law. The claimants 
and their predecessors in interest had occupied the property up to 
a visible fence line for nearly thirty years. However, according to a 
survey made after the running of the period of acquiescence, the 
fence line did not agree with the metes and bounds description in 
the deeds of both parties,*04 Because the true boundary was ascer-
tainable from the deed descriptions, the court held that the test of 
objective uncertainty was not met. 
Justice Howe, dissenting in both Halladay*0* and Strat-
us. Id. 
499. See supra notes 479-85 and accompanying text 
500. See infra note 503 and accompanying text. 
501. Halladay, 885 P.2d at 508 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting). 
502. No. 18306 (Utah Aug. 30, 1984). 
503. Id. slip op. at 5. 
504. Id slip op. at 1-3. The occupation of the property by the claimant* included 
building a fishpond and an exercise track for their horses. Id. 
505. 685 P.2d 500, 508 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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ford*0* argued that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has 
been applied restrictively in Utah and need not be limited further 
by the requirement of objective uncertainty.W7 Justice Howe also 
emphasized the policy reasons for accepting the doctrine, stating 
that it has provided a basis for settling disputes over insignificant 
amounts of land.900 In addition, the doctrine has discouraged dis-
putes in cases where a recent survey conflicts with long recognized 
boundaries.*0* Justice^Howe^concluded that JStratford coupled with 
Halladay "effectively sounds the death knell of boundary by ac-
quiescence in this state,"*10 
v
 Justice Howe's prognosis for the application of boundary by 
acquiescence is probably correct.111 The doctrine, as restricted by 
506. Stratford, No. 18306, slip op. at 8 (Howe, J., dissenting). 
507. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 508 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting). 
608. Id. 
509. Id. at 514. 
510. Stratford, No. 18806, slip op. at 9. 
511. The majority opinion in Halladay, 685 P.2d at 505-06, cites the following cases 
where the test of objective uncertainty would be met: Joaquin v. Shiloh Orchards, 84 Cal. 
App. 3d 192, 194,138 Cal. Rptr. 495, 496 (1978) (landmarks referenced in deeds have disap-
peared); Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 106, 110-11, 369 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1962) (metes and 
bounds descriptions that do not close); Moxkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d 237, 322 P.2d 391, 393 
(1958) (uncertainties or disputes created by conflicting terms in deeds, such as overlapping 
descriptions); Jensen v. Bartlett, 4 Utah 2d 58, 60, 286 P.2d 804, 806 (1955) (no official or 
original plat or survey by which the boundary lines can be located); id. at 60, 286 P.2d at 
806 (disagreement among different surveyors on the location of the boundary line); Young v. 
Hyland, 37 Utah 229, 233, 108 P. 1124, 1126 (1910) (internal inconsistencies in the plat); 
Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 271, 87 P. 1009-10 (1906) (inability to locate monuments 
established in the original survey). 
However, in reviewing twenty-six cases where the doctrine has been successfully in-
voked in Utah, the author of this development found only twelve that would likely survive 
the standard of objective uncertainty. An example of a case that decreed title by acquies-
cence prior to Halladay and Stratford that would probably not meet the test of objective 
uncertainty includes the situation where there U a valid survey, plat or deed description 
available but where the court determined the boundary line to be a fence or other marker 
that the parties had acquiesced in for the requisite period of years. See Brown v. Peterson 
Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980) (no survey had been made but the boundary could 
have been located from the record title); Baum v. Defa, 625 P.2d 725 (Utah 1974) (survey 
available); Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 506 P 2d 1199 (1973) (boundary ascertainable 
from the metes and bounds description); Universal Inv. Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 36, 
484 P.2d 173 (1971) (boundary could have been determined from the deed information, 
placing the boundary line through the claimant's home); Johnson v. Sessions, 25 Utah 2d 
133, 477 P.2d 788 (1970) (survey available); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 P.2d 893 
(1963) (boundary determinable by reference to the plat); Harding v. Allen, 10 Utah 2d 370, 
363 P.2d 911 (1960) (accurate survey available); Provonsha v. Pitman, 6 Utah 2d 26, 305 
P.2d 486 (1967) (line ascertainable by survey); Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 
(1951) (survey located true boundary), overruled on other grounds, Wood v. Myrup, 681 
P.2d 1255 (Utah 1984); Dragos v. Russell, 120 Utah 626, 237 P.2d 831 (1951) (deed line 
ascertainable by survey); Willie- v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718 (1946) 
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the court, applies only where it can be affirmatively shown that it 
was not possible for the two parties to determine their actual deed 
lines by survey at the time the fence or other boundary markers 
were placed.11* Even where a boundary marker has been acqui-
esced in for over twenty years, the doctrine would not apply if 
twenty years ago the fence or marker could have been placed on 
the true boundary line. It is difficult to imagine many circum-
stances where the parties could not have correctly surveyed their 
properties.1" Where a survey has not been made or where it can-
not be shown that the survey made was erroneous or inconsistent, 
the law no longer will imply uncertainty or dispute and subsequent 
agreement or mutual acquiescence in the location of a boundary. 
Rather, the claimant must be able to prove that the boundary dis-
pute could not be resolved by a survey made at any time during 
the period of acquiescence.114 
The court in Halladay opted for a "bright line" test. That 
test, however, may defeat the purpose of the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence for it disregards the conduct of the property own-
ers and their successors in interest during the period of acquies-
cence and ignores the element of occupation.'11 Those are the pre-
cise factors that the doctrine was designed to take into account in 
(accurate survey available); Davis v. Lynham, 67 Utah 283, 247 P. 294 (1926) (metes and 
bounds description in deed); Warren v. Mazxuchl, 46 Utah 612, 148 P. 360 (1915) (current 
survey available); Moyer v. Lanfton, 37 Utah 9, 106 P. 608 (1910) (court used a fence as 
evidence of 'the monuments used in the prior survey where the original monuments had 
disappeared). j 
612. See infra notes 616-18 and accompanying text ' j 
613. See $upra note 611 for situations where objective uncertainty would apply. j 
614. Prior Utah law held that it is "incumbent on the party disputing title by acquies-J 
cence to prove that a boundary was not established" once the four elements of boundary byj 
acquiescence were demonstrated. Fuoco //, 18 Utah 2d 282, 284, 421 P.2d 944,946 (1966). Ial 
Halladay, the court placed the burden of proving objective uncertainty on the party claim j 
ing by acquiescence. That aspect of the court's holding wss limited to the facta of the easel 
686 P.2d 607. However, by generally requiring evidence that the landowner was prevented! 
from accurately locating the boundary and by removing the implication of uncertaintfj 
where a boundary line has long been acquiesced in, the court places the burden squarely e n 
the claimant in most instances. ] | 
616. Halladay, 686 P.2d at 609 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Hotffl 
pointed to three criticisms of the court's requirement of objective uncertainty. First, a sujjjl 
vey actually may have been made but because of the lapee of time, no one who was prsssjSH 
then is alive or available to provide such evidence. Under the majority's rule the later survM 
therefore would govern. Second, the rule disregards the conduct of the owners in acquiesdagl 
to the markers on the ground. Third, the court takes on the impossible task of deUnnlningl 
whether the owners several years ago could have afforded s survey or whether the property? 
at the time would have been worth it Id. Justice Howe's concern with the Halladay teet*ofl 
ignoring the element of occupation was warranted, as is demonstrated in Stratford. SHIJ 
tupra note 604 and accompanying text 
No. 1] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 201 
settling boundary disputes.*1* While such a bright line test may 
promote reliance on the record title information,117 it is likely to 
lead to absurd practical results. In many cases the affected prop-
erty will be a narrow strip of ground. The survey costs may exceed 
the value of the property. Homes or other improvements may have 
been built on the strip of property in question. Under Halladay, 
uncertainty will not be implied in those situations and boundaries 
™}ll_be reestablished only after costly surveys and litigation.*1* 
Damages may be assessed for encroachments, and improvements 
more valuable than the property itself may be ordered removed.*1* 
Since claimants in Utah cannot rely on the doctrine of adverse 
possession to settle boundary disputes,*10 there is no effective way 
ftjrqujet titleTto small portions of land representing the difference 
between a fence line and a deed description. 
The result of Halladay and Stratford may be to convert a doc-
trine that was originally predicated on the policy of settling bound-
aries by reference to long acquiesced in lines into a doctrine that 
will serve as a basis for challenging boundaries not founded on re-
cent survey information. Thus, in contrast to the purpose of the 
court, litigation over boundaries may increase. In that event, the 
solution to future boundary disputes may lie in legislative action. 
516. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 609 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting). 
617. Id at 604. 
518. As an alternative theory to boundary by acquiescence, a claimant might argue a 
prescriptive easement Set Anderson v. Osguthorpe, 29 Utah 2d 32, 504 P.2d 1000 (1972) 
(easement in the nature of a profit a prendre to the entire tract where claimant had not paid 
taxes and could not establish boundary by acquiescence but had used the property for over 
fwenty years). 
J. 619. See, e.g., Stratford, No. 18036 (Utah Aug. 30, 1984). 
^ 620. In most states the impact of Halladay would be less severe because the claimant 
often could quiet titis by adverse possession. However, Utah requires the payment of taxes 
|for a claim of adverse possession and taxes are generally levied according to the description 
in the deed, not by fence lines acquiesced in by adjoining landowners. See UTAH COOI ANN. 
| | 78-12-12 (1977). Other states requiring the payment of taxes to quiet title by adverse 
possession include: (1) California, CAL. Crv. PROC. CODI | 325(2) (West 1972); (2) Florida, 
iPtA. STAT. ANN. | 95.18 (West 1982); (3) Idaho, IDAHO CODS f | 6-207, -210 (1979) (taxes 
Required when adverse possession based on an oral claim as opposed to a written instru-
ment); (4) Indiana, INO. Cona ANN. | 34-1-2-2 (Burns 1973); (6) Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. 
(|f11.160 (1983); (6) New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. | 37-1-22 (1978); (7) Washington, WASH. 
.tar. COM ANN. | 7.28.050,070 (1961). States that have a shorter statute of limitations for 
[adverse possession when taxes are paid and a longer one when taxes are not paid include: 
^ 8 o u t h Dakota, SJ). CODIFIED LAWS ANN. fS 15-3-10, -11, -15, -16 (1984) (twenty years 
r^equired when no taxes paid, ten years required when taxes paid); (^LTSSHJ^* Crv. STAT. 
AMM. arte. 5509, 6510 (Vernon 1958) (five years required when taxes paid, ten years required 
w^fcen no taxee paid); (3) Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN | | 893.26-27 (West 1983) (ten years 
required when no taxes paid, five years required when taxes paid). See generally POWKLL. 
^ o w r r v 1 1013f21 (1982). — — « * . 
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For example, the statute on , adverse «..posse8$ionMI^couldibi 
amended to conform to the realities of boundary problems inUtaE 
In addition to granting title by adverse possession where the claim? 
ant has paid the taxes and occupied the land under a claim of right 
for seven years,*" title by adverse possession could also be granted1 
where a claimant has occupied property up to a visibly marked linf 
for a period of twenty years without the payment of taxes.*** Su3t 
legislative action or a reversal of Halladay v. Cluff may be the onjf 
way to minimize litigation and stabilize boundary lines in Utatfft 
B. Easements in Gross 
In Crane u. Crane,**4 the Utah Supreme Court held thatjonM 
mercial easements in gross are transferable, contradicting fprijfij 
dicta that had indicated easements in gross were inalienabl^jj 
The decision signifies the Utah court's adoption of the Restate! 
ment of Property position"* regarding this type of property jntai 
est, a view that modifies the common law. NK*J 
The plaintiffs in Crane had used a dirt road that crossedJSI 
defendants' land to drive their cattle to and from grazing laijdftj 
the Fish Lake National Forest. The plaintiffs brought suit Wm 
tablish their continued right to use that road, claiming tha^raM 
had obtained a prescriptive easement across the defen 
property."7 
At the time the complaint was filed, ten of the twelve in 
ual plaintiffs had not been using the trail for the twenty years 
quired to establish an easement by prescription."* These plaintifl 
however, were successors to former members of a grazing assotf 
tion that had adversely919 used the same road to transport cattle 
and from the grazing land since 1950."° At trial, the question"; 
_3H 
~ ~ " 521. UTAH CODE ANN. | 73-12-12 (1977). 
522. Id. 
523. See $upra note 520. 
524. 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984). 
526. Emit v. Allen, 56 Utah 272, 277, 184 P. 827, 829 (1919) (quoting 3 Wjl 
PHRASES 2311). **' 
626. RISTATBMBNT or PROPERTY | 489 (1944): "Easement* in gross, if of a 
character, are alienable property interests." See infra note 544. 
527. 683 P.2d at 1063. I,( 
628. Id. at 1066; nee Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 160, 162 (Utah 1981) (recce^ ^ 
Utah common law rule requiring a twenty-year prescriptive period). ^ ' t t e t ] 
529. The Utah Supreme Court sustained the district court's finding that the v»f l 
adverse. Crane, 683 P.2d at 1065. I' 
630, Id. at 1066= f 
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wfiether these plaintiffs had established a prescriptive* easement 
kinged on whether the claimants could "tack on"611 the years of 
their^predecessors' use to determine if the period of adverse use 
smeTthe twenty-year requirement. The answer to that question de-
pended in turn on whether an established easement in gross1" 
cpid&be transferred.1** The district court held that the plaintiffs 
4*d|obtained a prescriptive easement/*4 and by inference, that 
easements in gross are transferable. 
r^J Easements in gross were not generally transferable at common 
pjr.JJhBy definition, an easement in gross burdens a servient tene-
Jiwuyithout benefiting any neighboring lapd owned by the pos-
Pfsmfdf the easement.*" Because such an easement tends to re-
t^ric^the utilization of the servient tenement by the owner without 
•^ng the use of any neighboring land, an easement in gross argua-
leads to a less efficient utilization of land.**7 In order to pro-
line economic utilization of land, common law courts there-
Veld that easements in gross were personal, nonalienable 
rests* That rule prevented those perceived "undesirable" inter-
•from lasting indefinitely, limiting their duration, at most, to 
twjUffiof the original owner of the easement. Early Utah case law 
loptemthat common law rule.*** 
wTlwiinalienability of certain types of easements in gross, how-
Ma%|tiurden8 society in general more than it protects the individ-
MJWyffint tenement from reduced utility. For example, a power 
tfmwajng private property might lessen the value of that land 
creating'an eyesore, a hazard, or by monopolizing space that 
•rwisefepuld be utilized by the property owner. On the other 
)|X^£fl&me power line may supply electricity to an entire com-
•ity^miles away. Transferability of that easement may decrease 
^duejgfthe servient tenement by allowing a potentially perma-
d 
JBEEt 
Jj^Fsckinf on" occurs when successive possessions are joined to constitute the full 
r period.'There must be some sort of privity between the current user and the pred-
j) fbr.tacfctaf on to be allowed. Cheatham v. Vanderwey, 18 Arix. App. 35, 499 P.2d 
J (lf72)?blckinaon v. Pake, 284 N.C. 676, 201 S.E.2d 897, 903 (1974). 
t s l l i e district court concluded that the easement in question was an easement in 
*5w?«83 P.2d at 1064-65. 
|MtK*l067. 
|J«\fti*1064. 
.JldSii 10M; Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Diet, 20 Utah 2d 195, 197, 
I t t 0 * » 2 (1968); Ernst v. Alien, 55 Utah 272, 276-77, 184 P. 827, 829 (1919); An not, 
J t 1263,(1941). 
fcgDeeeret Livestock Co. v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353, 358, 269 P.2d 607, 610 (1953). 
F.fftBvrATSMBNT of P*onwTY | 489 (1944). 
l^S#e Ernst v. Allen, 55 Utah 272, 277, 184 P. 827, 829 (1919). 
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HALLADAY V. CLUFF: "OBJECTIVE 
UNCERTAINTY" IN DEED! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence1 has had a confused and 
oftentimes troubled history in the Utah courts. In three 1984 Utah 
Supreme Court decisions,1 the requirements for boundary by acquies-
cence have been significantly extended, creating doubt as to the doc-
trine's continued availability in Utah. Although the recent cases have 
in some respects clarified the doctrine in Utah, the new requirement 
of "objective uncertainty" as to the true location of the boundary line 
makes the doctrine inapplicable to a great majority, if not all, of the 
"cases involving disputed boundary locations. This Note will attempt 
to clarify the status of the doctrine following these three most recent 
cases, focusing primarily on Halladay v. Cluff.* 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. A Brief History of Boundary by Acquiescence in Utah 
Although the Utah Supreme Court's historical acceptance of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has waivered, boundary by ac-
quiescence has existed in Utah in a fairly developed form for almost 
eighty years. During its history/ the doctrine has often been con-
fused with the doctrine of boundary by agreement.9 The confusion 
1
 Boundary by acquiescence if a judiciaJ doctrine where neighboring landowners who have 
recognized a boundary for a long period of time will be assumed to have agreed upon the 
boundary at an earlier date. Under the doctrine, such presumed boundaries are judicially recog-
nized and enforced. 
• Halladay v. Cluff, 686 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984); Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P 2d 360 (Utah 
1984); Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984). 
• 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). 
4
 Other articles have dealt in depth with the history and development of boundary by acqui-
escence and the related doctrine of boundary by agreement See Note, Boundary by Acquies-
cence, 3 UTAH L. Rav. 504 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Note, Acquiescence)', Note, Boundaries 
by Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 221 [hereinafter cited as Note, 
Agreement and Acquiescence}. Both articles summarize the development of the two doctrines, 
and provide a general overview of the confusions and inconsistencies which have plagued this 
area of Utah law. For the first case clearly establishing boundary by acquiescence in Utah, see 
Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269. 87 P. 1009 (1906); see also Halladay, 685 P.2d at 508 (Howe, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (stating that Halladay is "an unwarranted assault upon boundary 
by acquiescence as it has been developed by the cases of this Court over the past 80 years"). 
• See, e.g., Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792 (Utah 1975). The doctrines of 
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between the two doctrines became so pronounced that a Utah Law 
Review article written in 1975 concluded that boundary by agreement 
had merged into the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.6 The 
Utah Supreme Court, however, has again shown confusion between 
the two doctrines as recently as 1981.7 
Despite the confusion between boundary by agreement and bound-
ary by acquiescence, the court consistently required four elements for 
a boundary by acquiescence claim. They included: (Inoccupation up 
to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings, (2) mu-
tual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (3) for a long period of 
time,8 (4) by adjoining landowners.* In addition, some Utah Supreme 
Court cases,10 most notably the recent cases which are the subject of 
this Note, have imposed a fifth requirement that there be uncertainty 
or dispute as to the actual location of the property line. 
The degree of uncertainty required, and whether that uncertainty 
is measured objectively or subjectively, is the primary focus of the 
1984 cases of Halladay v, Clufftu Stratford v. Morgan11 and Parsons 
v. Anderson.1* The new requirement of uncertainty established in 
Halladay, Stratford and Parsons significantly narrows the applica-
tion of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence in Utah. Halladay, 
however, carefully limited some of its holdings to the facts before the 
boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence deal with two related but different situ-
ations. "Boundary by agreement it applied where adjoining landowners have actually orally 
agreed upon a certain line as the boundary between their property. Where there is no proof of 
an actual agreement, however, the court will rely upon the doctrine of boundary by acquies-
cence and imply an agreement if certain conditions are shown." 3 UTAH L. REV at 504. 
• See Note, Agreement and Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 232. 
' In Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981), the court erroneously stated that boundary 
by acquiescence would not apply because "the evidence simply fails to support any finding of 
an agreement between the parties." Id. at 729 (emphasis added). The confusion in Madsen v. 
Clegg is largely responsible for the opinions discussed in this Note. The correct approach would 
have been to see if the other four requisites of the doctrine were present: if so. the court could 
have implied an agreement filing the boundary. Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202, 
207 (1951). See also infra text accompanying notes 34-50. 
• The period of time required varies depending on the circumstances of the particular case. 
Most recently, the court has stated that it must be a "long period of time . . . generally related 
to the common law prescriptive period of 20 years; and only under unusual circumstances 
would a lesser period be deemed sufficient." Halladay, 685 P.2d at 503 n.l (quoting Hobaon V. 
Panguitch Lake Corp., 630 P.2d 792, 795 (1976) (10 years held insufficient)). 
• Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981); Hales v Frake, 600 P 2d 656, 56$ 
(Utah 1979); Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 284, 421 P.2d 944 (1966). Accord, Nunley v. 
Walker, 13 Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117 (1962); Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 
(1951); Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951). 
•• See, eg, Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 272-73, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949). 
» 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). 
»• 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984). 
!S
 690 p.2d 635 (Utah 1984). 
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court. With specific regard to the burden of proof in establishing "ob-
jective uncertainty," the Halladay court stated: "[A]s to this circum-
stance we hold that the party claiming boundary by acquiescence has 
the burden of proving objective uncertainty as part of the prima facie 
elements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence."14 The subse-
quent cases of Stratford and Parsons have further established the 
new requirement of proving objective uncertainty. They also have 
placed the burden of at least producing evidence of objective uncer-
tainty on the party seeking to prove boundary by acquiescence with-
out considering whether the circumstances fit the Halladay 
requirements. 
As with past history, the future of boundary by acquiescence in 
Utah is uncertain. In all three of the 1984 cases, Justice Howe has 
entered strong dissents against the majority opinions. He describes 
the Halladay opinion as "dicta and an unwarranted assault on the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence."15 Moreover, in his Stratford 
dissent he states that Stratford, combined with Halladay, "effec-
tively sounds the death knell of boundary by acquiescence in this 
state."16 
B. Halladay v. Cluff 
In Halladay, the defendants purchased two parcels of adjacent 
property in the city of Provo in 1947 and 1948. When they purchased 
their lots they believed that both lots extended to a fence which in 
fact rested behind their rear property lines. Believing the existing 
fences marked the adjacent property's boundary, the defendants used 
the land between their actual property line and the fence for cultiva-
tion and chicken coops. In 1956, one of the defendants hired a sur-
veyor who placed the boundary near the actual deeded boundary. 
Both of the property owners dismissed this survey as being errone-
ous, however, and continued to use it. During the same period of time 
the plaintiff contended that the disputed property belonged to him, 
and on one occasion told one of the defendants to stop using it.17 
Finally, in 1979, the plaintiff commenced suit to quiet title to the 
disputed land. Defendants counterclaimed, and the district court 
granted title to the defendants under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence.1* Plaintiff appealed on the grounds that there was no 
" Halladay, 685 P.2d at 607. See also infra text accompanying notes 79-80. 
" Id. at 608 (Howe, J., concurring and diwenting). 
»• Stratford, 689 P.2d at 366 (Howe, J., diwenting). 
" Halladay, 685 P.2d at 601-02. 
" id. ai 602. 
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dispute or uncertainty concerning the location of the boundary. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed, ordering that the district court quiet 
title in the plaintiff because the record of title to the property con-
tained no uncertainty that prevented the claimants from ascertaining 
the true boundary.19 
In holding for the plaintiff, the court identified the issues as: (1) 
whether a showing of uncertainty or dispute on the location of a 
boundary line is necessary to the application of boundary by acquies-
cence, and, if so (2) what is meant by uncertainty and (3) who has 
the burden of proof of uncertainty.10 The court held that proof of 
uncertainty or dispute is required as an element of boundary by ac-
quiescence in Utah, and that the uncertainty or dispute should be 
measured against an objective test. Finally, the court held, limited to 
the Halladay facts, that the party claiming boundary by acquies-
cence had the burden of proving objective uncertainty. Unfortu-
nately, Halladay and subsequent rulings have added to the doctrine's 
confused history by resurrecting questionable case dicta and holdings 
which had been either distinguished or silently overruled prior to 
Halladay.*1 
III. THE OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY RATIONALE: CASES AND CRITIQUE 
Halladay, Stratford and Parsons create a significant new require-
ment to establish boundary by acquiescence. Objective uncertainty in 
the location of the boundary must now be shown by the claimant. 
Although most of the significant developments of this requirement. 
are contained in Halladay, the Stratford and Parsons opinions do 
give a preliminary indication of how Halladay will be interpreted in, 
future opinions. This Note will focus primarily on Halladay and wi^ 
discuss the significant additions made by Stratford and Parsons, cj 
Halladay'a new requirement of objective uncertainty is yet another,, 
result of the confusion between the related doctrines of boundary fcyL 
agreement and acquiescence. As a result of the confusion, the Hallaz* 
day court digressed to a standard which had been disavowed ip ifl 
case preceding Halladay*1 Furthermore, what were significant limy 
tations on Halladay have been ignored by Stratford and Parsohss 
leaving some doubt as to the exact requirements for a boundary byj 
$ 
»• Id at 507-08. 
•• Id at 601. 
11
 See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. 
M
 The court had previously discarded the standard in Brown, 232 P.2d at 202. See also infra 
text accompanying notes 34-40. 
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acquiescence.1* 
A. Uncertainty or Dispute in Boundary by Acquiescence 
In addressing the issue of whether a showing of uncertainty or dis-
pute is required for boundary by acquiescence, the Halladay court 
notes that the confusion between boundary by acquiescence and 
boundary by agreement has carried over to the requirement of uncer-
tainty or "dispute over the boundary. Originally, uncertainty or dis-
pute was required only for boundary by agreement.*4 In 1928, how-
ever, the court in Tripp v. Bagley** began to refer to uncertainty or 
dispute as an essential ingredient for boundary by acquiescence. Hal-
laday cites a number of other acquiescence cases decided since Tripp 
v. Bagley which also required uncertainty or dispute as to the true 
location of the boundary. Although acknowledging a series of bound-
ary by acquiescence cases to the contrary, the Halladay court con-
cluded that the requirement of uncertainty or dispute as to boundary 
location is an ingredient "settled in our law."1* 
The case law cited by the Halladay court in support of its proposi-
tion that uncertainty or dispute is required has been misapplied. 
Most of the cases cited in Halladay have been either limited or nar-
rowly construed in later cases. Furthermore, several of the cases cited 
for requiring a showing of uncertainty or dispute refer to such a 
showing only as a possible defense to an action of boundary by 
acquiescence,97 
M
 See infra text accompanying notes 81-90. 
" Halladay, 685 P.2d at 503. 
•» 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928). 
M
 Halladay, 685 P.2d at 504. But cf. id. at 510-11 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting), 
where it is stated: 
proof of uncertainty or dispute is not and has never been an "ingredient" or element 
of a cause of action for boundary by acquiescence . . . fsjuch a requirement would be 
entirely foreign to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence because the basis of the 
doctrine is that the law implies that there once existed uncertainty and dispute. 
* Madsen v. Clegg. 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981), one of the most recent predecessors to Halla-
day, does contain language which implies that evidence of uncertainty may be a requirement of 
[the doctrine. That case, however, tm noted supra note 7, confused the doctrines of boundary by 
[agreement and by acquiescence. Furthermore, it was clear that the plaintiff never acquiesced in 
[the new boundary, thus eliminating the possibility of boundary by acquiescence. 
L Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951). one of the court's clearest pron ounce-
losenU on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, clarified that the absence of uncertainty 
[could serve as a defense to boundary by acquiescence, because if an absence of uncertainty 
could be proven, there would be no room for the court to imply an earlier agreement. See infra 
text accompanying notes 49-50. 
f Of the other cases cited in Halladay, Leon v. Dansie, 639 P.2d 730, 731 (Utah 1981). involved 
testimony on both sides thst there had been no dispute as to record title at any time over the 
pars. Nowhere in Leon, however, is there any indication that the court considered dispute or 
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JLTIPP V Bagley,2* the first Utah boundary by acquiescence case 
which required a showing of uncertainty or dispute, should have been 
decided as a boundary by agreement case." In Tripp, the property 
purchasers were actually informed of the correct boundary location 
when they purchased the land.*0 Thus in Tripp, there was actual 
knowledge of the true boundary. The Tripp court held that because 
of the parties' knowledge, there was no room for the court to enforce 
any agreement to establish a boundary, implied or otherwise, be-
tween the parties.31 Consequently, Tripp v. Bagley was not in fact a 
boundary by acquiescence case, but actually a case of boundary by 
agreement.82 Therefore, the Halladay court should not have relied on 
it. 
For several years Tripp v. Bagley was incorrectly cited as requiring 
uncertainty or dispute in boundary by acquiescence cases." The 
Utah Supreme Court should have interpreted Tripp as holding that 
proof of an absence of uncertainty left no room for the court to imply 
an agreement in boundary by acquiescence cases. Consequently, sev-
eral of the cases decided after Tripp v. Bagley, and subsequently 
cited in Halladay, mistakenly required evidence of uncertainty as an 
element of boundary by acquiescence. 
In 1951, the well-reasoned decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Milliner** clarified the confusion caused by Tripp over the 
uncertainty or dispute requirement. The Brown court limited Tripp 
uncertainty to be a prerequisite for a claim rather than at a defense. 
In Wright v. Chssold, 621 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1974), the court clearly recognized that the 
absence of a dispute or uncertainty in filing the boundary was a defense to rebut the presump-
tion that an agreement had been reached. 
Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury. 26 Utah 2d 36, 37-38, 484 P.2d 173, 174-76 (1971), 
placed the burden on the defendant to show that there was no dispute or uncertainty and thai 
the true boundary line was known. 
In Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Uiah 267, 272-73, 20S P.2d 257, 260 (1949), the court did requin 
that there be uncertainty or dispute as to the location of the boundary before a boundary bj 
acquiescence could be established. 
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 219, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (1943) (citing 
Tripp v. Bagley also requires that the boundary must be uncertain or in dispute). 
The final case cited in Halladay, Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 93, 34 P.2d 697, 698-9! 
(1934), found a claim for boundary by acquiescence on the grounds that the location of th 
boundary was not known or that there was no dispute. 
»• 276 P. 912. 
" See Note, Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 509. 
•• 276 P. at 917. 
" Id. at 918. 
•• See Note, Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 609. 
•• For cases citing Tripp, see Home Owners* Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 219, 14 
P.2d 160, 166 (1943); Peterson v. Johnson. 84 Utah 89, 93, 34 P.2d 697, 698 (1934). M 20 Utah 6. 232 P.2d 202 (1951). 
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and noted that several cases had misapplied Tripp. The Brown court 
stated that Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley,** Peterson v. John-
son*9 and Glenn v. Whitney,*1 cases which Halladay relied on, were 
cases where "[t]he doctrine of boundary of [sic] acquiescence was not 
applicable because in view of the evidence there was no room for any 
implication that the fence line had been erected by adjoining owners 
pursuant to an agreement between thera."M Furthermore, Brown 
continued, previous holdings of the Utah Supreme Court that uncer-
tainty or dispute need be proven as an element should be understood 
to mean that if the true boundary line is known to the adjoining own-
ers, they cannot by parol agreement establish the boundary 
elsewhere." 
Following the clarification that proof of uncertainty or dispute is 
not an affirmative requirement of boundary by acquiescence, the 
Brown decision returned the doctrine to the previous policy of al-
lowing proof of the absence of uncertainty or dispute as a defense to 
boundary by acquiescence.40 The Utah Supreme Court did not again 
require a showing of uncertainty or dispute by the party claiming 
boundary by acquiescence until 1981, in Madsen v. Clegg.41 Although 
boundary by agreement was thought to have merged completely into 
boundary by acquiescence by 1975,4* the doctrine of boundary by 
agreement was seemingly resurrected in Madsen in 1981. The Mad-
sen court stated that the trial court "could not have resolved such 
uncertainty on the basis of defendant's acquiescence theory, because 
the evidence simply fails to support any finding of an agreement be-
tween the parties. M° Thus the confusion between the two doctrines 
emerged once again, this time in the idea that boundary by acquies-
M
 106 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943). 
* 84 Utah 89, 34 P.2d 697 (1934). 
, " 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 267 (1949). 
•• Brown, 232 P.2d at 207-08. 
" Id. at 208. The court stated: 
fT]he Tripp case does not require a party relying upon a boundary which has been 
acquiesced in for a long period of time to produce evidence that the location of the 
true boundary was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That the true boundary 
was uncertain or in dispute and that the parties agreed upon the recognized boundary 
as the dividing line will be implied from the parties' long acquiescence. 
fid at 208. For an illuminating and more detailed discussion of the dispute over uncertainty 
luring this period, see Note. Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 608-11. 
.*•«• Brown, 232 P.2d at 209. Although Brown did not specifically hold that uncertainty i§ a 
lefanse, subsequent decisions interpreted the opinion this way. See, e g, Wright v. Clissold, 621 
\2d 1224, 1226 (1974). 
u
 639 P.2d 726 (1981). 
,—
 Note, Agreement and Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 232. 
." 639 P.2d at 72Q 
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cence required finding an agreement. 
Although there is room for both doctrines in Utah law, it is unfor-
tunate that the two doctrines cannot coexist without causing sucTf 
confusion.^Madsen should have resolved the boundary by acquies-
cence question by determining if the four traditional requirements44 
were met; if those requirements were met, the Madsen court should 
have implied an agreement.4* The actual holding in Madsen v. Clegg, 
however, extended no further than the original holding in Tripp v. 
Bagley4* which caused years of confusion. The Madsen court's state-
ment that "[i]n the absence of any initial uncertainty concerning the 
ownership of the property in question, the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence has no application,"47 is consistent with the traditional 
rule of uncertainty or dispute as clarified by Brown v. Milliner.4* 
Under the traditional rule, the doctrine of boundary by acquies-
cence must be clearly distinguished from the doctrine of boundary by 
agreement. In boundary by agreement cases, uncertainty has tradi-
tionally been required to minimize conflicts with the statute of 
frauds.40 In cases of boundary by acquiescence, however, the court 
assumes the presence of uncertainty, and implies that at some time 
the parties made an agreement to settle the uncertainty. If one party 
could prove an absence of uncertainty in a boundary by acquiescence 
case, the court could not assume that uncertainty had existed, leaving 
no room for the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.*0 Thus, uncer-
tainty of boundary should be viewed as a defense toHbounHary'bjf 
acquiescence rather than as a'requirement. 
B. The Degree of Uncertainty Required 
After deciding that uncertainty or dispute would be a requirement 
in boundary by acquiescence cases, the Halladay court held that 
"uncertainty" would be measured under an objective standard. In 
reaching its decision, the court noted that a subjective test for uncer-
tainty has often been the rule in Utah. Under the court's definition, 
subjective uncertainty allows that "a boundary line may be 'uncer-
tain' or 'in dispute' even though it is capable of being readily ascer-
44
 See supra text accompanying not* 9 
«• Brown, 232 P at 207 
44
 See supra text accompanying not* 39 
« 639 P 2d at 729 
*• See supra text accompanying notes 34 45 
49
 Note, Agreement and Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 223. 
•• Brown, 232 P 2d at 207 
1985] HALLADAY v. CLUFF 5 
tained."" Under this subjective standard, therefore, two adjoini 
landowners who knew the approximate boundary between their pro 
erty but who did not desire to hire a surveyor could create an e 
forceable boundary through long acquiescence in a line which th 
agreed upon. 
Although acknowledging that both objective and subjective tes 
had been used in Utah, the court adopted the objective test becau 
of two policy considerations." Under the court's new objective unce 
tainty standard, there must be a showing that "during the period 
acquiescence there was some objectively measurable circumstance J 
the record title or in the reasonably available survey information . . 
that would have prevented a landowner, as a practical matter, froi 
being reasonably certain about the true location of the boundary." 
In defense of the new uncertainty requirement, the Halladay opir 
ion argues that boundary by acquiescence has not been obliteratec 
Boundary by acquiescence is still applicable when there is objectiv 
uncertainty in the location of the true boundary that cannot reasona 
bly be resolved by reference to the record title and by use of reasona 
bly available survey information.94 A number of situations are cite< 
in Halladay where the doctrine would remain viable under the "ob 
jective uncertainty" standard.M 
In adopting objective uncertainty, the court returns to an idea sim 
ilar to the earlier Utah requirement of "objective uncertainty" firsi 
mentioned in Glenn v. Whitney** in 1949. Under the Whitney stan 
41
 Halladay, 685 P 2d at 604, (quoting Ekberg v. Bate*. 121 Utah 123, 239 P 2d 206, 207 (1951), which in turn quoted Willie v. Local Realty Co, 110 Utah 523, 175 P 2d 718, 723 (1946)). 
M
 See infra text accompanying notes 66-70 
•« Halladay, 685 P 2d at 605 
M /«/ 
" In Halladay, the court atatea "f b)oundary by acquiescence remains a viable means of es-
tablishing a boundary where there is objective uncertainty in the location of the true boundary 
that cannot reasonably be resolved by reference to the record title and by use of reasonably 
available survey information " 685 P 2d at 605 As examples of cases which would meet this 
objective uncertainty requirement, the court refers to inability to locate monuments estab 
lished in the original survey, internal inconsistencies in plat, no official or original plat or sur 
vey by which the boundary can be located, disagreement among different surveyors on location 
of boundary line, landmarks referenced in deeds have disappeared, and uncertainties or dis 
putes created by conflicting terms in the deed, such as overlapping descriptions or metes and 
bounds that do not close Id at 505-06 
Such disputes are rare, however, and comprise only a very small proportion of the vast array 
of instances in which boundary by acquiescence should be available Boundary by acquiescence 
did not orginate as only a means to resolve errors in recording property descriptions, but rather 
"with a view of preventing strife and litigation " Holmes, 31 Utah at 281, 87 P at 1014 
* 116 Utah 267, 209 P 2d 257 (1949) 
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dard, dispute is not proved by a mere difference of opinion, and un-
certainty is not proved by a mere lack of knowledge as to the true 
location of the boundary.57 This standard appears essentially identi-
cal to objective uncertainty. In support of returning to this standard, 
the Halladay court cites to Madsen v. Clegg, and several cases from 
Wisconsin and Idaho.M 
The Wisconsin and Idaho cases, however, are not applicable to the 
Halladay facts. The Wisconsin case, Hartung v. Witte** dealt with a 
combined doctrine of boundary by agreement and acquiescence. Cit-
ing conflicts with the statute of frauds, the Wisconsin court stated 
"an agreement to treat an existing fence as the line has no force when 
the true line can be ascertained from the deed itself and by a lawful 
survey."*0 The Wisconsin court clearly seemed to be dealing with the 
policy considerations behind boundary by agreement. 
Another cited Wisconsin case, Buza u. Wojtalewicz,*1 can also be 
distinguished in that boundary by acquiescence in Wisconsin has now 
been codified as part of the state's adverse possession law, thus mak-
ing the case irrelevant to Utah's common law doctrine.*1 Further-
more, dicta in the case seems to indicate that had the parties acqui-
esced for twenty years, the court would have enforced the agreement 
notwithstanding the lack of uncertainty or dispute,** 
The Idaho case, Fry v. Smith,*4 comes closest to supporting the 
Halladay court's position. But as in Hartung, Fry discusses boundary 
by acquiescence and agreement, indicating that the two doctrines and 
their requirements have become merged in Idaho.** Thus, none of the 
cases cited in Halladay provide any clear precedent for the objective 
uncertainty requirement in Utah. 
In addition to case law, the Halladay opinion cites two policy con-
siderations as supporting the "objective uncertainty" test. First, lim-
iting boundary by acquiescence minimizes the conflict with the stat-
ute of frauds' proscription of transfering land without a writing.** 
" 209 P.2d at 260. See also Halladay, 685 P.2d at 606. 
M
 Halladay, 686 P.2d at 505 (citing Buia v. Wojtalewicz, 48 Wia. 2d 557, 564-67,180 N.W.2d 
556, 560-61 (1970); Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis. 285, 298-300, 18 N.W. 175, 180-81 (1884); Pry v. 
Smith, 91 Idaho 740, 741-42, 430 P.2d 486, 487-88 (1967)). 
»• 59 Wis. 285, 18 N.W. 175 (1884). 
M
 18 N.W. at 180. 
•' 48 Wis. 2d 557, 180 N.W.2d 566 (1970). 
•• 180 N.W.2d at 559-60. 
•» Id at 560. 
" 91 Idaho 740, 430 P.2d 486 (1967). 
•• 430 P 2d at 487 
w
 Halladav. 685 P.2d at 605. 
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Second, an objective test corresponds more closely to the purpose 
the doctrine because it prevents litigation and promotes repose ol 
tie and stability of boundaries. This prevention of litigation is i 
thered if those who purchase, use or sell real property must rely 
descriptions in deeds and reasonably available survey information 
settle disputes. The opinion stated that boundary by acquiesce] 
should only be applied where it is not reasonable to expect landov 
era to verify the true location of their boundaries through referei 
to record titles and surveys.*7 
These policy considerations are, however, of questionable mei 
First, the court's concerns regarding conflicts with the statute 
frauds are without basis. In the first place, it is questionable wheth 
a boundary established by acquiescence would in fact conflict wi 
the statute since the person acquiring property would do so by opei 
tion of law rather than by virtue of agreement." The statute 
frauds is designed primarily to prevent fraudulent agreement 
Where an agreement is created by law, as in boundary by acquie 
cence cases, this concern is obviated because the agreement can 1 
assumed to be non-fraudulent. Furthermore, the Restatement (Se 
ond) of Contracts recognizes several exceptions to the statute < 
frauds, at least two of which would be applicable in a boundary b 
acquiescence case." Accordingly, concerns about the statute c 
frauds, although somewhat justified in a boundary by agreement situ 
ation, should not greatly concern a court dealing with boundary b: 
acquiescence. 
The court's second policy consideration is equally insufficient. Th< 
avoidance of controversy, the prevention of litigation and the promo-
tion of repose of title and stability of boundaries are not furthered by 
an objective uncertainty test. The inability to obtain a court settle-
ment because of the need for objective uncertainty will not result in 
" Not*. Acquiescence, supra not* 4, at 509 
RMTATE«K*r (S.COND) or CONTRACTS § 128 provides: 
£f i t r £ l i K z:z t r f s s trrof, r^ i n< • dividin< •—*» 
puted the contract becomeTenfor^Jh. I T " V*" b o u , l d a f * w a a h o n M t , y * s -
boundary ha. b e e n Z Z d o Z t n ° t W , t h * U n * n * ** « • * * when the agreed 
tract*. HaS U e n "**""«« ^ the subsequent use of the 
RESTATEMENT (S«COND) OF CONTRACTS § 129 prov ides . 
A contract for the transfer of interest in )anA ^«. u ^ .. 
.landing failure to comply with the S u t i t ^ ^ f bt.a*V!!*?a* • » ' • « * "otwith-
tion that inju»tice can be avoided onlv Z.HOSLVZT1- h M $ ° c h a n « e d h u !»«-
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the avoidance of controversy. A property disagreement between two 
adjoining landowners will not rest merely because a court will not 
enforce a long-established boundary between the parties; the dispute' 
will continue. Although the "objective uncertainty" test may in the* 
end prevent litigation, this prevention of litigation comes at a signifi-' 
cant price. With the objective uncertainty requirement, the doctrine" 
of boundary by acquiescence may cease to be viable in Utah.70 
Whether litigation will actually be reduced is also very questional 
ble. Because objective uncertainty will be so difficult to prove in1 
many instances,71 a party who has long accepted an erroneously 
placed boundary may now be willing to go to court to correct thtf^  
boundary on the assumption that even though the fence was errone^ 
ou9ly located, the record title will support their claim. * ^ 
The promotion of stability in boundaries, another cited goal, will* 
also be adversely affected by the objective uncertainty requirement! 
Long-standing boundaries which have at least had the potential j6f 
being judicially protected will become fair game if the physical 
boundaries disagree with the record title. As noted above, under th£ 
new requirement, a party which has long acquiesced in an improperly 
placed boundary may see the objective uncertainty requirement ai1'!' 
way to expand his or her property holdings by going to court, thus 
promoting boundary instability. This reality was recognized long ago4 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Binford v. Eccles1* where the cow; 
stated that an objective uncertainty would increase litigation.71 tyl* 
In short, the policy arguments relied upon in Halladay are, at th$ 
very best, questionable. At worst, the requirement of "objective un-
certainty" may prove in the end to stir up controversy, increase liti~ 
gation and destabilize existing boundaries that are technically incorf 
rect but stable boundaries, contrary to the court's stated purposes for 
adopting the new standard. ;?jjj 
The absence of supporting case law and the weakness of the court's 
policy arguments are not, however, as disturbing as what is likely to 
be the end result of the objective uncertainty requirement IfJtheioli! 
• • " • • •' " '• -
1
 ; g 
*• See infra text accompanying notes 75-78. 
71
 See infra text accompanying notes 76-78. 
" 41 Utah 453, 126 P. 333 (1912). 
" 126 P. 333. The opinion stated: 
Appellant would thus be permitted to unsettle boundaries which by the adjoining1 
landowners had been recognized and acquiesced in for approximately a quarter of a 
century. Any rule of law which would permit such a result would be pernicious, and' 
in the long run would produce strife and litigation, and in the nature of things would 
often result in injustice if not oppression. 
126 P. at 335. 
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jective uncertainty requirement becomes firmly entrenched in Utah 
law, the doctrine^of^ boundary by acquiescence will cease to exist in 
Utah. Several considerations, all of which are'at1*least briefly men* 
tioned by Justice Howe in his three dissents/1 Support the contention 
that the doctrinecannot co-exist with the objective uncertainty 
requirement. - - « .
 s» "^ajin':.* 
First, boundary by acquiescence has always had very limited appli-
cation. Now that further limitations have been imposed upon the 
doctrine, application of the doctrine will be an extreme rarity, if it 
continues at all.7* -*>'>-
Second, the majority of boundary by acquiescence cases involve 
fences or boundaries which have stood for many years, and involve a 
chain of title which has passed through several property* owners. In 
many situations it would be difficult, if not impossible, to .determine 
if there had been objective uncertainty when the original boundary 
was placed. This difficulty in retracing the history of a boundary is 
central to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; indeed i t is this 
difficulty of proof that made earlier Utah courts imply an • agree-
ment.74 For example, although the Halladay court notes1 in a foot-
note77 that an erroneous survey may create an objective uncertainty 
which would allow the doctrine to apply, the property may have been 
surveyed so long before the dispute that it is impossible to prove that 
the survey_was_taken or what the survey revealed. In short, although 
circumstances constituting objective uncertainty may have existed at 
K>me time in the past, such objective uncertainty may be impossible 
ft prove when the dispute arises.7* 
C. The Burden of Proving "Objective Uncertainty" 
The third and fined issue addressed in the Halladay opinion dealt 
[with the procedural aspects of the new doctrine; assuming that 
^boundary by acquiescence requires that there be a showing of "objec-
tive uncertainty," who carries the burden of proof in boundary by 
acquiescence cases? In holding that the defendant had the burden of 
proof, the Halladay court carefully limited the ruling to the circum-
stances before it. The court held in that circumstance that the party 
i • • •"•••• • • • — — — • 
Li tZSmSZ?"" *~*' " Haltaday- « P M « * *"** 689 P.2d 360; 
| " Jurtie, How. note, in bit Halladay diwent that . i n « tk. A . • . . 
•»• b~n .pplM
 ta only «ppro«im.t«ly 2 6 ^ , r . « h i T f K '"' ' UlC">U°a ta I 9 0 6 ' '* 
p £ • « • * * 686 P.2d * 612 ( H o w . ^ ^ n t " ' ; ) h , n g "" , U p ' " D ' £our t- 686 P-2d , t 608.. 
I" W. at 612 (How., J.. dU»ntinf). 
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claiming boundary by acquiescence had the burden of proving objec-
tive uncertainty as part of the prima facie case.7* The circumstance 
under which the holding is limited is that this case arose in the city 
of Provo, where survey information is reasonably available. In a foot-
note, the court stated, "[w]e express no opinion on whether this allo-
cation of the burden of proof would apply to property not located in 
a city or platted area."80 Thus the court appears to have limited its 
holding on this issue to city areas where survey information is readily 
available. 
The Halladay court carefully limited its holding for several rea-
sons. First, the court noted a historical conflict in case law as to who 
carries the burden of proof.01 Second, the question of burden of proof 
is evenly balanced on the authorities and both positions can be sup-
ported by persuasive arguments." Because of these considerations, 
the Halladay court limited its rule of law to the facts before it," im-
plying the burden of proof issue should be determined on a case-by-
case basis based on the availability of title and survey information 
between the parties. 
In the later cases of Stratford and Parsons, the court failed to even 
consider the limitations imposed by Halladay. Both cases placed the 
burden of presenting evidence of objective uncertainty on the parties 
seeking to establish boundary by acquiescence without considering 
whether the facts met the Halladay facts. The court's failure to dis-
cuss the Halladay limitations indicates that the limitations will not 
be of great concern to the court. Stratford and Parsons can both be 
cited as requiring that the burden of presenting evidence, if not the 
burden of proof, be placed on the moving party regardless of which 
party has better access to the information. 
Because the Stratford and Parsons courts failed to address the 
Halladay limitations, the similarity of the facts in the cases is un-
clear. Whether the plots in the cases were platted is unclear, but the 
cases' discussions of the disputes seem to indicate that they were 
not." Furthermore, it appears that neither of the properties were 
79
 Id. at 507. 
•• Id. n.6. 
•» Halladay, 685 P.2d at 506-07. 
M
 Id. at 507. 
'• Id. 
M
 The disputed property involved in Stratford was a 4.77 acre tract of land in Salt Lake 
County; the opinion makes no reference to any plats, and refers to a "metes and bounds** 
description of the boundary line between the properties. 689 P.2d at 361. In Par$on$t the dis-
puted property's boundaries were described in reference to an "old fence" as a monument to 
mark one boundary; there is no reference in the case to any platted records. 690 P.2d at 637. 
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within city limits. In Halladay, the platted nature of the property 
and its location within city limits were carefully noted as 
significant/1 
In Parsons, although the court did not explicitly place the burden 
of proof on the moving party, the court did list "evidence of dispute 
or uncertainty as to the true boundary line measured against an ob-
jective test" as one of the elements required to establish a boundary 
by acquiescence.M As a required element, it is clear that the burden 
lies on the moving party, for without showing evidence of such a dis-
pute, the moving party's claim will fail. Although the Parsons court 
could have dispensed with the case because the required period of 
acquiescence was not met,87 the court stated in dicta that in the ab-
sence of evidence indicating a dispute, boundary by acquiescence 
could not be established.84 
In Stratford, the court found that the moving party had failed to 
provide any objective or subjective evidence of uncertainty or dis-
pute.88 Without such a showing, the court stated, there was no uncer-
tainty or dispute as measured by Halladay.90 
Placing the burden of presenting evidence on the moving party 
does not, of itself, place the burden of proof on the moving party. 
However, under the language of Halladay, Parsons and Stratford, it 
strongly appears that future parties seeking boundary by acquies-
cence should not proceed without the potential ability of meeting a 
burden of proof requirement. As an element of a prima facie case for 
boundary by acquiescence, "objective uncertainty" must be shown by 
the plaintiff. Anything less than a showing of "objective uncertainty," 
by a preponderance of the evidence, may be insufficient to get the 
moving party beyond a directed verdict. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In adopting the "objective uncertainty" requirement as an element 
of boundary by acquiescence, the Utah Supreme Court has further 
confused one of the most troubled doctrines of Utah law. The new 
objective uncertainty standard, as Justice Howe stated in the Strat-
ford dissent, "effectively sounds the death knell of boundary by ac-
n
 Halladay, 685 P.2d at 607. 
•• 690 P.2d at 538-39. 
m
 Id. at 539. 
" Id. 
" 689 P.2d at 364. 
mId. 
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quiescence in this state."91 
The Utah Supreme Court should limit the future applications! 
"objective uncertainty" to, at the very most, those cases to which 
Halladay's originally limited holding clearly applies.** Because of thf 
questionable policy grounds upon which the Halladay opinion is 
based,98 and upon the probable consequence of the elimination of tht 
doctrine in Utah,*4 the precedent set by Halladay and somewhat ex-
panded in Stratford and Parsons should be limited to its narrowesi 
possible reach. & 
In Halladay, the court turned conventional thinking regarding 
boundary by acquiescence upside down when it argued that the goal? 
of preventing litigation and strife could best be served by adoption o 
the objective uncertainty requirement. Because the conventional ap 
proach outlined in Brown v. Milliner** had served these goals so well 
the court should return to that policy of clearly distinguishini 
boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence. 
LINCOLN W. HOBBJ 
*« Id. at 366 (Howe, J.t dissenting). 
M
 See supra text accompanying notes 79-83. 
•• See supra text accompanying notes 68-73. 
M
 See supra text accompanying notes 75-78. 
•* See supra text accompanying notes 34-41. 
MALAN V. LEWIS: ANOTHER "U" TURN IN 
GUEST STATUTE RATIONALE ON THE ROAD 
TO NEW TORT PRINCIPLES OF LOSS 
ALLOCATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
TJ Automobile guest laws were once effective in approximately thirty-
three states.1 Within the last decade, however, the trend of holding 
fautomobile guest statutes unconstitutional1 has nearly culminated in 
[their demise.* The quick decline of the automobile guest statute 
raises the question of what precipitated the recent rejection of a con-
temporary tort doctrine embraced by most states. The recent Utah 
Supreme Court ruling in Malan v. Lewis* which reduced the number 
of states maintaining guest statutes to four,8 may help in answering 
1
 Twenty-nine states have enacted automobile guest statutes at one time; four states have 
had judicially created statutes. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK or THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 at 187 
(4th ed. 1971); Comment, Treatment of Guest Passengers: Georgia Maintains Its Minority 
Rule, 31 MERCER L. REV. 1061 (1980). New Jersey is typically not thought of as having a guest 
statute, perhaps because its judicially created law only applied to guests who asked for rides. 
Lutvin v. Dopkua, 94 NJ.L. 64, 108 A. 862 (1920). See generally Note, The Present Status of 
Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 659 (1974). 
• The major impetus of the trend occurred in Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 
106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (holding California's automobile guest statute unconstitutional on 
equal protection grounds). 
* Cases holding guest statutes to be unconstitutional include: Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 
506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 
(1974); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 1980); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 
P.2d 362 (1974); Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932); Manistee Bank & 
Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Midi. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial 
Diat, Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975); Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 NJ. 276, 176 A.2d 483 
(1961) (judicially created); McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975); Johnson v. 
Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio S t 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 
(1975); Ramey v. Ramey, 273 S.C. 680, 258 S.E.2d 883. cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); 
McConville v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wi*. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962) (judicially 
created); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1978). States repealing guest statute laws in-
clude: Arkansas (1983); Colorado (1975); Connecticut (1937); Florida (1972); Georgia (1982) 
(judically created); Illinois (1971) (restricted to hitchhikers); Massachusetts (1974) (judicially 
created); Montana (1975); Oregon (1979); South Dakota (1978); Texas (1973) (limited to certain 
relatives); Vermont (1969); Virginia (1977); and Washington (1974). See Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661 (Utah, 1984); Green, The Excitements of Change: A Dialogue on the Constitutional-
ity of the Guest Statute, U CREIGHTON L. REV 37 (1980); Comment, Treatment of Guest Pas-
sengers: Georgia Maintains Its Minority Rule, 31 MERCER L. REV. 1061 (1980). 
• 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
1
 See supra note 3. The remaining four states include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 32-1-2 (1975); 
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A P P E N D I X 
Exhib i t "G" 
The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries 
and the Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy 
James H. Backman* 
in recent decisions, the Utah Supreme Court has overturned 
a long-established approach for settling boundary disputes.1 The 
court has placed significant restrictions on traditional means of 
settling disputes between neighbors regarding the practical loca-
tion of boundaries. Understanding the full impact of the recent 
Utah decisions requires familiarity with Utah law on adverse 
possession2 and with boundary dispute doctrines used in other 
jurisdictions.3 Several commentaries have already explored the 
specific decisions,4 beginning with Halladay v. Clufi? in which 
the Utah court has developed its new position. This article as-
sesses these decisions in a larger context and proposes legisla-
tion6 to revamp Utah's statute of limitations, making adverse 
possession the normal means of resolving most boundary 
disputes. 
L LEGAL DOCTRINES 
Courts have employed several major doctrines to award 
property to a party in possession despite superior record title in 
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. A.B., 
1969, Harvard College; J.D., 1972, University of Utah. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Richard van't Rood in the preparation of this article. 
1. See Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984); Stratford v. Morgan, 689 
P 2d 360 (Utah 1984); Halladay v. ClurT, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). 
2. UTAH CODE ANN § 78-12-12 (1953). 
3. See Browder, 77ie Practical Location of Boundaries, 56 MICH L REV 487 (1958); 
Comment, Built-up Boundaries Outweigh Paper Boundaries, 4 CALIF L REV 293 (1916) 
[hereinafter Comment, Built-up Boundaries]; Comment, Agreed Boundaries and 
Boundaries by Acquiescence: The Need for a Straight Line from the Courts, 9 LOY 
LAL REV 637 (1976). 
4. Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1985 UTAH L REV 131, 193; Note, Halladay 
v. ClurT "Objective Uncertainty" In Deed!, 11 J. CONTEMP LAW 567 (1985) (hereinafter 
Note, In Deed*), Note, Objective Uncertainty in Boundary by Acquiescence- Halladay v. 
ClurT, 1984 BYU L REV 711. 
5. 685 P 2d 500 (Utah 1984). 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 112-14. 
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another person.7 These doctrines are: (1) long-term adverse pos-
session; (2) short-term adverse possession; (3) prescriptive ease-
ment; and (4) boundary dispute doctrines, including boundary 
by agreement, acquisition, and estoppel. All of these doctrines 
are related, though their requirements differ. 
A. Adverse Possession 
Adverse possession, sometimes known as title by prescrip-
tion, transfers interests in land to a person in possession without 
the consent of the legal owner.* The doctrine originated in thir-
teenth century England and by 1623 evolved into the prototype 
for American statutes.0 The English statute was essentially a 
statute of limitations which limited the time in which a person 
with legal title could bring an action to regain possession from 
one in wrongful possession.10 The English rule was adopted by 
most early American jurisdictions and still prevails today. 
American scholars characterize the doctrine of adverse pos-
session as a method of taking title to another's property through 
a "wrongful" occupation.11 There are varying explanations for 
the rule, but most courts agree on its basic rationale. Justice 
Holmes aptly stated: "The true explanation of title by [adverse 
possession] seems to me to be that man, like a tree in the cleft of 
a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when 
the roots have grown to a certain size, can't be displaced without 
cutting at his life."11 Although his possession is said to be wrong-
ful, the claimant seldom deliberately sets out to take land from 
another by claiming adverse possession.1* Most people, in fact, 
settle into a piece of land believing that the land belongs to 
them. The doctrine has therefore been accepted as additional ti-
tle assurance for one who possesses land under a belief of 
ownership.14 
7. See generally R CUNNINGHAM, W STOEBUCK & D WHITMAN, THE LAW or PROP-
ERTY f 11.8, at 764-65 (1984) (hereinafter R CUNNINGHAM). 
8. See R POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 1012, at 1087 (abr. ed. 
1968) [hereinafter R POWELL]. 
9. See id. at 1087-88. 
10. Id. at 1088. 
11. See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.6, at 757. 
12. M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH or JUSTICE HOLMES 417-18 (1943) (quoting 
letter from Justice Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907)). 
13. J. CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 1554 (5th ed. 
1984). 
14. See Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L REV. 135, 135-37 
(1918). 
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However, because adverse possession is a judicial doctrine 
governed by state statutes, the requirements differ from state to 
state. Two types of adverse possession exist in the United States 
today, "long-term" and "short-term." 
To satisfyJ;he_ elementsj)f Jong-term adverse possession,1* 
c^jnu^have (1) actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) hostile, (4) 
exclusiyejuand_(5) continuous possession of the land for the stat-
utory period, usually about twenty years.16 The first element, ac-
~tuaT~possession, requires some physical occupation of the land. 
This may be satisfied by such possessory acts as building fences, 
roads, or buildings,17 which define the boundaries of the land 
taken. Some courts relax the actual possession element, requir-
ing only constructive possession, when the claimant holds a doc-
ument that gives "color of title"1*—the appearance of title to the 
land claimed. Under this exception to the actual possession rule, 
the description in the document, rather than the possessory acts, 
set the boundaries.1* 
Open and notorious possession requires that there be visible 
15. Forty-one states have this type of adverse possession. Pendley v. Pendley, 338 
So. 2d 405, 406-07 (Ala. 1976); ALASKA STAT § 09 10.030 (1983); ARIZ. REV STAT ANN § 
12-526 (1982); ARK STAT ANN J 37-101 (1962); COLO REV STAT § 38-41-101 (1982); 
Ruggiero v. Town of East Hartford, 2 Conn. App 89, 477 A.2d 668, 672-73 (1984); DEL. 
CODE ANN tit. 10, § 7902 (1975); FLA. STAT ANN § 95.12 (West 1982); GA CODE ANN § 
44-5-163 (1982); HAW REV STAT § 657-31 (1976); III . ANN STAT ch. 110, para. 13-101 
(Sraith-Hurd 1984); IOWA CODE ANN § 614.1 (West 1950 & Supp. 1986); KAN STAT ANN. 
! 60-503 (1983); KY REV STAT ANN § 413.010 (Baldwin 1972); ME. REV STAT ANN tit 
14, S 801 (1980), MD CTS & JUD PROC CODE ANN § 5-103 (1984); MASS GEN LAWS ANN 
ch. 260, § 21 (West 1959); MICH STAT ANN § 27A.5801 (Callaghan 1986); Miss CODE 
ANN § 15-1-13 (1972), Mo ANN STAT § 516.010 (Vernon 1952); NEB REV STAT § 25-202 
(1985); NH REV STAT ANN § 508:2 (1983); NJ STAT ANN § 2A.14-30 (West Supp. 
1986); NY REAL PROP ACTS LAW § 501 (McKinney 1979); NC GEN STAT § 1-40 (1983); 
N D CENT CODE § 28-01-04 (1974); OHIO REV CODE ANN § 2305 04 (Baldwin 1981); 
OKLA STAT ANN tit. 12, § 93 (West 1960 & Supp. 1987); OR REV STAT § 12.050 (1983); 
PA STAT ANN tit. 12, § 71 (Purdon 1970); RI GEN LAWS § 34-7-1 (1984); SC CODE ANN 
{ 15-67-210 (Law. Co-op. 1977); SD CODIFIED LAWS ANN § 15-3-3 (1984), TENN CODE 
ANN § 28-2-101 (1980); Tx Civ PRAC & REM CODE ANN § 16 026 (Vernon 1987), VT. 
STAT ANN tit 12, § 501 (1973); VA CODE § 8.01-236 (1984); WASH REV CODE ANN § 7-28-
050 (1961); W VA CODE § 55-2-1 (1981); Wis STAT ANN § 893.25 (West 1983), WYO 
STAT § 1-3-103 (1977). 
16. R CUNNINGHAM supra note 7, § 11.7, at 758* 
17. See id. 
18 Through the color of title exception, a person can increase the amount of land 
"possessed" by adverse possession because the description in the document giving color 
of title may include more land than is actually possessed. Lott v. Muldoon Rd. Baptist 
Church, 466 P 2d 815, 817-18 (Alaska 1970); Nyman v. City of Eugene, 286 Or. 47, 64, 
593 P2d 515, 524 (1979). 
19. Lott, 466 P.2d at 817-18. 
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evidence of the use of the land. Actual possession usually satis-
fies this element perforce; it is a more difficult (and particularly 
important) element in the caSe of constructive possession. This 
element, sometimes called the "notice" requirement, is consid-
ered crucial because it provides the legal owner with notice of 
the claimant's intention and thus with the opportunity to take 
preventive measures against the possessor.30 
The third element, hostility, means in most states that the 
possession cannot be with the owner's permission.*1 Therefore, 
any use with permission such as a license or lease will not qual-
ify as adverse possession. Some courts add to the lack-of-permis-
sion requirement by requiring specially that the possession be 
under a claim of right." Claim of right may be difficult to estab-
lish because many courts do not have a clear definition of the 
concept 
The exclusive-possession element demands that the owner 
and the adverse possessor never had concurrent ownership.** 
This requirement solidifies the adverse possessor's claim of con-
tinuous possession and evidences an intent to exercise dominion 
over the land to the exclusion of all others. 
Under the last element of adverse possession, continuity, 
the possessor cannot allow any significant interruptions of his 
possession before the statutory period runs. What constitutes a 
significant interruption depends on the nature of the land.*4 If 
an adverse possessor transfers his interest to another before the 
period of limitations has run, "tacking" allows the new possessor 
to add the time of his possession to that of his predecessor and 
use the aggregate to satisfy the statutory period.** To success-
fully invoke tacking, there must be privity between transferor 
and transferee, and the transfer must be made with a document 
showing color of title.** 
The second form of adverse possession, short-term adverse 
possession, has much the same requirements as long-term ad-
20. Oiwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982); R POWELL, supra note 8,1 1013. 
21. Perm v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1980); R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, 
at 760. 
22. R POWELL, supra note 8, % 1015, at 1091. 
23. Raftopouloa v. Monger, 656 P2d 1308, 1311 (Colo. 1983); Diuria v. Kucharik, 
164 Colo. 278, 282, 434 P.2d 414, 416 (1967); see R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, { 11.7, at 
762. 
24. R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 763. 
25. See R POWELL, supra note 8,1 1021. 
26. See generally Warren, A Problem in "Tacking," 88 U PA. L REV 897 (1940). 
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verse possession, with the differences ot a shortened limitation 
period and the special requirement that the adverse possessor 
either pay the property taxes before the legal owner,*7 or base 
his claim on a document (which boosts the claim to one made 
under color of title)." If the possessor pays the taxes or has 
color of title and satisfies all the requirements of long-term ad-
verse possession for a shorter statutory period—usually five to 
seven years—he receives title to the land. 
Short-term adverse possession was probably created as an 
incentive to pay taxes." But it also creates an incentive to take 
land by adverse possession. Because one must procure a tax 
description from the assessor's office in order to pay land taxes, 
one is likely to become aware that he is not the legal owner of 
land he possesses. One who thus learns that he is on land to 
which he has no legal title may deliberately try to take it 
through short-term adverse possession.30 
One who possesses land for a long period without having le-
gal title, but believing he is the actual owner, is unlikely to think 
of procuring a tax description in order to pay taxes on the 
land.*1 The tract that he wrongfully possesses will probably lie 
next to his own, and he will think that he is already paying taxes 
on it. Consequently, such a person rarely takes land by short-
term adverse possession. Furthermore, boundaries between 
propertiesjre probably seldom^ettled under the short-term ad-
verse possesgionjtequkeraeat^f paying taxes. Therefore, the ra-
27. See Montgomery, The Adverse Possession of Land Titles in Utah, 3 UTAH L 
REV 294, 310 (1953). Currently, nine states have shortened statutes of limitations for 
cases where taxes are paid, in addition to their long-term statutes. ALA. CODE § 6-5-200 
(1977); ARIZ. REV STAT. ANN § 12-525 (1982); Awe STAT. ANN. § 37-102 (1962) (posses-
sion not required); COLO. REV STAT. § 38-41-108 (1982); III . ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 
13-107, -109 (Smith-Hurd 1984); SD CODIFIED LAWS ANN § 15-3-15 (1984); TEX. Crv. 
PRAC. & REM CODE ANN § 16.025 (Vernon 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.28.070 
(1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.27 (West 1983). 
28. States which have shortened statutes of limitations for cases involving color of 
title include the following: ALA. CODE § 6-5-200 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.050 (1983); 
ARIZ REV STAT ANN § 12-523 (1982); and NC. GEN. STAT § 1-38 (1983). Some states 
require color of title for longer adverse possession also. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-
01-08 (1974). 
29. See Montgomery, supra note 27, at 313. 
30. A few states allow shortened statutes of limitations for color of title claims. See 
supra note 28. These statutes also require affirmative action by the possessor, thus 
preventing anyone from adversely possessing land not included in his deed description 
but within his physical boundary. 
31. See Herrmann v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916, 919-20, 693 P.2d 1118, ! 121-22 (1985); 
Piatt v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 323, 324, 563 P.2d 586, 587 (1977). 
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tionale behind long-term adverse possession of providing addi-
tional titl^^surance does/not: J*PpljMto_jhort-term adverse 
posseision. 
Utah is one of the _few states that, does not have long-term 
adverse possession,31 though it does have short-term adverse 
possession. However, since short-term adverse possession does 
not help resolve boundary disputes, Utah property owners must 
look to other methods of resolving such disputes and providing 
better title assurance. 
B. Prescriptive Easements 
The doctrine of prescriptive easements is another method 
whereby one can obtain rights to the land of another without the 
owner's permission.8* The prescriptive easement is a judicial 
doctrine based on the statute of limitations. It was created at 
about the same time as adverse possession and operates in much 
the same manner.84 The requirements for a prescriptive ease-
ment also resemble those of adverse possession. One can obtain 
a prescriptive easement by showing that a particular use of land 
has been "open and notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, ad-
verse, and under claim of right."8* 
A crucial difference between the doctrines of adverse pos-
session and prescriptive easement is that the former gives title 
to land while the latter confers only a right to use it in a specific 
way.8* Therefore, the doctrine will not serve to settle boundary 
disputes as does long-term adverse possession.87 The prescrip-
tive easement does, however, serve to settle disputes over the 
use of land. 
C. Boundary Dispute Doctrines 
Boundary dispute doctrines8* were created to resolve recur-
32. See supra note 15. 
33. See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 8.7; R POWELL, supra note 8,1 413. 
34. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
35. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 994 (1981); see also supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
36. R POWELL, supra note 8, 1 413, at 555. 
37. Another reason why the doctrine of prescriptive easements is insufficient for set-
tling boundary disputes is that a disputed tract will rarely be used for a specific purpose 
for the prescribed length of time. In most cases, the use of a disputed tract is construed 
as possession rather than a use and therefore does not qualify for a prescriptive ease-
ment See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 8.7, at 452. 
38. See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.8. 
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ring problems encountered in trying to fix boundaries between 
adjoining property owners. Adjoining landowners often suffer 
from incorrectly marked boundaries or unclear deed descrip-
tions. Three separate doctrines have been developed to resolve 
such questions. These include: (1) boundaryJby^greerneiit, (2) 
boundary by .acquiescence, and (3) estoppel/* All of these prin-
ciples share similar policy foundation^ wKich are to promote effi-
cient use of property, to reduce litigation, to establish a status of 
repose, to remove stale claims, and to avoid the necessity of pro-
ducing evidence of events from the distant past.40 
J. Boundary by agreement 
The theoretical bases of boundary by agreement and bound-
ary by acquiescence are similar but not identical. The differ-
ences are important in defining the elements of each of these 
boundary resolution rules. Boundary by agreement is premised 
on a contractual theory,41 whereas boundary by acquiescence, 
though it has some of the same elements, is founded on public 
policy considerations similar to the justifications for adverse 
possession.41 
The elements of an enforceable boundary by agreement are 
(1) an agreement (2) between adjoining landowners, (3) settling 
a boundary that was uncertain or in dispute, and (4) executed 
by actual location of a boundary line.43 In addition to these re-
quirements, many courts, including Utah,44 require mutual ac-
ceptance for a long period of time, typically the same length of 
time required for long-term adverse possession.4* As commenta-
tors have pointed out,46 the stated requirement that the bound-
ary set by agreement must have existed for a long period of time 
effectively removes a major distinction between boundary by 
agreement and boundary by acquiescence. In theory at least, 
39. See generally Browder, supra note 3. This article remains the best exploration 
of these boundary doctrines. 
40. See, e.g., Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979). 
41. See Comment, Built-up Boundaries, supra not* 3, at 293-96. 
42. Oisen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145,147 (1973). 
43. Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 24, 232 P.2d 202, 206 (1951); R CUNNINGHAM, 
supra not* 7, § 11.8, at 766-68; Browder, supra not* 3, at 490-95; Note, Boundaries by 
Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah, 1975 UTAH L REV 221, 221. 
44. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 794 (Utah 1975). 
45. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra not* 7, § 11.8, at 767. 
46. Note, supra note 43, at 222-23. 
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there should be no general time requirement in boundary by 
agreement. 
The boundary by agreement doctrine requires that the 
boundary agreement be in writing to comply with the Statute of 
Frauds because it involves the transfer of title to land.47 To the 
degree the boundary is set on a line that differs from the record-
title line, one of the parties gains title to an additional parcel of 
land at the expense of the other. Yet most boundary-by-agree-
ment situations involve only an oral understanding. To preserve 
oral agreements, some courts have indulged in the fiction that, 
because there is uncertainty, the agreement merely defines the 
actual boundary rather than transferring land from one party to 
another.4* Professor Browder justifies this fiction by arguing that 
boundary agreements are essentially in a unique category in 
which public policy should support a deviation from traditional 
contractual rules such as the Statute of Frauds. Courts, he indi-
cates, have appropriately argued that boundary agreements are 
akin to arbitration agreements and are therefore not subject to 
the Statute of Frauds.49 
Another contractual requirement—that the agreement be 
supported by consideration—is satisfied by the dispute-or-un-
certainty requirement. Each party by agreeing on a boundary 
surrenders its right to assert its position in a more formal con-
text. The compromise position reached "does not create new 
rights, but only establishes existing ones."50 
The legal difficulties associated with boundary by agree-
ment are troubling, but seldom defeat the doctrine's application. 
Th^major q t e t e ^ 
boundary by agreement.51 As mentioned above, most agreements 
made to settle boundaries are oral. Given the "long period of 
time" requirement in Utah, there is little chance that the origi-
nal owners who made the agreement are still in possession of the 
land. Therefore, it is unlikely that they will be available to tes-
tify as to the agreement. Even assuming that the original parties 
are available, it is unlikely that they could remember the alleged 
47. See Comment, Built-up Boundaries, supra note 3, at 293-94. 
48. See, e.g., Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 25, 232 P.2d 202, 206-07 (1951). 
49. Browder, supra note 3, at 490-93. The requirement of dispute or uncertainty it 
necessary to justify this analogy because there cannot be arbitration without a dispute. 
50. Id. at ,491. 
51. See Stith v. Williams, 227 Kan. 32, 35, 605 P.2d 86, 89 (1980); Huggans v. Weer, 
189 Mont. 334, 337-38, 615 P.2d 922, 924-25 (1980). 
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agreement. And if the original parties are still in possession, the 
party adversely affected by the agreement may not want to ad-
mit that he made it. These problems have led the courts to cre-
ate the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
2. Boundary by acquiescence 
According to many courts, the doctrine of boundary by ac-
quiescence is an extension of boundary by agreement. These 
courts presume an agreement once the elements of boundary by 
acquiescence are satisfied.63 Generally, those elements are: (1) 
occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments, 
fences, or buildings, and (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, (3) for a long period of time (4) by adjoining landown-
ers.53 Because it does not require an agreement, this doctrine 
does not have the same contractual underpinnings as boundary 
by agreement. Boundary by acquiescence is actually akin to a 
prescriptive theory in which rights are created by operation of 
law. Thus, it is not necessary in boundary by acquiescence to 
show satisfaction of contractual consideration requirements, and 
the Statute of Frauds does not pose a problem.*4 Rather, the 
doctrine is based on certain policy considerations which are il-
lustrated by the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen v. Park Daugh-
ters Investment Co., where the court said that boundary by ac-
quiescence is based on the policy 
that the peace and good order of society require that there be 
stability . . . in the ownership and occupation of lands . . 
[B]oundary lines which have been long established and ac-
cepted by those who should be concerned should be left undis-
turbed in order to leave at rest matters which may have re-
sulted in controversy and litigation . . . .M 
Because of the differences between these two doctrines, it is not 
necessary to prove the boundary was established by the parties 
as the result of a dispute or uncertainty. 
As shown above, boundary by agreement and by acquies-
cence have several important differences and are based on differ-
52. See Brown, 120 Utah at 25, 232 P.2d at 20?. 
53. See Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979); Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 
2d 282, 284, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966); see also Recent Developments in Utah Law, supra 
note 4, at 193-94. 
54 See Comment, Built-up Boundaries, supra note 3, at 300 
55. 29 Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145, 147 (1973); see also Noi# mpui iiotp I at 
224. 
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ing rationales. However, because the requirements of these two 
boundary resolution doctrines are so similar in some respects, 
the courts have often confused their elements.54 Utah courts 
provide a good example of such confusion in boundary disputes. 
The best case to illustrate this confusion is Madsen v. Clegg.*7 It 
is a particularly important case because it was the first of recent 
cases to make reference to dispute and uncertainty in determin-
ing whether boundary by acquiescence applied.5* Until Madsen, 
the strong opinion of Justice Wolfe in the 1951 case of Brown v. 
Milliner had adequately illuminated that dispute and uncer-
tainty were not necessary elements of the acquiescence doctrine: 
In some of the opinions of this court on the subject of disputed 
boundaries, there are statements to the effect that the location 
of the true boundary must be uncertain, unknown or in dispute 
before an agreement between the adjoining land owners fixing 
the boundary will be upheld, citing Tripp v. Bagley in support 
thereof . . . . But the Tripp case does not require a party rely-
ing upon a boundary which has been acquiesced in for a long 
period of time to produce evidence that the location of the true 
boundary was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That the 
true boundary was uncertain or in dispute and that the parties 
agreed upon the recognized boundary as the dividing line will 
be implied from the parties' long acquiescence.5* 
In Madsen, the court failed to understand this language 
when it said that "[t]he doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
has long been recognized, and when the location of the true 
boundary between adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncer-
tain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, by parol agreement, 
establish the boundary line . . . ."60 The court further reasoned 
that an agreement is implied from acquiescence, therefore re-
quiring uncertainty or dispute.61 
The jcourt in Madsen describes acquiescence in terms of 
boundary by agreement, failing to see the major difference be-
tween the two doctrines. Boundary by agreement requires an ex-
press agreement "between the parties. Since this doctrine is 
56. R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.8, at 768; Note, In Deed!, supra note 4t at 
567-68. 
57. 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981). 
58. Id. at 729. 
59. Brown, 120 Utah at 27» 232 P.2d at 208 (citation omitted). 
60. 639 P.2d at 728. 
61. Id. at 729-30. 
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based on contract law, the agreement can be defeated if there is 
a failure of consideration. If actual knowledge of the boundary 
situation exists, the consideration of the party gaining the land 
fails because he exchanged nothing, not even a nagging uncer-
tainty, to establish the boundary. Therefore, uncertainty or dis-
pute is a necessary element of boundary by agreement. Bound-
ary by acquiescence includes the requirement of acquiescence in 
a marked boundary for a long period of time. This element is 
defeated if the parties had knowledge of the true boundary, be-
cause in that case there is no acquiescence. Since this doctrine is 
based on the operation of law—on the policy of setting bounda-
ries on an equitable basis—uncertainty or dispute is not needed 
to fulfill the requirements of contract law. The court in Madsen 
apparently thought these requirements were interchangeable." 
In Halladay v. Cluff, three years after Madsen v. Cluff, the 
court drew on the language of Madsen in explicitly requiring un-
certainty as an element of boundary by acquiescence.63 The 
opinion in Halladay, with its new requirement, drastically 
reduces the availability of boundary by acquiescence. The court 
set an objective standard for uncertainty or dispute, requiring, 
for example, that deeds be inconsistent or that surveyors disa-
gree on the true boundary.*4 This, of course, places on property 
owners the financial burden of getting their land surveyed. The 
burden is likely to be particularly noticeable when the land is 
transferred, since title insurance does not cover an incorrectly 
placed boundary. 
3 Estoppel 
Under certain facts, a boundary may be established by the 
acts or representations of the original titleholder. Even if the 
record title describes a different boundary line, detrimental reli-
ance on the title owner's misstatements of the boundary location 
may give rise to a boundary by estoppel. If the true owner of the 
62. Id at 730. 
63. Halladay, 685 P.2d 500, 504-05 (Utah 1984). Though Justice Howe concurred in 
Madsen, 639 P.2d at 730 (Howe, J., concurring), he'later explained in his dissenting 
opinion in Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (tJtah 1984) (Howe, J., dissenting), 
that he "regarded the reference in [Madsen] to uncertainty and dispute as surplusage, 
and directed to cases where a boundary is fixed by an express parol agreement as distin-
guished from a case of boundary by acquiescence/' For that reason, he explained, he 
**only concurred in the result m that case M Id. 
64. 685 P.2d at 505-06. 
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property knows that his neighbor is making improvements that 
will abut an existing fence line which the parties have errone-
ously considered as the actual boundary line, then the true 
owner may later be estopped from asserting a boundary claim 
that shows the true line running through his neighbor's newly 
constructed building. The elements of boundary by estoppel are: 
(1) representations by the true owner that the mutually ac-
cepted line is the true boundary; (2) reasonable reliance by the 
neighbor on those representations; and (3) substantial costs det-
rimentally incurred by the neighbor. In most cases, the true 
owner must have known that his representations were erroneous 
or must have been grossly negligent in making them. A court 
with its equity powers can, because of the estoppel, quiet title in 
the neighbor. 
Other equitable grounds may exist for fixing a different 
boundary than the one which the record description would es-
tablish. For instance, the Utah Supreme Court recently used the 
equitable doctrine of reformation of a deed to change the record 
boundary line to correspond with the boundary line intended by 
the parties to the conveyance.6* 
II. APPLICATION OP THE LAW 
The full impact of Utah's relatively drastic departure from 
prior decisions regarding the dispute-or-uncertainty requirement 
in the boundary by acquiescence context is best illustrated by 
applying the above boundary resolution approaches used in 
other jurisdictions to the facts of a recent Utah case. This exer-
cise will show that the Utah Supreme Court has left a major gap 
in its recognition of rights to property held for long periods of 
time. 
A. The Facts 
The fact situation we shall apply comes from a Utah case 
predating the recent flurry of cases in which the Utah Supreme 
Court established its novel approach. Brown v. Peterson Devel-
opment Co.," decided in 1980, involved a large strip of land, 
seventy feet by 969 feet. Since before 1925, an old fence had 
been the practical boundary between the adjoining properties. 
65. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P 2d 360 (Utah 1984). 
66. 622 P2d 1175 (Utah 1980) 
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Plaintiffs' land lay immediately to the west of the fence. How-
ever, their record title, according to a survey made in 1973, en-
ded seventy feet west of the old fence. Plaintiffs and their prede-
cessors had "occupied, possessed and used the land included in 
the disputed strip for more than 40 years."*7 Defendants' land, 
on the east side of the fence, was divided into three parcels. The 
description of parcel one, on the north, overlapped the eastern 
twenty-six feet of the disputed strip. The forty-four feet of land 
between parcel one and the plaintiffs' land was not covered by 
any deed. Parcel two, in the middle, had two descriptions, the 
first overlapping the disputed strip by two feet, and the other 
reaching all the way to the eastern border of the plaintiffs' 
description. The third parcel, on the south, ended at the old 
fence. Land between the plaintiffs' description and parcels two 
and three was also not covered by any deed." No evidence is 
given to show that taxes were paid by either party, but it can be 
presumed that each party paid taxes for the land described in its 
deed and that no one paid taxes on the land not covered by any 
deed. 
The court ruled in Brown that the plaintiffs had good title 
to the disputed strip because their predecessors in interest had 
established title "by operation of law under the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence."0 The opinion offers, however, no 
analysis of the traditional elements of boundary by 
acquiescence. 
One unfamiliar with Utah law might immediately inquire 
why this fact situation was litigated under boundary by acquies-
cence and did not justify application of the more common doc-
trine of adverse possession. The answer is that Utah_does not 
have a long-term adverse possession jloctrine descended from 
the original common law. Twenty years of possession is not suffi-
cient to establish aHverse-possession,titleJn .JJtah.™ The claim-
ants could "only "have qualified^undetJJtah's shortened seven-
year adverse possession rule, and this requires payment of taxes 
foTseven consecutive years.71 The difficulty with this approach, 
however, is that property tax assessments are always based on 
67. Id. at 1176-77. 
68. Id. at 1177. 
69. Id. 
70. See Montgomery, supra note 27, at 301, 310. 
71. UTAH CODE ANN § 78-12-12 (1953). 
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the record metes-and-bounds description.71 Thus, only the party 
who possesses under some document including the same descrip-
tion used by the county property tax assessment records can ob-
tain property by short-term adverse possession.7* 
Several commentators have pointed out that some states 
which apply adverse possession restrictively appear to compen-
sate by applying boundary by acquiescence more liberally.74 
Utah law prior to Halladay v. Cluff fits into this pattern. The 
payment-of-taxes requirement has transformed many claims 
that would be treated under the doctrine of adverse possession 
in other states to a claim relying on one of the boundary-resolu-
tion doctrines in Utah. For that reason, Utah has far more 
boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence cases 
than other jurisdictions in which this fact situation would be a 
typical adverse possession case. 
B. The Application 
The following is an analysis of each boundary dispute doc-
trine as applied to the facts of Brown. 
1. Adverse possession 
Under the long-term adverse possession a successful plain-
tiff must show the fulfillment of the five requirements listed 
above. Since the disputed strip was "occupied, possessed, and 
used . . . for more than forty years" by the plaintiffs, and the 
defendants did not interfere,75 the actual, open and notorious, 
exclusive, and continuous possession requirements are appar-
ently satisfied by the facts of Brown. 
The hostility requirement is not so easily satisfied. Hostility 
usually means possession without the permission of one legally 
72. The lack of a long-term adverse possession doctrine may also create problems 
where valuable improvements have been made in the disputed area by the nonprevailing 
party. In Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981), the court affirmed the lower 
court's order requiring plaintiff to reimburse defendant for the fair value of the shed and 
fruit trees placed on the property by defendant unless plaintiff decided to remove them 
rather than use them. Utah, like many states, has a so-called betterments statute to 
govern the situation where improvements are made by a possessor who later loses a title 
dispute regarding the property on which the improvements were made. UTAH CODE ANN. 
I 57-6-3 (1986). 
73. See Montgomery, supra note 27, at 310-11. 
74. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN. REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND DEVELOP-
MENT 138 (2d ed. 1981). 
75. Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 1980). 
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entitled to possession.7* The facts of Brown do not indicate 
whether there was permission. Thus, some jurisdictions would 
find claimants' position inadequate to establish title by adverse 
possession. These jurisdictions place the burden of showing hos-
tility on the plaintiff, thus they might find that the claimants' 
state of mind was not hostile through the full twenty-year pe-
riod.77 If the fence had been regarded all along as the actual 
boundary line that fit the claimants' record title description or if 
there was no explanation for the possession, then plaintiff could 
not show that he had the requisite hostile intent required for 
title by adverse possession. 
However, other jurisdictions hold that adverse-possession 
claimants should be allowed the benefit of a presumption that 
an otherwise unexplained possession by one who does not have 
record title is a hostile act under the requirements of adverse 
possession.™ In a court that follows this rule, the defendant 
would have to show permission. * 
A question remains as to the land in Brown that was not 
covered by any deed. Apparently neither party ever had legal 
title to that portion of the property. Although the defendants 
are not the proper party from whom to seek title to that land, 
possession by plaintiffs should be sufficient to establish title by 
adverse possession against the title owner, whoever that is (pre-
sumably a prior grantor who never succeeded in conveying away 
the full strip). Because the plaintiffs paid no taxes on the un-
claimed strip, they cannot get title to it through short-term ad-
verse possession. In some states, however, (including California) 
proving that no one else paid taxes on the land satisfies the tax 
requirement in short-term adverse possession situations.7* If 
that rule were applied to the facts in Brown, the plaintiffs would 
get only the land not covered by any deed. Of course, the plain-
tiffs would not get all the land up to the old fence unless another 
doctrine justifying such taking applies, but some land is better 
than none. 
In summary, there is a fundamental difference between ad-
verse possession and boundary by agreement. Adverse posses-
sion is based on a philosophy of a hostile claimant taking the 
76. See supra text Accompanying notes 20-21. 
77. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 761. 
78. Id. at 760. 
79. Gilardi v. Hailam, 30 Cal. 3d 317, 326, 636 P.2d 588, 593, 178 Cal. Rptr. 624, 629 
(1981). 
972 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1986 
land from the owner of record. Boundary by agreement is based 
on an actual agreement. In adverse possession cases, there is no 
agreement because the claimant establishes the boundary with-
out the consent of the other landowner. In fact, proof of an 
agreement would negate the hostility element necessary to show 
adverse possession. Conversely, there is no hostility requirement 
in either boundary-by-agreement or boundary-by-acquiescence 
cases. Notwithstanding this fundamental difference, most 
boundary dispute claimants in Utah are forced into the bound-
ary resolution doctrines because adverse possession doctrines are 
unavailable. 
2. Prescriptive easement 
Attempting to apply the Brown facts to the prescriptive 
easement doctrine will not produce the results desired by most 
property owners. Applying the doctrine will not quiet title in the 
person in possession;*0 it will merely give that person a right to 
use the land in a specific manner. In Brown, the plaintiff's pred-
ecessors used the land only for farming. There were no particu-
lar lanes of ingress or egress. It is unlikely, however, that any 
court will construe farming as a mere use as opposed to posses-
sion of the land.91 Even if a court did, that use is not a viable 
option for plaintiffs since the disputed tract and the adjoining 
tracts are too small for farming.81 Therefore the doctrine of pre-
scriptive easements does not resolve the boundary dispute. 
3. Boundary dispute doctrines 
a. Boundary by agreement. This brings us to the applica-
tion of these facts to the boundary dispute resolution doctrines. 
To satisfy the requirements of boundary by agreement, the 
plaintiff must show that there was uncertainty or dispute about 
the actual boundary (which assumes that the property of the 
parties is adjoining), and that the parties agreed to set the 
boundary at a particular place.83 These requirements can rarely 
be satisfied and are therefore seldom litigated. In Brown, there 
is no evidence of any communication between the parties. Thus, 
boundary by agreement fails. 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
81. See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 8.7, at 452. 
82. Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P 2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 1980). 
83. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
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b. Boundary by acquiescence. Boundary by acquiescence is 
similar to boundary by agreement Nevertheless, it works 
through the operation of law rather than through private agree-
ment.14 The four traditional requirements for boundary by ac-
quiescence are (1) occupation up to a_yisible line marked defi-
nitely by monuments, fences^jorJbuildJngs» (2) acquiescence in 
thelinejisJheJboundary (3) for a long periodjand (4) by adjom-
ingTandownersJlLSince there is no contractual basis!Jbhis doc-
tnne has traditionally presumed agreement by the parties and 
therefore has not required dispute or uncertainty. The courtlh 
BrowJiHeteTmined without discussion that all the requirements 
of boundary by acquiescence were easily met.* 
But Brown may have been decided differently in Utah had 
it arisen after Halladay v. Cluff. The traditional doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence does not apply after Halladay be-
cause the claimants may have had difficulty showing the newly 
required element of uncertainty or dispute at the time the fence 
was erected.17 There is no discussion of this element in Brown, 
but because thelence was so old, it is highly unlikely that evi-
dence jcould have been found to~ illuminate the circumstances 
jurrounding the initial, construction^of the~fence. Under tradi-
tional boundary-by-acquiescence reasoning, an agreement was 
implied from the fact that the fence had been erected and was 
allowed to serve as the practical boundary between the proper-
ties for such a long time. Now, however, Utah courts require an 
objective showing that the implied agreement grew out of a dis-
pute or uncertainty as to"thcTproper location of theboundary. 
The "claimants probablyjwould be unable to carry tfris burden of 
proof. They would in essence have to establish the same factors 
that are required in a boundary-by-agreement case^ which jnore 
than likely would be_ impossible.*1 The end result would be to 
award the seventy-foot disputed strip of property to the party 
whose record title covered the disputed area—the reverse of 
Brown's result 
84. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
85. See supra test accompanying note 53. 
86. Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 1980). 
87. See supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing evidence). 
88. The court in Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah 1984), said that the 
dispute arose when a survey was made. This implies that the dispute requirement will be 
satisfied when parties acquiesce in a boundary for the required time after a survey shows 
a boundary different from the boundary acquiesced in. That kind of reasoning, however, 
contradicts the requirement that the true boundary must not be known by the parties. 
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c. Estoppel. Since the defendant in Brown apparently made 
no actual representations to the plaintiff, the doctrine of estop-
pel would be held inapplicable to the facts of that case. 
III. SURVEY OF CASES 
The Utah Supreme Court has decided Joiir^njboundary.. 
cases in the past severuyears.8* In this section, four of these 
cases are considered as representative of different categories: (1) 
claims that might have satisfied the general adverse possession 
requirements in other states, but were not recognized in Utah 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; (2) claims that 
met the earlier requirements for boundary by acquiescence in 
Utah but would not meet the stricter doctrine announced in 
Halladay u. Cluff; (3) claims following the Halladay decision 
that satisfy boundary by acquiescence requirements; and (4) 
claims following Halladay that were recognized on a theory of 
equitable reformation of deeds because they would not qualify 
under the new acquiescence requirements. By looking at the 
cases chronologically, we gain a perspective of the immediate 
context from which the new Halladay requirement evolved and 
the problem it has created. 
In looking at each case we will consider what the result 
would have been if (1) Utah had an alternative adverse-posses-
sion doctrine eliminating the necessity of tax payments by the 
claimant; (2) the pre-Halladay approach to the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence had not been changed; and (3) the ad-
ditional requirement that boundary by acquiescence arise from a 
dispute or objective uncertainty were applied. 
A. Claims That Failed Under the Pre-Halladay Approach 
In Hales v. Frakes,90 the parties argued over a strip of land 
two rods wide lying between the record title boundary on the 
north and an old fence line on the south. Plaintiff owned prop-
89. These include Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984); Stratford, 689 
P.2d at 360; Halladay v.~UIun7685 P 2d 500 (Utah 1984); Wood v. Myrup, 681 P7R 1255 
(Utah 1984); Condas v. Willesen, 674 P.2d 115 (Utah 1983); Leor^v. Dansje, 639 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1981);Ttfadsen_v. Clegg, 639 P 2d 726 (Utah 1981); Eddington v. CJegg, 639 P.2d 
143 (Utah 198rTTGoo<fman v. Wilkinson, 629 P 2d 447 (Utah 1981); Brown v. Peterson 
Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980); Park v. Farnsworth, 622 P.2d 788 (Utah 1980); 
Monroe v. Harper, 619 P.2d 323 (Utah 1980); Neeley v^Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 
1979);"and Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979). 
90. 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979). 
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erty to the north of the strip in question. Record title to the 
disputed strip was owned by defendant. The trial court refused 
to accept plaintiff's claim that she was entitled to the disputed 
property under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Es-
sentially, the court found that the fence had been built to keep 
cattle from entering plaintiff's property to the north. The fence 
was placed two rods south of the true boundary line because a 
road was to be built to join an already-existing four-rod wide 
road to the west. The fence line was the continuation of a fence 
that ran along the south side of the road on the property to the 
west of the disputed strip. Based on these facts, the supreme 
court agreed that plaintiff had not established boundary by ac-
quiescence because the parties had never intended the fence to 
be the boundary line.*1 
This case would probably have turned out the same both 
before and after Halladay v. Cluff. After Halladay. there would 
probably have been a second element missing. Because the fence 
had been built prior to 1933 by a common owner before the 
larger tract had been subdivided, the boundary was not estab-
lished to settle a dispute or an uncertainty. 
The plaintiff in Hales may, however, have been able to sat-
isfy the requirements of adverse possession if there were a stat-
ute of limitations retaining the common-law approach requiring 
a twenty-year period of possession but making no mention of 
property tax payments.** Certainly the time period here would 
91. Id. at 560. For a case where a possessor failed to establish boundary by acquies-
cence because a line intended to be a boundary was not marked by monuments, see 
Monroe v. Harper, 619 P.2d 323 (Utah 1980). The boundary between the parties' parcels 
in Monroe was set in an old survey and marked with a row of stakes. After the line was 
set, the disputed tract was in the possession of the plaintiff who developed it with a road 
and an orchard. Approximately 25 years after the old survey, the defendant, who owned 
the land on the north, had a new survey made and found the true boundary to be about 
17 feet south of the old line. Sometime between the time these surveys were made, the 
stakes placed during the old survey disappeared. 
The supreme court ruled for the defendant based on one of the elements required 
for boundary by acquiescence—"occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by 
monuments, fences, or buildings."* Id. at 325. The court construed this prerequisite 
strictly, noting that the trees and gravel roadway, though placed within the disputed 
strip, were not located on the boundary line. * 
Obviously the parties knew where the old boundary was marked. Nevertheless, 
through strict construction of the requirement, the court in effect created the same result 
as in Halladay. The parties in Monroe were forced to rely on the deed description de-
spite continuous possession for 25 years. 
92. Another case where 20-year adverse possession may have been satisfied but for 
the tax requirement is Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979). In Neeley, a dispute 
over a seven-acre tract of land involved the doctrine of adverse possession but none of 
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have been sufficient; the defendant did nothing to interfere with 
plaintiff's or her predecessor's use of the property until 1974 
when defendant tore downf the fence that had been constructed 
in 1933. It is unclear, however, whether sufficient adverse hostil-
ity and other elements required for adverse possession could be 
met Apparently the defendant did not use the property north of 
the fence line during that time. If the plaintiff did and that pos-
session was uninterrupted, it is possible that the case would 
have come out in the plaintiffs favor—the reverse of the actual 
result 
B. Claims That Succeeded Under the Pte-Halladay 
Approach 
Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment CoV was a quiet title 
action involving a boundary dispute between parties owning 
property on either side of the Provo River. The defendants re-
ceived an eighty-acre tract of land on the west side of the river 
in 1883. Their deed described the middle of the river as the east-
erly boundary of their tract The plaintiffs received their land 
east of the river three years later. Theirs was also an eighty-acre 
tract, but the deed described the tract by metes and bounds. 
The westerly boundary was a straight line that crossed the river 
at a bend and invaded the land described in the plaintiffs' 
deed.*4 
The basis for the plaintiffs' suit was the Marketable Record 
Title Act** Under this Act, the plaintiffs' deed would have ne-
gated any prior deed. The court ruled, however, that the Mar-
ketable Record Title Act did not apply because it was super-
seded by the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.** The court 
the boundary doctrines. The trial court's ruling in favor of the defendant landowners was 
reversed under the doctrine of adverse possession. Because defendants had never paid 
taxes on the disputed parcel, the requirements of adverse possession had not been satis-
fied although defendants apparently convinced the trial court that other requirements 
for adverse possession had been fulfilled. Id. at 982. Here a party who had used and 
possessed a tract of land for more than 20 years without interruption or objection from 
the record owner was forced into court and ended up losing his claim to the property. If 
Utah had a 20-year statute of limitations for adverse possession claims, this case would 
probably have been decided differently. The policy behind both statutes of limitations 
and adverse possession in reducing conflict and cutting down on litigation was frustrated 
in this case. 
93. 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973). 
94. Id. at 423-24, 511 P.2d at 146-47. 
95. Id. at 424-25, 511 P.2d at 147; see UTAH CODE ANN § 57-9-1 to -10 (1986). 
96. Olsen, 29 Utah 2d at 426, 511 P.2d at 148. 
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held that when a dispute about boundaries between properties 
arises, and a physical boundary has been acquiesced in for a long 
period of time, the conflict is presumed to be reconciled.*7 Al-
though a dispute like the one required in Halladay existed, it 
was probably not a determining factor. The case would have 
come out the same with or without dispute, for uncertainty is 
traditionally presumed to exist when there is long acquiescence 
in the boundary. 
In most cases of boundary by acquiescence, a fence is built 
or a line otherwise marked for some unknown reason by an ear-
lier occupant of the land. The actual boundary is subsequently 
destroyed for one reason or another and the subsequent owners 
acquiesce in the new boundary. In such a case, there will be un-
certainty so long as there is no survey of the land. The Halladay 
case takes away this type of uncertainty by presuming knowl-
edge if a survey is possible. Therefore, the requirement effec-
tively precludes boundary by acquiescence in Utah unless there 
is a defect or mistake showing uncertainty on the deeds them-
selves rather than in the minds of the parties. 
Olsen is perhaps the only case in Utah Jhat ^would have 
clearly~come ourthe"samirbo^^ ?"d-*ft*r Mnllndny -The 
reason for this JSjfclfttiJhg rnmmrm grantor in Jly>_1 ftffinj^H^ a 
mistake on the deeds which created uncertainty and dispute. No 
conduct on the part of the parties could have created uncer-
tainty in the location of the boundary. 
C. Claims That Fail Under the Post-Halladay Approach 
A prime example of a boundary-by-acquiescence case where 
a party lost after Halladay but would have won before is Strat-
ford v. Morgan** In 1951, plaintiffs bought a 4.77 acre tract next 
to Big Cottonwood Creek to farm as a hobby. Shortly thereafter, 
the plaintiffs built a fence along the river. They treated the land 
as their own, using it without interruption until 1979. 
In 1979, the plaintiffs had the land surveyed and found that 
the actual boundary zig-zagged across their fence and created 
two disputed parcels of land on the plaintiffs' side of the river. 
The plaintiffs then presented defendant with quitclaim deeds 
for the disputed parcels. The defendant refused to sign them. 
97 Id at 425, 511 P 2d at 147. 
98 689 P 2d 360 (Utah 1984). 
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Plaintiffs then initiated a quiet title action to get title to the 
land." * 
The court held that the plaintiffs did not establish bound-
ary by acquiescence because there was no uncertainty or dispute 
as to the true boundary, since a survey was available to the par-
ties.100 All the other elements of boundary by acquiescence were 
satisfied. There was insufficient dispute because the dispute did 
not start until the 1979 survey was made.101 As in Olsen, nothing 
the plaintiff could have done would get the disputed parcels 
through any of the boundary resolution doctrines because the 
deeds accurately set forth the boundaries. The plaintiffs were 
therefore forced to give up the land that they had used for 
twenty-eight years. 
D. Claims That Succeed Under the Post-Halladay Approach 
Another approach used by the court since the Halladay de-
cision may provide a judicial alternative to claimants who previ-
ously would have relied on the doctrine of boundary by acquies-
cence. That approach is to permit reformation of a deed in order 
to allow one occupying up to a visible fence to quiet title to the 
disputed parcel even though a survey showed the actual descrip-
tion in the recorded deeds fell short of the fence. In Hottinser v. 
Jensen,10* decided three months after Halladay, the court ig-
TicretTThe parties' arguments regarding boundary by acquies-
99. Id. at 361-62. 
100. For another case dealing with post-Halladay boundary by acquiescence, see 
Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984). In Parsons, both parties claimed a strip 
of land that was about five feet wide and 340 feet long. Title to this strip was quieted in 
the plaintiffs' predecessors in 1939. Defendant, the wrongful possessor, also acquired his 
Und to the west of the plaintiffs' by warranty deed in 1972, and received a quitclaim 
deed for the disputed strip dated 1957. Since at least 1957, a fence existed, running in a 
straight line from north to south starting at the dividing line on the south and serving as 
the boundary. The fence, which placed the disputed strip on the defendant's side, ex-
isted in part until the dispute arose. 
Both parties paid taxes on the property from 1967 to 1976. Plaintiffs paid first in six 
of those years, and in the other three years, both parties paid on the same day with no 
record of who paid first 
The trial court quieted title in the defendant based on boundary by acquiescence. 
The supreme court then reversed. Boundary by acquiescence failed because there was no 
uncertainty or dispute and because it was unclear whether the long time requirement 
was satisfied. Justice Howe dissented because the court did not look at all the facts 
showing the length of possession. Furthermore, he disagreed with the court's use of un-
certainty or dispute as a requirement of boundary by acquiescence. 
101. 689 P.2d at 363-64; see also supra note 88. 
102. 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984). 
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cence. Instead, defendant successfully obtained reformation of 
the deecTto quiet title in her name. 
Defendant and her husband acquired the land in 1945 as 
part of a fifteen-acre parcel. They divided the property in 1958, 
keeping only the parcel which contained their home, yard, and 
garden. The larger parcel that they transferred to new grantees, 
according to the stipulated facts, was intended to be separated 
from the defendant's home property by an existing fence. After 
two further transfers of the larger parcel under the same mutual 
understanding as to the intended boundary line, plaintiffs ob-
tained the property in 1973. Plaintiffs claimed there were no 
representations made to them that tHe fence was tEe boundary 
UneTFinally, in 1980, plaintiffs learned from a survey* thai de-
fendant had been using a ninety-foot strip north of the fence 
line that was described in the deed as plaintiffs9 property. The 
actualjiescription brought the boundary line to within_aJew feet. 
of defendant's house. At that time plaintiffs tore down the previ-
ously erected fence, built a new one at the line described in the 
deed, and brought suit to quiet title to the disputed area. De^ 
fendant's counterclaim asked for reformation of the deed and ti-
^ayigte iJnj ig i i iame^^ 
The court ruled in defendant's favor, ordering reformation 
of the deed and quieting title in defendant. Plaintiffs were not 
able to prevent reformation of the deed because they were 
deemed to have inquiry notice of the mistake in the original 
deed descriptions which negated their claim to be bona fide pur-
chasers without notice. The notice arose from possession and ob-
vious use of the property by defendant and the existence of the 
fence both before and after plaintiffs' purchase.104 
The facts of this case would satisfy general long-term ad-
verse possession requirements, but lack of tax payments by the 
defendant prevented her from gaining title by adverse posses-
sion under Utah's short-term adverse possession statute. It also 
appears that the time period between 1958 and 1980 would have 
been sufficient to satisfy the time requirements to establish 
boundary by acquiescence. The other elements required prior to 
Halladay would also have been met. However, the requirement 
of objective uncertainty probably would not have been satisfied, 
so boundary by acquiescence would not have been available af-
103. Id. at 1272-73. 
104. Id, it 1273-74. 
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ter Halladay.10* Asurvey, the very means by which the discrep-
ancy between the record boundary description and the existing 
fence line was discovered} is a determinative factor inMalladay's 
objective uncertainty requirement10* 
The court could have determined that actions commenced 
and tried before Halladay would be decided free of the newly 
adopted prerequisite for application of boundary by acquies-
cence by refusing to give Halladay retroactive effect. It was un-
necessary to reach that issue, however, because the case pro-
vided a sufficient alternative basis for decision. 
The reformation-of-deed approach may be suitable in sev-
eral other boundary dispute situations. However, in the typical 
case the original grantor or grantee of the deed first incorporat-
ing the challenged description will not be a party in the law suit. 
Evidence and proof sufficient to permit a court to order reforma-
tion of a deed would be difficult if not impossible to discover. 
The understandings and intentions regarding boundary lines are 
generally not easy to reconstruct107 These realities regarding the 
difficulty of accurately deciphering events from the distant past 
are part of the theoretical basis for prescriptive theories. Acts by 
the parties, in the form of long-term, uninterrupted possession, 
are better and more reliable forms of evidence as to the intent of 
the parties regarding the practical location of boundaries. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The best solution to theJLJtah scheme of..protection.ioiLpar: 
ties in long-jterm possession^oCproperty Js_ jiot to tinker_with 
boundary-by:jicquie.SiQfence^ pcinciples_but to amende the_statej5 
adverse-possession rules.I0* The state should retain its current 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
106. See Halladay v. duff, 685 P.2d 500, 507 (Utah 1984). 
107. See Neeley v. Kelach, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979). In Neeley, a similar issue of 
mutual mistake was argued. In that case, although the original parties were present, the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of 
mutual mistake which would justify the ruling that the original deed to defendants 
should be reformed to include the disputed tract 
A similar problem arises in boundary by agreement. See supra text accompanying 
note 51. 
108. A bill proposed in the 1987 General Session of the Utah Legislature attempt to 
overturn the effect of Halladay v. Cluff. Senate Bill No. 120, Boundary By Acquiescence, 
adding UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40a-l to -5. The bill introduces a distinction between a 
"marked boundary" and the "actual boundary'*. A marked boundary may become the 
basis for a quiet title action if: 
(1) the marked boundary has been in place for 20 years or more; 
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seven-year statute of limitations based on payment of property 
taxes. In addition, however, the legislature should adopt an al-
ternative statute of limitations requiring a longer period—up to 
a maximum of twenty years—for claims that cannot qualify for 
the shorter seven-year period. 
This approach is the appropriate means of protecting" per^ 
sons in possession as quickly as is reasonably possible"109 in the 
limitation porio3irVro^ 'Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the curative and limi-
tation provisions of the Uniform Simplification of Land Trans-
fers Act.110 It is significant that this Act, which is designed to 
strengthen and streamline record titles generally,111 nonetheless 
liberally enforces the rights of persons in possession. Yet, the 
Utah Supreme Court, when faced with the same competing poli-
cies—record title compared to rights springing from long-term 
possession—leaned heavily in the other direction in order to 
strengthen the position of record title and the recording system 
generally. This attention to record title is too legalistic because 
it ignores generations of deference to the practical realities rep-
resented by the unchallenged possessory conduct of another 
The Utoh^§^j i^me,CQurt.has eliminatedjeur-impottaALdoc-
trine in its arsenaL for reaching equitable results incases based 
on possession.111 It may not be fiHly^saSsBeSPwith ^he an-
nounced principles and the apparently inconsistent results flow-
ing from the old doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. But that 
liberality in applying this boundary doctrine was justified be-
cause it was the last route of escape for a party that had exer-
cised significant possessory claims to property for substantial 
periods of time.11* ^ ™ 
The state legislature should recognize the unfortunate situa-
tion that has "now been created. It should be willing to close the 
(2) there is no evidence that during the 20-year period any of the owners of the 
properties adjoining the marked boundary ever asserted that the marked 
boundary was other than the actual boundary; and 
(3) all owners have used their properties only up to the marked boundary dur-
ing the 20-year period. 
Id. at § 78-40a-2. 
109. UNIFORM SIMPLIFICATION or LAND TRANSFSBS ACT $ 3-404 comment (1977). 
110. Id. i 3-404. 
111. See id prefatory note. 
112. See Halladay v. Cluff, 6S5 P 2d 500, 514-15 (Utah 1984) (Howe, J., dissenting) 
(An appendix lists cases supporting the old boundary-by-acquiescence doctrine.). 
113. Id. at 509. 
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hole thatjta own unreasonable limitation j)iustatutes of limita-
tions has created. It should provide a statutory means of block-
ing a record title owner who has been less than diligent in pro-
tecting his rights in the face of another's possessory activities. 
There appears to be no special reason why the age-old right to 
perfect adverse possession title should be limited to claimants 
who pay property taxes on the disputed property. Boundary-dis-
pute cases in particular make the tax payment requirement un-
reasonable.114 There should be a residuary statute of limitations 
for a longer period of time to cover all those claimants who do 
not qualify for any shortened time period. Payment of taxes and 
making claims under color of title are justifiable grounds for giv-
ing a claimant special treatment by allowing a shorter possessory 
period,116 but Utah's approach to statutes of limitations is inade-
quate if it does not cover parties who fit into one of the short-
ened time periods. 
